

CLR

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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

Purpose and Scope

The *Christian Libertarian Review* (CLR) is an open access academic publication founded in 2017 by the 501(c)(3) Libertarian Christian Institute (LCI). The purpose of the CLR is to foster intellectual dialogue, exploration, and research surrounding the relationship between Christianity and libertarian thought. As an interdisciplinary journal, contributions may span into fields of philosophy, political philosophy, theology, ethics, law, economics, anthropology, history, social studies and similar disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.

CLR is blind-reviewed by a team of scholars with terminal degrees in their respective fields. Each annual volume contains full-length articles and critical book reviews. Some accepted articles/reviews may be published online prior to the release date of the volume in which they appear. Contributors come from a wide variety of backgrounds and typically have graduate education and/or professional experience in the business world. All contributors identify as “Christian” (as outlined in the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds) and “libertarian.” The intended reader audience is generally upper-class undergraduate or graduate level.

General Submission Information

Submissions (articles to editor@christianlibertarianreview.com; book reviews to bookreviews@libertarianchristians.com) should be of academic quality and tone, and should generally conform to the standards laid out within the *Chicago Manual of Style: Sixteenth Edition* supplemented by *The SBL Handbook of Style for Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines: Second Edition* for ancient text citation and abbreviation. All submissions will be evaluated through blind peer-review and edited for publication. The initial review process generally takes a minimum of two months. Some published articles/reviews may appear online before others in the same volume have been published; all such “pre” publications are at the discretion of the General Editor and have no set schedule. Otherwise, complete volumes of the journal are released each July 1. More information can be found at christianlibertarianreview.com.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

It is with great pleasure and joy that I write this preface to the second volume of the *Christian Libertarian Review*. Feedback from the first has been overwhelmingly positive, and we have a number of new contributors for a solid and fascinating lineup of articles and reviews.



We also have two new Associate Editors, Dr. Deirdre McCloskey and Dr. Alexander Salter. Dr. McCloskey is the Emerita Distinguished Professor of Economics and of History, and Professor of English and of Communication at the University of Illinois (Chicago) and a visiting Professor at a number of other prominent institutions. In addition to being the author of the acclaimed three-volume “The Bourgeois Era” trilogy, Dr. McCloskey has authored over a dozen books, over three hundred articles on economic theory, economic history, philosophy, rhetoric, feminism, ethics, and law, and recently served as a Distinguished Affiliated Fellow of the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Mercatus Institute) and Inaugural Michael Polanyi Visiting Scholar of Ideas and Innovation (Charles Koch Institute).

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at George Mason University, a project fellow with the Atlas Sound Money Project, and an associate editor of the *Journal of Private Enterprise*.

The first article of our new volume comes from the history doctoral student Angela Tharp, which is entitled "Understanding the Anti-Suffragists as Christians: The Beliefs of the Men and Women Opposed to Woman's Suffrage From a Religious Point of View." She looks at the various dynamics of how Christians thought about women's suffrage. Like any good work of history, Tharp draws on a rich variety of primary and secondary sources and connects key observations to our experience in the present.

The second article, "The Constitution of Economic Expertise" by Alexander Salter, steps back to look at how the modern discipline of economics is conceived. He examines the mechanics and motivations for the discipline and how they are skewed by the desire to be approved by the "managerial-administrative state." Those who are convinced that economics is more or less an ideologically-neutral extension of mathematics will have much to think about.

The third article by Reverend Mark Chenoweth, "Origen's Interpretation of Violence in the Book of Joshua," performs an incisive study of one early church father's attempt at reconciling Old Testament violence with broader theological themes. Though Origen has received modern criticism for his "allegorical" method of interpretation, Chenoweth finds Origen's insight to be valuable and instructive.

The volume then concludes with ten thoughtful and well-written book reviews from a wide variety of contributors.

With much appreciation to the readers, LCI, and the rest of the *CLR* team, I hope you find this volume worth all the time and effort it took in producing it.

Jamin Andreas Hübner
Rapid City, SD
July 1, 2019

UNDERSTANDING THE ANTI-SUFFRAGISTS AS
CHRISTIANS: THE BELIEFS OF THE MEN AND
WOMEN OPPOSED TO WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE
FROM A RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW

Angela Tharp¹

Abstract: This article analyzes the anti-suffrage movement from a Christian point of view. Most analyses of this movement have looked to its political aspects and the class interests of the anti-suffragists for answers; indeed, many historians have drawn the conclusion that anti-suffragists’ motivations were largely class-based. If historians mention religion at all, it normally occupies a very marginal role in their analysis. This article illustrates the fact that many of the anti-suffragists’ opinions concerning men’s and women’s roles, the nature of the family unit, and even economics may be traced to Christian traditions and were common to Christians during the time period in which most organized anti-suffragist activity occurred (which was roughly from 1880-1920). The article specifically looks at Catholic, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian anti-suffragists.

Keywords: Christianity, women’s suffrage, American religion, Protestant history, feminism

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I. INTRODUCTION

The story of woman's suffrage in America is probably somewhat familiar to many students of history. Beginning in the nineteenth-century, supporters of woman's suffrage lobbied, marched, and engaged in picketing and hunger strikes as part of a long campaign to win the vote for women. Some of the suffragists pursued state ratification; they were able to obtain full suffrage for women in more than a dozen states and partial suffrage in others before the nineteenth amendment was passed by the House and Senate. Then, of course, thirty-six states ratified the amendment; at this point, at least theoretically, women everywhere in America could vote, or so it would seem.² The whole process took place over a span of some eighty years, and more than a little bit of ink has been spilt discussing the time and the depth of this struggle. However, perhaps in their zeal to emphasize the efforts of the suffragists, some have failed to contemplate at least one of the reasons for the protracted battle: a fairly large number of people were not on board with woman's suffrage until the final days of the fight, and some were not on board even after the fight was over.

These were the anti-suffragists, or remonstrants, as they were often called—protectors, they believed, of traditional motherhood, hearth, and home. Remonstrants disagreed with the suffrage movement for many reasons, but protection of the home and motherhood loomed large in their arguments. However, even though there have been several well-written histories covering the anti-suffrage movement, some historians seem to have quickly passed over the roots that undergirded these beliefs. Perhaps this is because these roots were often religiously oriented. Indeed, most of the primary anti-suffrage arguments from this time period, as one might

² Of course, many African American women, the poor, and some other groups were often disenfranchised long after 1920. See Sara M. Evans, *Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997), 169-72; 270-1.

imagine, were theological or religious in nature, or, perhaps more specifically, Christian. Their proponents claimed that

God had ordained man and woman to perform different functions in the state as well as in the home, or that he had intended woman for the home and man for the world.³

Yet, in many of the histories of anti-suffrage, the Christian religion’s role in the movement is treated very superficially—if it is discussed at all.⁴

However, since the “primary” arguments for the anti-suffragists’ positions came from Christianity, a more detailed assessment of the origins of these ideologies seems relevant and necessary.⁵ It also seems necessary given the fact that various explanations for the anti-suffragists’ sentiments appear to fall short in many ways. It has often been argued, for example, that the protection of class interests played a primary role in the position these groups and their leaders held with regard to suffrage; if suffrage was voted in, these people, who were the leading philanthropists and the business and agricultural elites of their day, would be replaced by professional social workers. They would no longer be necessary to society, and, of course, other reforms, such as child labor and perhaps higher wages for workers, would affect their economic interests as proprietors. Some have also simply labeled these people as “Republicans,” which is questionable as well. For one, white southern anti-suffragists would have been Democrats. Secondly, while the ideologies of the antis may have resembled modern Republicanism in some ways, one must remember that

³ Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement: 1890-1920* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981), 16.

⁴ The same is true for the treatment of religion in the history of feminist thought. This habitual ignorance of religion and theology’s role is highlighted in Jamin Andreas Hübner’s review of Rosemarie Tong and Tina Botts, *Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction*, 5th ed. (New York: Westview Press, 2018) in *Priscilla Papers* 32:3 (2018): 29-30.

⁵ Kraditor, *Ideas*, 15.

at this time, northern Republicans did support some reform movements, so anti-suffragism would not have completely fit into this paradigm.

Of course, many historians, like Susan Marshall, have pointed out that the anti-suffragists' beliefs stemmed from "separate spheres"—the ideology that posited that men best functioned in the public sphere, which includes the political realm, while women best functioned in the private, domestic sphere.⁶ One of the biggest promoters of separate spheres, Catharine Beecher, claimed that woman must "take a subordinate station" and assume a domestic role for the good of society; indeed, these ideas appear to be at the very heart of the anti-suffragists' beliefs and values.⁷ However, even the doctrine of separate spheres does not explain the anti-suffragists' positions concerning economics, which were overwhelmingly laissez-faire. It may be argued that even though there may not have been a system or ideology that provided a basis for all of the anti-suffragists' beliefs, there may be an explanation that accounts for their economic ideas and even, to an extent, for separate spheres. Even though they may have campaigned against suffrage partly due to their economic interests, white, Christian anti-suffragists also disparaged suffrage because they sincerely believed it to be out of step with God's design for women and the family.

Additionally, many late-nineteenth and early twentieth century Christians tended to believe in laissez-faire economics (or a system in which the government did not intervene in the economic market) and disparaged socialism. One could reasonably expect Christian anti-suffragists to maintain similar beliefs. Such sentiments were not just common fare for the wealthy; they were commonplace among most believers at this time.

⁶ Susan Marshall, *Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 109.

⁷ Catharine Beecher, *Treatise on Domestic Economy for the Use of Young Ladies at Home and at School* (Boston: T.H. Webb and Co., 1843), 26; see also Kathryn Kish Sklar, *Catharine Beecher: A Study in Domestic Economy* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1976), 158.

Religious arguments, then, appear to have informed some of the ideologies antis had concerning women’s roles and the family unit, as well as their rhetoric and beliefs about socialism, philanthropy, social welfare, and the care of the poor—subjects that suffragists thought they could affect by holding the ballot. Some of the arguments and activities of some of the members of three of the largest Christian groups that opposed suffrage—Catholics, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians—bear this out.

II. ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND WOMEN’S ROLES

Historian Thomas J. Jablonsky claims that Roman Catholics were the most unified national religious body of anti-suffragists. They were also, quite possibly, the most dogmatic when it came to their ideologies concerning women’s roles.⁸ According to Aileen Kraditor, the underpinnings of most anti-suffragists’ ideologies were theological, biological, and sociological.⁹ This is a fair and useful way to classify anti-suffrage arguments, so it will sometimes be mentioned here. However, with Catholicism, as with other forms of Christianity, it should be understood that there are deep doctrinal beliefs that undergird these ideologies.

The Church’s hostility toward woman’s suffrage was deeply rooted in its history and theology, going back to Augustine.¹⁰ Although disputed

⁸ Thomas J. Jablonsky, *The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 1868-1920* (New York: Carlson, 1994), 54; see also Lois Banner, *Women in Modern America: A Brief History*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 88.

⁹ Since Kraditor’s *Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement*, other scholars such as Susan E. Marshall and Jeanne Howard have created alternative categories and even subcategories for these arguments. Elna Green claims she prefers the simplicity of Kraditor’s classification system; indeed, this system appears to be the simplest and the most concise. See Elna C. Green, *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997), 225.

¹⁰ Rosemary Radford Reuther, “Contraception, Religion in Public Policy, Essay,” in *Conscience Magazine* (May 2006), accessed July 6, 2017. http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/issues_publications/women-reproductive-rights-and-the-church-2/.

by some modern feminists, certain Catholic commentators such as Fr. Edmund Hill argue that while Augustine believed that women were created in God's image, the early church father also held that men's and women's bodies symbolized different phenomena. According to Hill, Augustine believed that since God could only create men and women in a bodily form, He created them to image the human mind, which has two functions: males represented rationality or the contemplation of the eternal; women represented the body and the material world, or the management of temporal affairs.¹¹ Males and females also played different roles, with men as tillers of the soil and women as "helpers" to men through the bearing of children.¹² In 1880, Leo XIII declared in the encyclical *Arcanum* that the husband was the "ruler of the family and the head of the wife."¹³ The "husband ruling," Leo's encyclical declared, "represents the image of Christ and the wife obedient the image of the Church" with "Divine love at all times setting the standard of duty."¹⁴ The Catholic Church has declared that it has "always" maintained this position, which Leo repeatedly emphasized during the 1880s, and the Church adheres to this position today.¹⁵

Catholic priests were some of the first to articulate theological, biological, and sociological arguments per their doctrine concerning women and voting—although they usually claimed that the Catholic Church took no position regarding politics. As James J. Kenneally

¹¹ Fr. Edmund Hill, O.P. "Talk given at the Robert Hugh Benson Graduate Society at Fisher House" (Cambridge: MA, 1994), accessed July 26, 2017.

<https://www.its.caltech.edu/~nmcenter/women-cp/augustin.html>; see also St. Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, Johannes Quasten, ed., trans. John Hammond Taylor, S.J., *Ancient Christian Writers*, Vol. I (New York, Newman Press, 1982), 98-9.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Leo XIII, quoted in Augustin Rossler and William Fanning, "Woman," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, New Advent (New York: Robert Appleton Company) accessed July 27, 2017, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15687b.htm>

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

explains, John J. Williams, the Archbishop of Boston, commented on the suffrage issue to the *Boston Advertiser* in 1885, foreshadowing the position of the Catholic attitude toward suffrage “for the next thirty-five years.”¹⁶ While the Church, Williams claimed, did not involve itself in political questions, since he was being asked for his opinion on the matter, the archbishop asserted that “women should not take part in politics.”¹⁷ Williams added that there were “two distinct spheres of activity, one for each sex. That of woman centered around her position in perpetuating the race” and as the nucleus of the “society of the family.” He continues: “This was a system designed by God, revealed by a Pauline interpretation of scripture and the natural law, re-enforced by biological differences, and supported by a historical tradition which proclaimed the political supremacy of man.”¹⁸ Adding the “sociological” argument, Williams proclaimed that the participation of either sex in activities which properly belonged to the other sex was “unnatural, a threat to universal order.”¹⁹

Other priests’ and bishops’ arguments were similar. In Cincinnati, Cardinal Gibbons, like Williams, asserted that he did not take a position regarding suffrage, but claimed that woman’s “proper sphere” was in the home.²⁰ Christianity, he averred, had exalted her to this, setting her as the equal peer of man. If a woman were to participate in politics, the cardinal warned, she might neglect her children—and her husband would suffer from her absence.²¹ Even worse, he lamented, she would surely “carry

¹⁶ James J. Kenneally, “Catholicism and Woman Suffrage in Massachusetts,” *The Catholic Historical Review*, vol. 53:1 (Apr., 1967): 43-57.

¹⁷ Interview of Williams in the *Boston Advertiser*, quoted in Katherine E. Conway and Mabel W. Cameron, *Charles Francis Donnelly, a Memoir* (New York, 1909), 30.

¹⁸ This is Kenneally’s summary of the position as described in the *Massachusetts Catholic press*; see Kenneally, 43.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

away on her some of the mud and dirt of political contact.”²² William O’Connell of Maryland took a similar position, as did the Reverend J.P. Bodfish, a priest from Canton, Massachusetts. Most Catholic priests also took the opinion that although some women’s success in the working world was not necessarily wrong, professionalism was the province of the exceptional woman. Katherine E. Conway, a Catholic novelist, apparently agreed with this opinion concerning herself.²³

According to Kenneally, the Boston clergy’s attitudes were more aggressive than many others in their profession. But they were reflective of the typical American Catholic sentiment of the time.²⁴ As late as 1900, the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) could list only six Catholic clergymen who supported woman suffrage. Elizabeth Cady Stanton listed the persuasion of Catholic women to the cause of suffrage as one of her organization’s most important tasks.²⁵

III. CATHOLICS, SUFFRAGE, AND ETHNICITY: STILL ABOUT RELIGION

Some historians have pointed to cultural reasons for Catholics’ aversion towards suffrage, such as the protection of ethnicity by mostly Catholic immigrant groups, like the Polish, the Irish, and the Italians.

Indeed, according to Jablonsky, some of these immigrants saw suffragists as “dangerous radicals” who threatened to destroy their

²² Cardinal Gibbons, quoted in Victoria Pruin DeFrancisco and Catherine Helen, *Communicating Gender Diversity: A Critical Approach* (Sage Publishing: University of Northern Iowa, 2007), 42.

²³ Kathleen Sprows Cummings, *New Women of the Old Faith: Gender and American Catholicism in the Progressive Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2009), 170.

²⁴ Kenneally, 47; see also Lois B. Merk, “Massachusetts and the Woman-Suffrage Movement” (PhD dissertation, Radcliffe, 1961), 184.

²⁵ Kenneally, 47; see also Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, *History of Woman Suffrage*, Vol. IV (New York: Source Book Press, 1970), 1079-80.

customs and the traditional family unit.²⁶ However, Jablonsky also asserts that this angst was rooted in these peoples’ identities as Catholics, not so much in their identities as immigrants.²⁷ Kathleen Sprows Cummings claims that particularly after 1900, as more people of Irish or Italian heritage, for example, came to be born in the United States rather than in their native homelands, these people’s identities became religious in nature, not ethnic as much.²⁸ This is, among other things, evident in the writings of Katherine Conway and Margaret Buchanan Sullivan, an Irish nationalist. The terms “Irish” and “Catholic,” in other words, came to be at least convertible in nature.²⁹ It should also be noted that, according to some research done by Eileen McDonagh and H. Douglas Price, the Irish were apparently only opposed to suffrage to a certain degree; with Italian Catholics, there was apparently no significant opposition.³⁰ It would appear, then, that many of these people were organizing to protect their religious interests, or that at least their ethnic identity had become intertwined with their religious identity.³¹ As a case in point, many Protestant women apparently campaigned for the vote as an effort to limit the voting potential of *Catholics*, not so much immigrant groups per se.³²

Germans appear to have been an exception: they did, indeed see woman’s suffrage as a threat not only to their religious identity, but to their ethnic identity as well. In a study of Nebraska Catholics, Laura McKee Hickman claims that those of German heritage in Nebraska saw suffragists as a threat to their culture—particularly those suffragists who advocated prohibition. Many German immigrants carried on traditions

²⁶ Jablonsky, *The Home*, 66.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁸ Cummings, *New Women*, 168.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Eileen McDonagh and H. Douglas Price, “Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910-1918,” *The American Political Science Review* 79:2 (June, 1985): 430.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Mary E. Blake, “The Trouble in Boston Schools,” *Catholic World*, XLVIII (1888-89), 501-09.

such as brewing beer at home and often operated successful breweries; Marshall notes that the German-American Alliance worked with brewery organizations to actively campaign against prohibition—and woman’s suffrage.³³ However, some Nebraska German Catholics apparently voted against woman’s suffrage for religious reasons as well; many of them joined the national Central-Verein, an organization which sought to undermine the Americanization of the Catholic Church.³⁴ For Nebraska Germans, be they Catholic or not, suffrage was part and parcel of the Americanization of their culture. Besides fighting to protect their right to consume, produce, and sell alcohol, Germans wanted to preserve their language, which they campaigned to have included in public school instruction.³⁵ They also felt that suffrage threatened German family values, which championed domestic roles for women.³⁶ According to Hickman, Germans made up more than fifty-four percent of Nebraska’s foreign-born population; in 1882, in precincts that were fifty percent or more German, when the time came to vote concerning woman’s suffrage, they voted it down ten to one.³⁷

Besides Catholics’ conservative views regarding the roles of women, they organized against the suffrage movement for other causes that similarly stemmed from their religious beliefs. For one, Catholics attacked suffrage and feminism as allies of socialism. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII denounced socialism as a great evil in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. Socialism, he claimed, gives credence to the material world only, punishes the virtue of thrift, advocates a government-sanctioned theft of private

³³ Marshall, *Splintered Sisterhood*, 68-9.

³⁴ See Laura McKee Hickman, “Thou Shalt Not Vote: Anti-Suffrage in Nebraska: 1914-1920” Nebraska State Historical Society, accessed July 8, 2017. <http://www.nebraskahistory.org/publish/publicat/history/full-text/NH1999Anti-Suffrage.pdf>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

property, and can even promote a type of class warfare.³⁸ All of this is antithetical to biblical teaching concerning the laws of God and nature; man has a right to the fruits of his own labor and to the private property he gains from it.³⁹ To the extent that Catholics were listening to their Pope at this time, socialism was out of the question as an economic system. The Pope implied that besides seeking to equalize people’s labor, including the labor of men and women, socialism has also sought to displace the family as the central unit of society. Government or the community would act as the father, the natural provider for the family, according to Pope Leo; this was unnatural—and wrong.⁴⁰ Socialism was, therefore, also out of the question for Catholics since it was often an ally of woman’s suffrage and the feminist movement.⁴¹

Some Catholic writers saw this connection and pointed it out. During the Nebraska campaign, a woman named Mary Nash Crofoot declared in a pamphlet she circulated entitled “Lest Catholic Men Be Misled” that socialists are unanimous for woman suffrage, “because they hope by the women’s vote to help themselves politically.”⁴² That suffrage would help women, she concluded, was a fallacy; only danger would ensue if suffrage passed. She also went on to say that socialists “are opposed to anything

³⁸ Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, Papal Encyclicals Online, May 15, 1891, accessed July 24, 2017, <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/113rerum.htm>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid; in *The History of Woman’s Suffrage*, the writers admit that the socialists were always ‘steadfastly for woman’s suffrage’ and that the suffrage issue was always in their platforms. See *History of Woman Suffrage*, Vol. V, 362; Anne Myra Benjamin also admits that the Socialist Party was the only party to admit women into membership and to elect them as leaders. See Anne Myra Benjamin, *A History of the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895-1920* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 161. The “moderate” WCTU leader, Frances Willard, was also a socialist, and campaigned for suffrage partly for this reason. See Frances Willard, *Let Something Good Be Said: Speeches and Writings of Frances E. Willard*, eds. Carolyn de Swarte Gifford and Amy R. Slagell (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2007), 166.

⁴² Crofoot, quoted in Hickman, 59, accessed July 8, 2017.

Christian” and “they bitterly hate and attack Catholics.”⁴³ Caroline Corbin, a Catholic novelist and a longtime member of the Illinois Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, invariably linked suffrage with socialism. If passed, suffrage would result in socialism and subsequently the destruction of private property, the loosening of the bonds of marriage, and the destruction of the home.⁴⁴ The Bishop of Fall River Massachusetts, William Stang, agreed: woman trying to become man’s “equal” under suffrage and socialism was a mistake and would only reduce woman to the barbarism she lived under before Christianity elevated her to the queenly duties of mother and homemaker.⁴⁵

According to Kenneally, Catholics also often opposed suffrage because they associated it with the birth control movement. Due in part to the efforts of the Massachusetts Association Opposed to the Further Extension of Suffrage to Women (MAOFESW), birth control became conflated with the suffrage movement. The MAOFESW was established by a group of women who had originally organized as remonstrants against the introduction of women’s municipal suffrage in Boston. Although it was not established by Catholics, some Catholics were persuaded and joined its ranks.⁴⁶ It is true that Margaret Sanger, the founder of the modern Planned Parenthood, supported suffrage herself, believing it might lead to changes in the laws in states that prohibited birth control; some suffragists, apparently, returned the favor by supporting Sanger’s National Birth Control League.⁴⁷

Mary Ware Dennett, one of the organizers and the president of the League in 1915, had formerly been a field secretary of the Massachusetts

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Caroline Corbin, *Woman Under Socialism* (Chicago: The Truth Society, 1903), 7, 18; see also James Kenneally, *The History of American Catholic Women* (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 133-4.

⁴⁵ William Stang, *Socialism and Christianity* (New York: Benzinger Bros., 1905), 20, 178.

⁴⁶ A gentlemen’s group of remonstrants, Massachusetts Man Suffrage, formed at the same time and cooperated with the women’s group. See Marshall, *Splintered Sisterhood*, 23, 25.

⁴⁷ Kenneally, “Catholicism and Woman Suffrage,” 44.

Woman Suffrage Association and later a corresponding secretary of NAWSA.⁴⁸ The MAOFESW alerted the public to the “sinister association” between these two groups.⁴⁹ The MAOFESW claimed that birth control was being taught to young factory girls, and successfully prevented suffragists from holding a birth control meeting in the Medford library.⁵⁰

It should not come as a surprise, then, that some Catholics conflated suffrage with the birth control movement and that Sanger was heckled publicly for the first time at a meeting in Boston by David Goldstein, a convert to Catholicism and an anti-suffragist.⁵¹

There are many other examples from the time period in which Catholic leaders and lay people sought to influence the political process regarding suffrage. In 1871, women’s anti-suffrage mobilization officially began when

nineteen women published a petition to the U.S. Congress remonstrating against votes for women in the editorial pages of the popular Godey’s *Lady’s Book and Magazine*.⁵²

At least two of the signers, Ellen Ewing Sherman (wife of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman) and Madeline Vinton Dahlgren, the reputed author of the petition, were Catholics.⁵³ John Boyle O’Reilly, editor of the Boston Catholic newspaper the *Pilot* and the Reverend Joshua P. Bodfish, chancellor of the Archdiocese of Boston, were among some of the signatories to the first male anti-woman suffrage petition.⁵⁴ In 1886, the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ See Margaret Sanger, *My Fight for Birth Control* (New York: Farrar-Rinehart, 1931), 73, 103-4.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁵¹ Kenneally, “Catholicism and Woman Suffrage,” 45.

⁵² Marshall, *Splintered Sisterhood*, 19-20

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Kenneally, “Catholicism and Woman Suffrage,” 45; see also *The Boston Herald*, February 15, 1885.

opponents of woman suffrage prepared a pamphlet which they distributed to every member of the Massachusetts legislature; they then circulated these throughout the state.⁵⁵ One of Bodfish's sermons and an appeal by O'Reilly was included.⁵⁶ In 1895, both sexes were given the opportunity to express their opinions regarding the desirability of woman's suffrage; opponents established the Man Suffrage Association so that a large "no" vote might be obtained.⁵⁷ Some of the members of this group included Bodfish, Charles F. Donnelly, a Catholic legal counselor, and John F. Fitzgerald, a Congressman whose grandson would later become the president of the United States.⁵⁸ The *Pilot* frequently espoused anti-suffrage sentiment with O'Reilly as editor; he was succeeded by James Jeffrey Roche, an Irish Catholic poet and journalist. He was subsequently succeeded by Conway, who frequently used her pen to attack suffrage. Conway also disparaged suffrage in the *Boston Globe*, and the *Catholic World*, as well as in her own book, *The Christian Gentlewoman and the Social Apostolate*.⁵⁹

IV. PRESBYTERIANS AND EPISCOPALIANS: OLD STOCK AMERICAN PROTESTANT ANTI-SUFFRAGISTS AND BELIEVERS IN "VOLUNTARY" REFORM

Like Catholics, many Presbyterians and Episcopalians tended to be anti-suffrage. However, unlike Catholics, who were usually coming from a marginal position (often as recent immigrants and as non-Protestants), these mainline Protestants hailed from mainstream America.

⁵⁵ Kenneally, "Catholicism and Woman Suffrage," 46.

⁵⁶ The Rev. J.P. Bodfish, "Woman Suffrage, Unnatural and Inexpedient," (Boston: MAOFESW, 1886), 26.

⁵⁷ Kenneally, "Catholicism and Woman Suffrage," 46.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See Conway, *Boston Globe*, February 17, 1907; see also Conway, "Symposium—Woman Question Among Catholics," *Catholic World*, LVII (1893): 669-84; see also Conway, *The Christian Gentlewoman and the Social Apostolate* (Boston, 1904), 14, 25.

Interestingly, most Protestant anti-suffragists wanted little to do with Catholics, even though most of their Roman neighbors were often also anti-suffragists. Protestant “antis” tolerated such Catholics, according to Jablonsky, much like “dirty-faced urchins.”⁶⁰ Most of the Presbyterian and Episcopalian anti-suffragists were, according to Elna Green and Jablonsky, of old “Anglo-Saxon” stock, with roots taking them back to the British Isles.⁶¹ Also, even though, as a Mrs. John Balch, the president of the Massachusetts Association claimed, “authors, doctors, lawyers, teachers, librarians, newspaper writers, stenographers...cooks, housemaids” and “nurses”⁶² could be named among those opposed to suffrage, the typical anti-suffragist *leader* came from “a segment of the population with strong ties to patterns of behavior that...provided them with status and security.”⁶³

This was the case with anti-suffragists everywhere, apparently. Most of the remonstrant women did not work; their husbands and remonstrant men typically dominated professions like large scale farming and the textile mill and railroad businesses in the south; northern male remonstrants and remonstrant husbands typically were in business, banking, or politics.⁶⁴ It certainly could be argued that their affiliations with the Presbyterian and the Episcopalian churches, normally the religions of choice or family heritage for wealthier, more landed Protestants, are incidental—a byproduct of their class status and ethnic affinity.⁶⁵ Green, Marshall, and Jablonsky point to these people’s class

⁶⁰ Jablonsky, *The Home*, 69.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶² Mrs. John Balch, “Who the Massachusetts Anti-Suffragists Are,” in *Anti-suffrage Essays by Massachusetts Women*, ed. Ernest Bernbaum (Boston: Forum Publications of Boston, 1916), 22; see also Jablonsky, *The Home*, 53.

⁶³ Jablonsky, *The Home*, 54.

⁶⁴ See Green, *Southern Strategies*, 38-40.

⁶⁵ Elizabeth Hayes Turner appears to take this opinion concerning Episcopalian women in Galveston. Among the women who participated in reform from about 1870-1920, Turner has noted that it was usually Episcopalian women who were the most predominant and who

status, claiming that southern anti-suffragists feared women's suffrage could result in other reforms that might take away some of the wealth and power from the privileged. Green also claims that the introduction of black women's suffrage and the degradation of states' rights also loomed large in southern anti-suffragists' minds.⁶⁶ Northerners feared the radicalism and socialism that they believed woman's suffrage might bring; after 1915, according to Green and Jablonsky, possibly out of desperation, northeastern anti-suffragists began to attack suffragists as "Bolsheviks, and unpatriotic German sympathizers."⁶⁷ However, these factors do not entirely inform these individuals' aversion to suffrage. Basically, the anti-suffragists trembled at the thought that suffrage might alter the world in which they lived permanently, particularly if the family unit, what they considered to be the "cell" of a healthy civil society, was toppled by socialism and a welfare state.

Religiously, it may be well to note briefly, perhaps, not just what these people were, but what they were not. Jablonsky claims that both of these groups, unlike Methodists, Quakers, or Unitarians, for example, did not engage in reform as much as some others in the nineteenth century.⁶⁸ Generally, religiously-oriented people who engaged more in "reforms," like Methodists, for example, believed that the individual could affect social progress for him or herself by making good choices. Part of the origin of this ideology came from the Second Great Awakening. Due to

held the highest positions of leadership in community endeavors, whether those activities were politically oriented or not. Presbyterian women were second in number. Turner concludes that, even though they were greater in number in Galveston, Lutherans, Methodists, and Baptists assumed fewer and "lesser" positions of leadership in community improvement activities due to their decidedly middle class status. See Elizabeth Hayes Turner, "Episcopal Women as Community Leaders: Galveston, 1900-1989," in *Episcopal Women: Gender, Spirituality, and Commitment in an American Mainline Denomination*, Catherine Prelinger, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 75-82.

⁶⁶ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 90; see also Jablonsky, *The Home*, 66.

⁶⁷ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 90; see also Jablonsky, *The Home*, 100.

⁶⁸ Jablonsky, *The Home*, 53.

this religious revival, many cast aside the old Calvinist ideas concerning total depravity and predestination for a more optimistic view.⁶⁹

It would appear that the religious groups that the antis belonged to did not take this attitude as much—although it may be argued that some began to champion reform more in the late nineteenth century when their denominations began to embrace liberal theology.⁷⁰ Along these lines, the northeastern Protestant antis’ aversion to reform, particularly, also cannot be attributed to the fact that they tended to be Republicans. Although Republicans normally did not support women’s rights, or abolitionism in the early days, some Republicans did participate in reforms, such as temperance and education during the antebellum years and after the Civil War; indeed, there were “progressive Republicans.” A direct tie from these antis’ religious beliefs to their aversion to “reform” is not clear. However, what is clear is that most of the Protestant anti-suffragists, regardless of their political affiliation, participated in voluntary organizations like ladies’ clubs, patriotic clubs such as the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Daughters of the Confederacy, or church organizations.⁷¹ Unlike their evangelical neighbors, they were probably not attempting to change the “inside” of the individual; historian Elizabeth Hayes Turner claims that as sacramentalists, most Episcopalian women, for example, had the attitude that evangelism was the job of the clergy, although many did participate in church work.⁷² Outside of their church activities, Episcopalian and Presbyterian women generally appear to have been more interested in clubs to better themselves, not necessarily society. When they did seek to better society, they did it voluntarily.⁷³ This

⁶⁹ See Herman Belz, *A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen’s Rights, 1861 to 1866* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976); see also William E. Gienapp, *The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852–1856* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 163.

⁷⁰ Ferenc Morton Szasz, *The Divided Mind of Protestant America, 1880-1930* (Alabama University: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 46.

⁷¹ Marshall, *Splintered Sisterhood*, 47.

⁷² Turner, “Episcopal Women,” 85.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

type of activity fits more closely with the general mood of both denominations at the time.

Presbyterians, according to Wayne Flynt, generally saw the church as being of a “spiritual” nature; the church, they believed, should primarily concern itself with preaching the gospel and saving souls.⁷⁴ Therefore, any engagement with politics was inappropriate. This included involvement with the temperance movement and even with some of the reforms associated with the “Social Gospel,” such as the elimination of child labor.⁷⁵ However, Flynt concedes that even some Presbyterians in the ultra-conservative Presbyterian Church in the United States, or PCUS,⁷⁶ “ranked under this doctrine” when it came to “demon rum;” some supported Prohibition while others did not.⁷⁷ By the 1910s, Presbyterians had opted for some evangelical educational institutions, opening schools for African American students, immigrants, American Indians, and mountain children.⁷⁸ It is apparent, though, that even these ventures were controversial to many Presbyterians.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ The title of Flynt’s book indicates that he is primarily addressing southern Presbyterian churches; however, on this point, as well as on some others, he appears to be talking about American Presbyterians across the board. Wayne Flynt, *Southern Religion and Christian Diversity in the Twentieth Century* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2016), 100-01.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁷⁶ The PCUS was originally the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, from 1861-1983. In 1983, it merged with the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA) to form the Presbyterian Church USA (PCUSA). The PCUSA is today the largest Presbyterian denomination and one of the big-three “mainline Protestant denominations” of the U.S. (the other two being the United Methodist Church and the United Church of Christ). See Randall Balmer and John R. Fitzmier, eds., *The Presbyterians, Denominations in America*, no. 5, Henry Warner Bowden, series ed. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993), 254-5.

⁷⁷ Flynt claims that Presbyterians were very divided concerning this doctrine, as when the Synod of Alabama endorsed statewide Prohibition in 1909—and then the Synod of Virginia angrily condemned the endorsement shortly thereafter. See Flynt, *Southern Religion*, 101.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 100-106.

V. PRESBYTERIAN CONSERVATISM AND WOMEN’S ROLES

In fact, Elna Green, Ruth Tucker, Walter Liefeld, Lois Boyd, and R. Douglas Brackenridge all appear to maintain that Presbyterian churches everywhere in the United States were some of the most conservative regarding women during the nineteenth century.⁸⁰

As late as the 1870s, most Presbyterian churches still accepted John Calvin’s dictum that the female *imago dei* was “in the second degree,” or “under the dominion of males” via God’s creation ordinance.⁸¹ Women preachers and even the speaking of women in Presbyterian churches was still controversial in 1876. (When the Rev. Isaac M. See invited two women from the WCTU to speak in a New Jersey church, another minister, the Rev. Elijah R. Craven, attacked See in the general assembly for four hours, charging him with “disobedience to divine ordinance.”⁸² See was then advised by the presbytery of New Jersey to “abstain” from the practice “in the future.”⁸³) Flint claims that southern Presbyterians were extremely conservative, particularly the PCUS church. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, for example, they explicitly rejected higher criticism; this may not seem too conservative to some, but the PCUS was even squeamish about women’s missionary societies.⁸⁴ As late as the 1880s, when most other denominations supported women’s boards of home and foreign missions, the PCUS did not.⁸⁵ They eventually did, at the behest of their women.

⁸⁰ See Green, *Southern Strategies*; Ruth Tucker and Walter Liefeld, *Daughters of the Church: Women in Ministry from New Testament Times to the Present* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1987), 283; Lois Boyd and R. Douglas Brackenridge, *Presbyterian Women in America: Two Centuries of a Quest for Status*, 2nd ed. (London: Presbyterian Historical Society), 94-110.

⁸¹ John Calvin in his Genesis commentary, quoted in Flynt, *Southern Religion*, 93.

⁸² Elijah R. Craven, quoted in Boyd and Brackenridge, *Presbyterian Women*, 98.

⁸³ The Presbytery of New Jersey, quoted *ibid.*, 99.

⁸⁴ Boyd and Brackenridge, *Presbyterian Women*, 100.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

VI. PRESBYTERIANS AND WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE: SUFFRAGE NOT A RIGHT, DETRIMENTAL TO THE FAMILY, AND A STATIST PROPOSITION

More than a few Presbyterian writers attacked suffrage in many of the same ways Catholics had, but with some of their own emphases. Perhaps one of the most vocal opponents to woman's suffrage was the PCUS Rev. Robert Lewis Dabney. Dabney, a professor at Union Theological Seminary, proclaimed that women and men had been given different callings by God.

Women were not to take on leadership roles in the church, nor should they preach—or vote—and he saw these two as being related to one another. In two of his articles on this subject, “The Public Preaching of Women” and “Women’s Rights Women,” Dabney never spoke of Calvin, but the reformer’s fingerprints are seemingly all over the pages. Dabney asserted that God had assigned to the “stronger” man “the domestic government” and to the “weaker” woman the “obedience of love.” “On this order,” he claimed, “all social order depends.”⁸⁶ Dabney believed that the demand for women’s preaching and woman’s suffrage were “synchronous,” being derived from distorted ideas concerning total equality from the *Declaration of Independence*.⁸⁷ The founding fathers, Dabney asserted, in declaring all men equal, only meant that all people have a common origin in God, with the rights and privileges granted a group by law falling “equally to each person within the group”—but not all groups of people receive the same rights.⁸⁸ Women, Dabney claimed, have not been and should not be given the same rights as men because

⁸⁶ Calvin once spoke of a woman’s governance as being a “monstrous” thing. See John Calvin, *Commentary on Timothy, Titus, and Philemon*, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, Grand Rapids, MI, accessed May 20, 2018.

<https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom43.iii.iv.iv.html>; see also Robert Lewis Dabney, “The Public Preaching of Women,” *The Southern Presbyterian Review* (October, 1879), 111.

⁸⁷ Dabney, “The Public Preaching,” 115.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 116.

they are biologically constituted differently and because their divinely appointed role is properly in the home; entering into politics would be an unnecessary burden upon women that would ultimately change and corrupt them.⁸⁹ Apparently, the General Assembly agreed: in 1916, it proclaimed in a report on women’s position in the church that “Authority is invested in man....This is the regulative principle of government in the family and in every other sphere.”⁹⁰ Although the report does not explicitly say so, the implication is clear: women should not preach, enter into politics, or, presumably, vote.

In a pamphlet printed by the Woman’s Anti-Suffrage Association of the 3rd Judicial District of the State of New York entitled “Shall Women Be Burdened with the Ballot?” the Rev. Theodore Cuyler, pastor of the Park Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn, agreed with Dabney that suffrage was not a Divine right; it was a privilege granted by the *Constitution* to certain people under prescriptive conditions.⁹¹ Cuyler, like Dabney,

⁸⁹ Robert Lewis Dabney, “Women’s Rights Women,” *The Southern Magazine*, March, 1871, 322-334. Cf. the comments of Dabney’s Dutch Reformed contemporary Abraham Kuyper, *De Eerepositie der Vrouw* (Kampen: Kok, 1932), trans. Irene Konyndyk (1990), 19-20, 28: “The private and public life form two separate spheres, each with their own way of existing, with their own task ... And it is on the basis of this state of affairs, which has not been invented by us, but which God himself has imposed on us, that in public life the woman does not stand equally with the man. Nor more that it can be said of the man that he has been called to achieve in the family that which is achieved by the woman....for which the man is the appointed worker [the public domain], she will never be able to fulfill anything but a subordinate role, in which her inferiority would soon come to light anyway.” Contrast with Kuyper’s successor, Herman Bavinck, who did not object to women’s suffrage.

⁹⁰ *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States* (Wilmington, N. C.: Jackson and Bell, 1880), 55. One should note the role of “regulative principle” terminology in Reformed theology: it often refers to what is explicitly stated in scripture. See for example, the “regulative principle of worship” in the *Westminster Confession of Faith*.

⁹¹ See Theodore Cuyler, “Shall Women be Burdened with the Ballot?” in *Pamphlets Printed and Distributed by the Woman’s Anti-Suffrage Association of the 3rd Judicial District of the State of New York* (Albany, 1905), no page given; Cuyler was considered by many to be one of the best religious writers around; some of his comments, in fact, were submitted by the MAOFESW at the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of

believed that God had ordained men to rule in the political realm and women in the home. Women also were not men and men were not women; one attempting to be like the other was, as Cuyler quoted the Rev. Horace Bushnell as saying, ‘against nature.’⁹² Cuyler, like some Catholic ministers, also addressed the linkage between woman’s suffrage and the probability of new social welfare laws.⁹³ If women got the vote, Cuyler warned, reforms like Prohibition would not work; it would merely send the drunkards from the saloons and into the street.⁹⁴ Also, once instigated, like most reforms, he implied, there would be no revoking it. Additionally, Cuyler added, “depraved” women would have the right to vote, along with the decent ones.⁹⁵ Of course, current readers would see Cuyler as speaking about recent immigrants, and they might be correct, since Cuyler later disparages the “foreign” voter.⁹⁶ Yet, it should be remembered that many of the suffragists also feared “foreign” voters and recent immigrants, and it is fairly certain that Cuyler was also talking about people who were, indeed, per the original meaning of “depraved,” unscrupulous or unprincipled—in a word, *bad*.

The Rev. Charles H. Parkhurst of New York City’s Madison Square Presbyterian Church, who regularly attacked suffragists in a monthly column in the *Ladies’ Home Journal* that he authored, added that giving woman the ballot might take her out of the home, away from her primary duty of service to her family; the family, he added, in words that sounded an awful lot like Cardinal Williams,’ was the cell of society.⁹⁷ Parkhurst proclaimed that the mother’s role and the family unit were critical; the family was like a mini-state—only here might a child learn how to interact

Representatives, on March 13, 1912. See *Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Woman’s Suffrage*, 62d Congress, 2d session, March 13, 1912, 98.

⁹² Horace Bushnell, quoted in Cuyler, no page given.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Charles Parkhurst, “The Unit of Society,” *Ladies’ Home Journal* (March, 1895), 13.

with others, how to obey, and how to be a responsible citizen and fulfill his or her obligations.⁹⁸ Parkhurst also claimed, in another article, that substitutes for divinely sanctioned laws bore little success; although he does not mention “socialism” or the state, it seems clear that this is what he meant.⁹⁹ Parkhurst intimated that, ultimately, socialistic laws and socialistic substitutes for the family would not help anyone, including the poor, because many of those who might be seen as benefitting from the new laws were not wretched because they were poor, *they were poor because they were wretched*.¹⁰⁰ Corrupt conditions in society were only what the “character of the individual families” constituted them to be.¹⁰¹ Woman’s suffrage might be voted in, but ultimately, problems of a sociological nature could not be voted out. While those discussing the issues went on with their discussion, improper people would only be “going to the devil faster and faster.”¹⁰² As an example to his readers, he referred to a group of forty women in a neighborhood in eastern New York City who had earnestly worked for years to try to ameliorate the problems of the very poor. These women, Parkhurst claimed, had experienced some success because they sought to improve family relations, which were at the core of the well-being of civil society. New laws would not be any more effective in ridding society of the ills many of the suffragists thought the ballot might help them to vote in; there were enough laws on the books already, Parkhurst asserted.¹⁰³

Essentially, what Parkhurst and Cuyler were expressing here, at least to a degree, was an aspect of the particular belief system common to Protestants at this time. Personal responsibility, anti-statist, anti-socialist beliefs, and the idea of the family as the “unit” or the “foundation” of

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ See Charles Parkhurst, “Women Without the Ballot,” *Ladies’ Home Journal* (June, 1895), 15.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ See Charles Parkhurst, “The True Mission of Woman,” *Ladies’ Home Journal* (March 1895), 15; see also Parkhurst, “Women Without the Ballot,” *Ladies’ Home Journal*, (June, 1895), 15.

society were all trademarks of typical nineteenth-century Protestantism. Some have argued that such notions regarding the family originated with Puritanism; others, like Margo Dodd, claim they originated with humanist writers such as Aristotle.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, they appear to have been prominent in nineteenth-century American Protestantism.¹⁰⁵ To many nineteenth-century American Protestants, the family was much better equipped for raising children than was the state; they also appear to have believed that if an individual, a family, or even a segment of society continued to experience poverty, this was primarily the consequence of poor choices on the part of those individuals; low wages were determined by supply and demand and could not be changed by any bargaining or laws.¹⁰⁶ According to Henry F. May, these kinds of beliefs were also common in the so-called “low” churches. Methodists, May asserts, did not begin to adopt social liberalism and contribute to the Social Gospel until after the turn of the twentieth century because the church had championed John Wesley’s injunctions to work hard and participate in charity.¹⁰⁷ Methodists also believed that sin was the “sufficient explanation” for all social evils.¹⁰⁸ Baptists, May claims, have traditionally been hostile to statism and suspicious of any efforts to build society in any kind of “worldly” manner.¹⁰⁹

In sum, Protestant anti-suffragists’ aversion to socialism and changes in wages, or any suggestion that poverty was the result of anything but vice was typical for many American Protestants at least until around the

¹⁰⁴ Margo Dodd, *Christian Humanism and the Social Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5.

¹⁰⁵ Colleen McDannell, *The Christian Home in Victorian America, 1840-1900* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 24.

¹⁰⁶ Jaynes Thayer Addison, *The Episcopal Church in the United States, 1789-1931* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 283.

¹⁰⁷ Henry F. May, *Protestant Churches and Industrial America* (New York: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1949), 189.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

turn of the twentieth century.¹¹⁰ When Protestants did begin to champion social liberalism, according to May, a large number of them were still consistently conservative regarding their solutions to social problems. The result of this was that they tended to advocate the amelioration of ills, rather than to participate in social reconstruction.¹¹¹

VII. HELEN JOHNSON’S *WOMAN AND THE REPUBLIC*: AN APOLOGETIC WRITING FOR CHRISTIANITY’S EXONERATION OF WOMEN

Female Presbyterian anti-suffragists, like the male ones, also wrote anti-suffrage materials. One of these writers’ articles is worth mentioning; the other deserves some further explanation.

In her “Talk to Women on the Suffrage Question,” Emily Bissell chided suffragists for promoting individualism, and encouraging divorce and selfishness, to the neglect of the family; like many of the Christian male anti-suffragists, Bissell disparaged suffragists for promoting ideas that appeared to assault the home and the community.¹¹² However, from a Christian perspective, Helen Johnson’s *Woman and the Republic* is perhaps one of the most important philosophical anti-suffrage writings (1897).¹¹³ In the book, Johnson took the controversial and perhaps questionable position that women should not vote due to their inability to defend the country during times of war.¹¹⁴ Perhaps more importantly, though, she also argued for the traditional role of women, for educating

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 163.

¹¹² Emily Bissell, “Talk to Women on the Suffrage Question,” in the *Debaters’ Handbook Series: Woman Suffrage: Selected Articles on Woman Suffrage*, Edith Phelps, ed. (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1916), 148.

¹¹³ Susan Goodier, *No Votes for Women: The New York State Anti-Suffrage Movement* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 54-5.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 54-5.

women differently from men, and for the Bible and the Church as the sources from which women's "rights" flowed in the first place.

Johnson began by declaring that women's primary role of raising and educating children was essential to the maintenance of the Republic; for this, women did not need the vote.¹¹⁵ Johnson deplored the loss of the power of the church in recent years, and castigated suffragists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton for declaring the church an enemy of woman. This was sheer folly, she declared, asserting that more than a few women have been educated by church-supported schools; she also claimed that many successful women's colleges, like Vassar, Smith College, and Troy Seminary, were founded on the belief that women required their own unique style of education tailored to their distinctly feminine mental processes—a far different attitude than that advocated by those who would try to make the sexes "equal" in all things. Johnson further claimed that in disparaging the Bible and creating the new "suffragist" Bible—Elizabeth Cady Stanton's *Woman's Bible* commentary—suffragists only betrayed their ignorance on the subject.

Perhaps most significantly, Johnson points out that the suffragists seem to be very confused concerning whether or not Scripture actually teaches woman's subordination to man—particularly in the first and second chapters of Genesis. For example, Johnson asserts that Elizabeth Cady Stanton declares in her introduction that Christianity and the Church have taught the subordination of women since time immemorial.¹¹⁶ However, as we read in Johnson, Stanton claims in her commentary on Creation that "In the great work of Creation, the crowning glory was realized when man and woman were evolved on the sixth day...How then is it possible to make woman an afterthought...No lesson

¹¹⁵ Helen Kendrick Johnson, *Women and the Republic: A Survey of the Woman-Suffrage Movement in the United States and a Discussion of the Claims and Arguments of Its Foremost Advocates*. Project Gutenberg: 2005, accessed July 23, 2017.

<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/7300/pg7300-images.html>.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

of woman’s subjection can be fairly drawn from the first chapter of the Old Testament.”¹¹⁷ Johnson then notes that Ellen Battelle Dietrick, one of the other commentators, claims that the Creation story in the second chapter of Genesis, which has been seen to teach woman’s subordination because woman is created after man, was “manipulated by some wily Jew in order to give ‘heavenly authority’ for requiring a woman to obey the man she married.”¹¹⁸ Another commentator, Lillie Devereux Blake, Johnson observes, then asserts that Genesis 2 lists the created beings “in a gradually ascending series” with “Creeping things” first, and finally “the crowning glory of the whole,” woman, listed last.¹¹⁹ “It cannot be maintained,” Blake concludes, “that woman was inferior to man, even if, as asserted in chapter ii, she was created after him, without at once admitting that man is inferior to the creeping things because created after them.”¹²⁰ Stanton then sums up the commentaries by declaring that the second chapter of Genesis still leaves woman as an “afterthought” by having her arrive at the end of all created beings.¹²¹ It is not clear whether Johnson was poking fun more at the “theology” of the commentators or the logic of their conclusions. Nevertheless, she claims, it is interesting that the women who spurn the Bible as the source of woman’s degradation also find in it their “highest warrant” for believing in the equal position of woman to man.¹²² Perhaps, Johnson concludes, the “wily Jew” has been outsmarted after all.¹²³

Perhaps when seen as an argument for limited voting, *Woman and the Republic* may be lacking. However, when seen as a sort of apologetic for Christianity’s support of the rights of women, it seems to take on a wholly different character. Some, like Johnson, would probably argue that the

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

innate value of women is something that may only be unfolded from a religious perspective. *Woman and the Republic* was lauded as containing some of the most analytical, unbiased arguments against suffrage. Johnson became somewhat of a celebrity for it and was frequently interviewed by newspapers.¹²⁴

Female Presbyterian anti-suffragists also did the bulk of the organizing against suffrage; they, like their male counterparts, also championed the public and private spheres for men and women, respectively, and the value of personal responsibility. They also disparaged the efficacy of regulation and more laws to the end of a better society. The founder of the National Association Opposed to Woman's Suffrage (NAOWS), Josephine Dodge, illustrates these principles well. Dodge, a Presbyterian, organized the National Association Opposed to Woman's Suffrage in her Park Avenue home in November, 1911, along with some remonstrants from eight anti-suffrage clubs when the referendum for suffrage in California passed.¹²⁵ In keeping with the anti-public/private philosophy, Mrs. Dodge believed the primary task of the NAOWS to be defensive in nature; when the suffragists charged disfranchisement, the NAOWS would counter. This position would keep the group from looking like they were trying to usurp the male prerogative of engaging in the political process, she believed.¹²⁶ Dodge was not shy, however, about expressing her opinions to news reporters, particularly concerning morality and the efficacy of the law. All the laws in the world, Dodge averred, would not create better morals or people, nor would they help women.¹²⁷ Presbyterian women were usually the second largest group of Protestants who served in anti-suffrage

¹²⁴ Benjamin, *A History*, 127.

¹²⁵ Jablonsky, *The Home*, 84.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ See, for example, "Low Cut Gowns and High Morals, Suffrage and Sex," *The Courier* (Harrisburg, PA), May 11, 1913; see also "Woman's Suffrage Battle Opens in New Jersey as Antis Unlimber Big Guns," *The Chatham Press* (Chatham, NJ), May 29, 1915.

organizations; besides Dodge, Bissell, and Johnson, Alice Wadsworth also played an important role, taking over the national group’s presidency after Dodge resigned after six years.¹²⁸

VIII. EPISCOPALIANS: NOT SO “LIBERAL” ABOUT WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE

Episcopalian churches now often have the reputation of being “liberal” theologically and otherwise. During the early 1900s, however, most Episcopalian leaders and churches, much like Catholic and Presbyterian leaders and churches, appear to have held to very conservative opinions concerning the roles of women—and they attacked suffrage, naturally, seeing it as an attack on the family, traditional gender roles, and Christianity.

The Rev. John Williams of St. Barnabas Episcopal Church in Nebraska claimed that although he saw a difference between the mainstream suffragists and the more radical ones, the mainstream ones had failed to suppress the radicals; as a result, the movement was “subversive to Christian morality, marriage, and home life.”¹²⁹ Bishop Arthur Cleveland Coxe of New York denounced the suffragists as trying to emancipate themselves, not just from the home, but from religion altogether.¹³⁰ These statements are similar to many of the ones propagated by other conservative ministers from the time period. Apparently, Williams was also correct: it would seem that when the suffrage movement purged itself of its radicals, as Aileen Kraditor has pointed out, more conservative women came on board.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Hickman, accessed July 26, 2017.

¹³⁰ “The New Woman and Bishops Doane and Coxe,” *The Literary Digest: A Repository of Contemporaneous Thought and Research*, 11:8 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls: June 22, 1895), 215.

¹³¹ Kraditor, *The Ideas*, 85.

Similar in sentiment but not so much in execution were the opinions of perhaps one of the most outspoken Episcopal bishops, the Rev. William Croswell Doane of Albany, New York. Doane was a personal friend of Anna Prunyn, the president of the Albany anti-suffragists; he openly encouraged the group in its ventures, and his wife served on its executive committee.¹³² Doane, like many of his contemporaries, obviously felt that suffrage for women was out of step with their divinely ordered place in society; at an 1895 address to the graduates of the St. Agnes School he established in Albany in 1870, Doane made his opinions known, fairly causing a firestorm among some of the women's rights activists and in the local papers.¹³³ Doane asserted that many a "cowardly representative" simply folds at a woman's request for rights.¹³⁴ He then declared that "the aggravated miseries of an enlarged, unqualified suffrage...in its universality of male voters, is our most threatening danger today." God might yet save the country from its ills, he went on, but this could only happen via some type of divine punishment.¹³⁵ Constitutions having been changed, and the Bible having been altered into a "new" Bible, and "motherhood" having been replaced with "mannishness," the United States would "reap in tears" the effects of woman being made out to be man's equal.¹³⁶ Not only was Doane probably taking a jab at higher criticism and perhaps at Elizabeth Cady Stanton's *Woman's Bible*, he was obviously calling the men who supported suffrage "cowards" and the women who supported it "mannish." The reaction to his words was

¹³² Goodier, *No Votes*, 47.

¹³³ Doane produced other writings, such as his "Why Women do not Want the Ballot," an essay that the anti-suffragists circulated with their tracts and which appeared in the prestigious *North American Review*. Doane's remarks at the St. Agnes ceremony are included here. See William Croswell Doane, "Why Women do not Want the Ballot," *North American Review* 161"466 (September, 1895): 257-67.

¹³⁴ Doane, quoted in "The New Woman and Bishops Doane and Coxe" in *The Literary Digest*, 215.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

instant; Stanton herself reportedly heard of Doane’s diatribe and was reported by the *Literary Digest* to have called the bishop’s words “utter rot.”¹³⁷

Doane was a very powerful man with a large diocese and many wealthy benefactors, like J. P. Morgan; he obviously did not fear the effects of his words.¹³⁸ The *New York Herald* claimed that Doane’s “address before the graduates of St. Agnes School in Albany on June 6 [1895] created more discussion than any other woman suffrage utterance of the year”; this was obviously true because besides drawing the ire of Stanton, Doane’s words motivated another suffragist, Ellen Dietrich (one of the commentators for Stanton’s *Woman’s Bible*) to write a book entitled *Women in the Early Christian Ministry: A Reply to Bishop Doane, and Others* (1897). In her book, Dietrich offered a refutation of Christian teachings that she felt relegated women to second-class status.¹³⁹ Doane obviously stirred up controversy on this topic; however, one does not have to wonder where he stood. Nothing close to “liberal theology” can be found in his anti-suffrage rhetoric, or in his stance concerning the “new woman,” whom he denounced as a “freak.”¹⁴⁰

IX. EPISCOPALIANS AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

It is true that some Episcopalians, like some Presbyterians, did embrace social liberalism by participating in the Social Gospel, a movement which applied Christian ethics to social problems. However, according to David

¹³⁷ Stanton, quoted in “The New Woman and Bishops Doane and Coxe” in *The Literary Digest*, 216.

¹³⁸ George Lynde Richardson, “William Crosswell Doane, First Bishop of Albany,” (Hartford, CN: Church Missions Publishing, 1933), *Project Canterbury*, accessed July 27, 2017, <http://anglicanhistory.org/usa/wcdoane/glrichardson.html>.

¹³⁹ Ellen Dietrich, *Women in the Early Christian Ministry: A Reply to Bishop Doane, and Others* (Philadelphia: Alfred Ferris, 1897).

¹⁴⁰ *The New York Herald*, June 7, 1895; see also “New Womanhood Denounced,” *New York Times*, June 9, 1909.

L. Holmes, the move toward this type of action was slow and activism was definitely not the case everywhere. New York Bishop Henry C. Potter, for example, mediated strikes for some coal and steel laborers; bishop Charles D. Williams of Michigan was a persistent critic of the automobile business.¹⁴¹ Caleb S. Henry, first a priest and then a professor of philosophy and history at New York University, espoused the right to apply religion to politics.¹⁴² Some Episcopal churches in New York also established the Church Association for the Advancement of the Interests of Labor (CAIL) to study the problems of working men and women, partly so that it might offer plans to mediate workers' strikes.¹⁴³ However, according to Holmes, this type of activism came from the "broad wing" of the Episcopal church, a movement which emphasized reason as a mediator to religious truth, as well as moral living and social justice; most Episcopalians' participation in anything approaching the Social Gospel appears to have been conservative in nature, amounting to the amelioration of ills, not necessarily to the curing of them.¹⁴⁴ This was particularly the case with women. An analysis of at least a couple of churches bears this out.

X. EPISCOPAL WOMEN AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL: SOCIAL CONCERN AND CHARITABLE GIVING

According to Elizabeth Hayes Turner, who has studied Episcopal women in Galveston, these groups operated from the standpoint of the ideology of the priest and spokesman for the Episcopal Church in Galveston, Edgar Gardner Murphy. Murphy may be considered, as author Hugh Bailey has called him, a "gentle Progressive," since the priest advocated better race

¹⁴¹ David L. Holmes, *A Brief History of the Episcopal Church* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1993), 128.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

relations, the end of child labor, and better education in the South.¹⁴⁵ For charitable enterprises, Murphy counselled Episcopalians to operate under the auspices of “social concern.”¹⁴⁶ Those who are privileged, Murphy preached, should prioritize service and sacrifice to the good of the community. The wealthy, Murphy believed, should carefully distribute resources so as to ameliorate suffering.¹⁴⁷ It would appear, then, that, at least in Galveston, these women’s disdain for political reforms was informed, at least in part, by a religiously defined notion of charity via a spirit of “social concern.”

This was not just the case with southern Episcopal churches, which were probably more conservative. At the St. James Episcopal church in Chicago, for example, according to Rima Lunin Schultz, most of the women from 1880-1920 who worked in charitable enterprises adopted a service-oriented model and accepted the patriarchal system along with a subordinate position to the male clergy.¹⁴⁸ Schultz claims that most “women’s work” was done by women in the Woman’s Auxiliary and might best be called “social Christianity”; the women of the St. James, Grace, and Trinity parishes in Chicago “pioneered mission Sunday School classes, mothers’ meetings, infant creche schools, and sewing and industrial classes and...distributed aid to the sick and indigent.”¹⁴⁹ The Oxford movement, an Anglican phenomenon which began in the mid-nineteenth century and brought some Roman elements back into the Anglican and Episcopal churches, opened up a couple of new venues for service to some particularly dedicated women in the Chicago diocese; deaconesses and sisters also participated heavily in service. Deaconesses

¹⁴⁵ Turner, “Episcopal Women,” 80; see also Hugh Bailey, *Edgar Gardner Murphy, Gentle Progressive* (Miami: University of Miami Press), 1968.

¹⁴⁶ Turner, “Episcopal Women,” 80.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Rima Lunin Schultz, “Women’s Work and Women’s Calling in the Episcopal Church, 1880-1989,” in *Episcopal Women: Gender, Spirituality, and Commitment in an American Mainline Denomination*, 24.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

worked within the church community (which could mean, of course, sometimes physically leaving the church) as nurses and social workers, and visited inmates in prisons and the sick in hospitals. Their vows were not considered permanent, although many of them thought of themselves that way. Sisters took lifetime vows and, along with charitable work, operated educational institutions. The Woman's Auxiliary, which was mostly made up of women of means, financially supported these groups.¹⁵⁰

Schultz makes it clear that these women moved into these roles not as feminists, but as "True Women."¹⁵¹ The Auxiliary women, according to Schultz, were well aware of the ministrations of Jane Addams and her "hull houses," but they did not, like Addams and her followers, move into the city's slums—they supported the educational, social, and charitable enterprises of the church. Their rationale for reform, if it could be called that, was motivated by their Christian convictions; they were to feed the poor and hungry, spread the gospel, and, they had come to believe, build institutions via the church—such as orphanages—to make the world better. As might befit Episcopalian women, the Auxiliary women's meetings always began with prayer, and many Episcopalian churches of the time erected "Lady" chapels dominated by Marian statuary and candles.¹⁵²

Auxiliary women, like many other Episcopalian women of means at the time, also looked at charitable giving through the eyes of simple Christian stewardship. Louise Bowen, an Episcopalian and a member of the late nineteenth century Chicago elite, wrote in her diary that she knew she would one day inherit a fortune, and that God would hold her accountable for what she did with it.¹⁵³ Bowen gave freely of her time and money for years, and although she eventually, according to Schultz,

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 30.

became a Progressive reformer, most of the elite women helped pay for the bishop’s programs “but never used the money to challenge the status quo.”¹⁵⁴ Even if some of these women’s ventures might be considered the beginnings of “Social Gospel” work, all of the women—deaconesses, sisters, and auxiliary women—looked to the hierarchy of the Church for their authority and to its teachings for guidance concerning charity and finances.¹⁵⁵

Many Episcopalian women wrote for and actively engaged in anti-suffrage organizations. Their words and actions were not always preserved for posterity, but the ones that are available often bear out a conservative stance towards gender, finances, personal responsibility, and the efficacy of the law. In an article entitled “Why I Oppose Woman Suffrage,” a Mrs. Horace Brock chided the suffragists for naively believing they could reform society by changing laws.¹⁵⁶ Alice George, who regularly spoke for the Massachusetts organization, said the same, claiming that the suffragists would be better off looking to the ‘power of character’ to change humanity rather than the “power of the law.”¹⁵⁷ George also frequently asserted that woman’s suffrage would “unsex” women, making women like men and men like women, weakening the country. Elizabeth Crannell, who addressed the members of the Committee on Resolutions at the Republican national convention in 1896, claimed that “women were already protected by existing laws, that supply and demand and not the ballot determined wages” and that the ballot was meaningless without the military force behind it “to insure compliance with the law.”¹⁵⁸ Crannell’s words were not original, but they were highly applauded by the press, including the *St. Louis Star*.¹⁵⁹ Anne Myra

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁵⁶ Benjamin, *A History*, 191.

¹⁵⁷ Alice George, quoted in *ibid.*, 192.

¹⁵⁸ Crannell, quoted in *ibid.*, 30.

¹⁵⁹ Benjamin, *A History*, 31.

Benjamin claims that Crannell did not “convert” the Republican Party to the antis’ views; she did, however, corroborate their opposition to suffrage.¹⁶⁰ According to Susan Goodier, neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties particularly supported woman’s suffrage.¹⁶¹ Shortly after Crannell’s speech, the Republican party claimed that it was “mindful of the rights and interests of women” and that it welcomed women’s “co-operation in rescuing the country from Democratic mismanagement and Populist rule.”¹⁶² This was the only “trifle” allowed into the Republican Party platform concerning women at the time.¹⁶³

Episcopalians appear to have been the largest group of organized Protestant Christian remonstrants. For example, Green claims that in North Carolina, the majority of the anti-suffrage leaders were members of Episcopalian churches—some sixty percent of the women and some forty-two percent of the men.¹⁶⁴ Although many anti-suffrage organizations already existed, one in North Carolina began very late in the fight for suffrage—in 1920 as the Nineteenth Amendment, having passed through Congress, went to the states for ratification.¹⁶⁵ Its officers were drawn from many of the “notable” citizens in Raleigh. One of the vice presidents of the group was Anna Lay, the wife of an Episcopal minister; another was Elizabeth Cheshire, the wife of the Episcopal bishop Joseph Blount Cheshire.¹⁶⁶ Bishop Cheshire was on the advisory board.¹⁶⁷ Interestingly, according to Green, a large number of Episcopalians appears to have been common in many southern anti-suffrage groups. For example, Green claims that in Texas, more than one-fourth of the anti-suffrage women

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁶¹ Goodier, *No Votes*, 70.

¹⁶² *Republican Party Platform*, quoted in Benjamin, 31.

¹⁶³ Benjamin, *A History*, 31.

¹⁶⁴ Elna C. Green, “Those Opposed: The Antisuffragists in North Carolina, 1900-1920,” *The North Carolina Historical Review* 67:3 (July 1990): 326.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 322.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

“were members of Episcopal churches”; in Tennessee, she asserts, “the number was more than one-third.”¹⁶⁸ In the northern groups, this may have also been the case; Susan Goodier notes that many of the anti-suffragists in her study of the anti-suffrage movement in New York had ties to the Episcopal church.¹⁶⁹ This appears to have also been true of Presbyterians.¹⁷⁰ Apparently, some of the anti-suffragists were related and lived very close to one another, often in prestigious neighborhoods.¹⁷¹ Could it be that at least some of the anti-suffragists joined together against the changes they saw taking place in society—not just because of their class status and family ties—but because of their shared church membership and their strongly held values and religious beliefs? Green intimates that many of the folks in Raleigh, North Carolina did indeed worship together in local Episcopalian churches.¹⁷² Goodier claims that Bishop Doane supported and encouraged the Albany antis, some of whom were his personal friends and family members.¹⁷³

This was probably the case with many of the other anti-suffragists.¹⁷⁴ It may be that the wealthier antis had the time, the status, and the means to engage in and to assume leadership roles in the anti-suffrage movement, perhaps more so than their middle class and working class counterparts. This does not mean, however, that their only motivation for doing so was class-based or even entirely political.

XI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, historians are to be commended for finally recognizing the important contributions of the anti-suffragists and, particularly, the

¹⁶⁸ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 73.

¹⁶⁹ Goodier, *No Votes*, 150.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Green, “Those Opposed,” 332.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Goodier, *No Votes*, 46.

¹⁷⁴ Green, “Those Opposed,” 332.

agency of the “anti” women in conjunction with the “anti” men in recent years. However, the religious beliefs that in all probability undergirded—at least in part—the antis’ actions and ideologies, have not been given enough credit. It does appear likely that some of the antis certainly had class-based interests and fought to protect themselves against social encroachments. However, class interests do not explain everything.

It may be argued that the antis’ Christian-based beliefs concerning gender and the traditional family were commonplace at the time to antis and suffragists, although the suffragists championed more egalitarian male and female roles. As Jean Bethke Elshtain has pointed out, the suffragists believed that the mantle of private morality could be thrown over the public sphere; this having been done, a better, more utopian America would be the result.¹⁷⁵ The antis, however, apparently did not believe that this was possible. Character and personal responsibility were the traits and practices that paved the road to a better life, and the centralization of state power and socialism were great evils to be avoided at all costs. These beliefs were common, not just to upper class Americans and northeastern Republicans, but to many American Catholic and Protestant Christians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Included in this group were members of the so-called “low” churches, many of whom were middle and working class, such as Baptists and Methodists.¹⁷⁶

Additionally, one is left to ponder the merit of some of the antis’ predictions, whether they were religiously conceived or not. The antis’ insistence that women do not belong in politics, or their fear that suffrage would undermine the traditional family may be ideas that are open to question; however, the anti-suffragists also predicted that suffrage would not purify politics, nor would it usher in some kind of a utopian age. It

¹⁷⁵ Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists,” in *The Family in Political Thought*, Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 58.

¹⁷⁶ See May, 153, 163; 188-190.

certainly did not, and neither did Prohibition or the many other reforms that many of the suffragists promoted. As Christians, many of the anti-suffragists did not believe that reliance on the state was the way to improve one’s lot; hard work, personal responsibility, good character, and reliance on God were the things that ultimately secured a good life. Additional laws and regulations would also most likely undermine a free market economy and, as Cuyler had previously intimated, would be difficult to repeal once voted in.¹⁷⁷ One should not wonder, then, that the antis questioned the efficacy of suffrage, or its long-term effects. Evidently, they did not believe legislation was a solution to many of the problems unique to women, or to many other problems, for that matter. Ultimately, they also did not apparently believe that a utopian existence was possible—at least, not while on this earth.

¹⁷⁷ Cuyler, “Shall Women be Burdened,” no page given.

THE CONSTITUTION OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE, PAST AND PRESENT

Alexander Salter¹

Abstract: Why are the institutions that constitute scholarly economics the way they are? What determines the kinds of questions economists ask and the answers they find convincing? This article answers these questions by positing that within the modern economics profession, economic ideas compete on margins unrelated to the pursuit of truth. The adaptive value of certain kinds of economics can explain the prevalence of the economics that is currently practiced. The article questions the claim that modern economics has “passed the market test.” Ultimately, the mutual network between Academy and State supports economics that promote the managerial-administrative state and discourages economics that do not. The result of this unfortunate dynamic is the kind of skewed economic practice that has frequently plagued the discipline.

Keywords: Academy, bureaucracy, economics profession, experts, managerial state, New England tradition, Progressivism

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I. INTRODUCTION

“If we are to safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based on a superficial similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will have to be directed toward debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now become the vested interests of established university departments.”

—Friedrich A. Hayek²

“But the progressives command the historian’s attention, because they prevailed. It was the progressives who fashioned the new sciences of society, founded the modern American university, invented the think tank, and created the American administrative state, institutions still at the center of American public life and still defined by the progressive values that formed and instructed them.”

—Thomas C. Leonard³

In this paper, I explore how economics is constituted as a scholarly discipline: what questions economists ask, why they ask them, and what kinds of answers they find satisfactory. The institutions within which economists do economics, particularly the research university and the organs of government that hire economists to design and implement public policy, must occupy center stage in such an exploration. The governance structures of Academy and State—I capitalize to indicate these words will be used as shorthand for the networks of organizations that comprise the general categories—give shape to the questions and answers in which economists deal as well as allocate professional goods (employment, funding, prestige, awards, etc.) in accordance with those questions and answers. My thesis is that a historically informed perspective on the institutions of economic scholarship gives us grounds to suspect that economists’ theories, especially those concerning the

² Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Pretense of Knowledge,” *American Economic Review* 79:6 ([1974] 1989): 6.

³ Thomas C. Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), xiii.

relationship between the government and the economy, are adaptively successful for reasons other than truth.

This is primarily a paper about the historical development of the economics profession and the institutions within which economists practice their trade. I carry forward Tollison's⁴ project of "putting economists in the model," with heavy emphasis on institutional detail. A related literature, drawn from several literatures across the social sciences, focuses on scientific experts in democratic societies.⁵ My goal is to explore the place of economics in the public square and how the interaction between scientific and political authority impinges on their respective institutions.

To motivate my study, consider the following puzzles of economic practice.

The first is perhaps the most confusing. Economists, in their scientific discourse, regularly engage in practices that rest on a shaky theoretical foundation and perhaps are inconsistent with the discipline's basic theories. In macroeconomics, the most striking example is the use of national income statistics to study business cycles; in microeconomics, the range of policies proposed to correct market failures. In both cases, economists' techniques run afoul of more basic theoretical considerations. National income statistics can only provide reliable information about aggregate production if the prices used to construct the statistics are

⁴ Robert D. Tollison, "Economists as the Subject of Economic Inquiry," *Southern Economic Journal* 52:4 (1986): 909–22.

⁵ For example, Sheila Jasanoff, *The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Philip Kitcher, *Science, Truth, and Democracy*, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Henry S. Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mark B. Brown, *Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Roger Koppl, *Expert Failure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart, *Escape from Democracy: The Role of Experts and the Public in Economic Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

competitive equilibrium prices.⁶ But if the prices are competitive equilibrium prices, then there can be no gap between actual and potential output. At the micro level, correcting market failures, such as those caused by external economies, presumes the theorist and public policy practitioner have knowledge about the efficient equilibrium and how to reach it. But this knowledge is generated by the market process itself; it cannot be known apart from the operation of market forces, from which cost and benefit curves, both private and social, acquire their content.⁷ This

⁶ For example, consider how macroeconomists construct GDP data. To simplify a very complex process, these data are constructed by adding up the final-market prices for all goods and services produced and sold in a given year. Variations in GDP from its trend can be evidence of an undesirable bust. The problem is ascertaining whether a change in the value of GDP does in fact indicate something meaningful. If an economy produces 100,000 more apples than last year but 200,000 fewer oranges than last year, is that evidence that the economy is producing below its potential output level? The only way we can infer that the economy is producing more or less wealth—and wealth, not the goods and services in themselves, is ultimately what economists care about—is to assume the observed market prices from which GDP is constructed are taken from a situation of economy-wide *microeconomic* equilibrium. If this is the case, then by the necessary conditions of general equilibrium, everyone in the economy agrees about the marginal value of a dollar’s worth of output in any given line of production, which means everyone agrees on whether more apples and fewer oranges is wealth enhancing on net. But if this is the case, then there is no “overproduction” (alternatively, underconsumption) at all.

⁷ The only way to know the costs and benefits of particular activities is for the market mechanism to generate that knowledge through the decentralized exchange activity of the traders who comprise it. Tradeoffs are revealed in the course of exchange. But in the case of any particular market failure, how is the economist to know the size of the gains yet to be captured due to the market failure, as compared to the costs of implementing the public policy? If the latter exceed the former, then correcting the market failure would actually make people *worse off* in their own estimation. Finally, how can the economist know how big to make the given public policy correction? For example, if there are external diseconomies caused by pollution, how big ought the tax on the polluter be? Given economists’ commitment to value subjectivity, the only way for the “objective” data to exist that is necessary to answer these questions is to assume that the economy is in competitive equilibrium in every market, except for the one market where the market failure exists. This implies unanimous intersubjective agreement as to the marginal value of resources in consumption and production across the economy; it is this intersubjectivity that enables

tension obviously has relevance for the validity of, at minimum, all policy work involving economics. But economists only rarely work on possible resolutions.

To this major puzzle could be added a series of minor puzzles. Consider the popular narrative and massive public policy responses surrounding the 2007-8 financial crisis. Although there is a literature by respected economists suggesting the financial crisis was caused by some combination of reckless monetary policy and poor regulation that incentivized large financial organizations to take larger risks than they otherwise would have,⁸ the most prevalent story is one of market malfeasance, the failure of “neoliberal” economics and “cowboy capitalism,” and the necessity of significantly increased public oversight of the financial sector. The 2009 stimulus package (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) and the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council suggest that the latter narrative has been disproportionately important in determining the course of public policy following the crisis. If the economics profession is reasonably divided—more economists than not think the problem was with markets, rather than government, but the consensus is not overwhelming—why is it that the policy response, of which economists played a part, is so one-sided?

economists to specify concretely *social* costs and benefits. To say this condition is unlikely to prevail in real economies is an understatement. For a more rigorous argument, see Art Carden, “Economic Calculation in the Environmentalist Commonwealth,” *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics* 16:1 (2013): 27-44.

⁸ For example, Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Link or No Link?” BIS Working Papers No. 346, 2011, <http://www.bis.org/publ/work346.pdf>; Guillermo Calvo, “Puzzling over the Anatomy of Crises: Liquidity and the Veil of Finance,” IMES Discussion Paper Series 13-E-09, 2013, <http://www.columbia.edu/~gc2286/documents/CalvoBOJpaperMay2013REVJune282013.pdf>; John B. Taylor, *Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2009); Nicolas Cachanosky and Alexander W. Salter, “The View from Vienna: An Analysis of the Renewed Interest in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the Business Cycle,” *Review of Austrian Economics* 30:2 (2017):169-192, and references therein.

To be clear, this is not a question of why the economists in favor of the managerial-administrative state are prevailing over their laissez-faire counterparts. The economics profession is currently often a source of frustration not only for those in the Austrian tradition, but for those in the Marxist, post-Keynesian, feminist, or other heterodox traditions.⁹ The tools, techniques, and other means of constructing the policy responses to perceived economic crises all rely on a standard set of methodological assumptions that shut out economists with more radical opinions on how to do economics and how the knowledge gained from doing economics should be applied. According to methodological orthodoxy, whether economists practice their craft in the Academy or the State (or both), unless they are modeling constrained optimization or fitting a line through data, their peers will be skeptical that they are doing “real” economics. Many scholars¹⁰ over the decades have pointed out that the methodological requirements economists have adopted to assure themselves that economics meets the requirements of science are questionable in themselves and selectively applied. Furthermore, they are often nonbinding, in the sense that when economists speak to each other and, occasionally, change each other’s minds, it is for reasons other than

⁹ In the interests of full disclosure, I identify (positively) with the Austrian and Virginia schools of political economy, and (normatively) with classical liberalism. But my arguments are not a critique of mainstream economics from either of those perspectives. The point I want to make concerning the adaptive value of some economic theories over others should be concerning to *all* social and policy scientists.

¹⁰ For example, Peter J. Boettke, “Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Modern Economics as a Flight from Reality,” *Critical Review* 11 (1997); Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, “High Priests and Lowly Philosophers: The Battle for the Soul of Economics,” *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 56:3 (2006): 551–68; Kenneth E. Boulding, “After Samuelson, Who Needs Adam Smith?” *History of Political Economy* 3:1 (1971): 225–37; David Colander, *The Making of an Economist, Redux* (Princeton University Press, 2007); Philip Mirowski, *More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Robert H. Nelson, *Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

the scientific nature of their claims as embodied in their theoretical models or careful empirical explorations. Because the methodological mainstream, of which short-run macroeconomics and market-failure microeconomics are a part, is incapable of living up to its self-imposed standards of scientific rigor, the merits of mainstream methodology cannot be the reason for the marginalization of alternative perspectives.

But perhaps there is some criterion other than scientific Truth that serves as a filter, promoting some kinds of economics while discouraging others. The question is, *Where does the filter come from, if it even exists?* Given that the economics mainstream spans the “intellectual range from M to N,”¹¹ can we find something about the economics profession at the institutional level that would explain the previously mentioned puzzles?

I believe there is. The puzzles of economics’ practices containing inconsistencies with their own theories, the one-sided public policy response to economic crises, and the methodological two-step are not separate puzzles, but merely different features that arise from the rules, conventions, and feedback loops that govern the economics profession within and across Academy and State. Unfortunately, since this is what I purport to discuss, the title “The Constitution of Economic Policy” has already been used by a famous economist,¹² although I mean it in quite a different sense than the original author. In political economy, “constitution” refers to the framework of rules governing a specific social sphere. This framework and its historical development, for economists insofar as they act as experts, is precisely what my paper is about. I argue that the above puzzles have deep historical roots and are inseparable from the development of the American research university, the professionalization of the economics discipline in the late nineteenth century, and the role of economists in shaping the Progressive movement,

¹¹ Donald McCloskey, “Kelly Green Golf Shoes and the Intellectual Range from M to N,” *Eastern Economic Journal* 21:3 (1995): 411.

¹² James Buchanan, “The Constitution of Economic Policy,” *American Economic Review* 77:3 (1987): 243–50.

including its successor ideologies from the Great Depression to the aftermath of the Second World War. Those historical trends and forces explain why the economics profession is the way it is, which in turn explains the puzzles.

My contribution is this: linking the revolution in economics that began during the Great Depression and culminated in the early days of the Cold War with deeper historical forces that set the background against which activists and social scientists built their institutions and modified existing ones. To my knowledge, no one has yet directly linked modern managerial-administrative economics with the New England intellectual tradition by way of the research university, the social gospel, and the Progressive movement. Of course, many¹³ have recognized the connection between modern economics and the Progressive movement. But that link has historical antecedents in intellectual traditions characterized by a religious or quasi-religious eschatology.¹⁴ We cannot understand modern economics, and the puzzles it presents, without appreciating the feedback loops promoting certain scholarly ventures that themselves are the "extended present"¹⁵ of the profession's history.

I organize the remainder of the paper as follows: In section 2, I explore the rise of the research university in the United States and the religious conflicts that often accompanied changes in higher education. In section 3, I link these religious forces to the social gospel, the Progressive movement, and the professionalization of economics as a scholarly discipline. In section 4, I show how the alliance between Progressivism and the social gospel weakened, leaving economists with a secularized mission within the university to develop, and sometimes wield, the tools

¹³ For example, Koppl, *Expert Failure*; Levy and Peart, *Escape from Democracy*; Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*, and the references therein. Also relevant is Murray Rothbard, *The Progressive Era*, ed. Patrick Newman (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2017).

¹⁴ Nelson, *Economics as Religion*.

¹⁵ The term is Boulding's ("After Samuelson, Who Needs Adam Smith?"), though I am using it in a different sense.

that would guide the managerial-administrative state. In section 5, I argue that these historical processes help us understand the positive feedback loop between the economics of statecraft and statecraft-oriented economics: modern economics, because of the entanglement of Academy and State, outcompetes other, more radical paradigms (both on the left and right). In section 6, I conclude by discussing what my argument does *not* imply, what I find most troubling about the current state of affairs, and what if anything should be done about it. In building my arguments, I draw on several literatures: the role of the economics profession,¹⁶ the

¹⁶ Boettke, "Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Modern Economics as a Flight from Reality"; Peter J. Boettke, "Don't Be a 'Jibbering Idiot': Economic Principles and the Properly Trained Economist," *Journal of Private Enterprise* 32, no. 3 (2017): 9–15; Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, "High Priests and Lowly Philosophers: The Battle for the Soul of Economics"; Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, "Earw(h)ig: I Can't Hear You Because Your Ideas Are Old," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 38 (2014): 531–44; Peter J. Boettke and Kyle W. O'Donnell, "The Social Responsibility of Economists," in *Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics*, edited by George DeMartino and Deirdre McCloskey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Kenneth E. Boulding, "Economics as a Moral Science," *American Economic Review* 59:1 (1969): 1–12; Boulding, "After Samuelson, Who Needs Adam Smith?"; Samuel Bowles, "Economists as Servants of Power," *American Economic Review* 64:2 (1974): 129–32; William Butos and Peter J. Boettke, "Kirznerian Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Science," *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines* 12:1 (2002): 119–30; Malcom Campbell-Verduyn, "Moral Economese of Scale? Discursive Change and the Varying Authority of Economists since the Global Financial Crisis" (paper prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association's annual conference, May 27–29, 2014); A. W. Coats, "The First Two Decades of the American Economic Association," *American Economic Review* 50 (1960); A. W. Coats, "The American Economics Association and the Economics Profession," *Journal of Economic Literature* 23 (1985); Colander, *The Making of an Economist, Redux*; Christopher J. Coyne and Peter J. Boettke, "The Role of the Economist in Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics* 9, no. 2 (2006): 47–68; Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization*, vols. 4 and 5, 1918–1933 (New York: Viking, 1959); Till Duppe and E. Roy Weintraub, "Siting the New Economic Science: The Cowles Commission's Activity Analysis Conference of June 1949," *Science in Context* (forthcoming); Marion Fourcade, *Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890's to 1990's* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana, "From Social Control to Financial Economics: The Linked Ecologies of Economics and Business in Twentieth Century

relationship between the professionalization of the social sciences and the growth of the American university,¹⁷ and Progressivism’s antecedents,

America,” *Theory and Society* 42 (2013): 121–59; Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan, “The Superiority of Economists,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 29, no. 1 (2015): 89–113; Stephen Horwitz and Peter J. Boettke, “The Limits of Economic Expertise: Prophets, Engineers, and the State in the History of Development Economics,” *History of Political Economy* 37 (2006): 10–39; Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 66:2 (2007): 309–34; Mitchell Langbert, Anthony J. Quain, and Daniel B. Klein, “Faculty Voter Registration in Economics, History, Journalism, Law, and Psychology,” *Econ Journal Watch* 13:3 (2016): 422–51; David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart, *How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur-Text of Racial Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart, *The “Vanity of the Philosopher”: From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Levy and Peart, *Escape from Democracy*; Timothy Mitchell, “Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century,” in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences*, edited by George Steinmetz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Mirowski, *More Heat than Light*; Philip Mirowski, “How Positivism Made a Pact with the Postwar Social Sciences in the United States,” in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences*, edited by George Steinmetz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Nelson, *Economics as Religion*; Dani Rodrik, “When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28:1 (2014): 189–208; Murray N. Rothbard, “The Politics of Political Economists: Comment,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 74, no. 4: 659–65; Rothbard, *The Progressive Era*; George J. Stigler, “The Economist and the State,” *American Economic Review* 55:1 (1965): 1–18; George J. Stigler, “The Influence of Events and Policies on Economic Theory,” *American Economic Review* 50:2 (1960): 36–45; George J. Stigler, “The Politics of Political Economists,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 73:4 (1959): 522–32; Luigi Zingales, “Preventing Economists’ Capture,” in *Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jelveh Zubin, Bruce Kogut, and Suresh Naidu, “Political Language in Economics,” Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 14–57, 2015.

¹⁷ Mary O. Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977); George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); R. J. Rushdoony, *The Messianic Character of American Higher Education* (Vallecito: Ross House Books, 1963).

constituent beliefs, and effect on American institutions.¹⁸ I invite my readers to consult the relevant sources, both for their own edification and to check my claims.

II. THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

The first factor that must play a part in explaining the state of the modern economics profession is the rise of the research university in America. This is especially important in light of the American university system's dominance, which developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and had become more or less established following the Second World War. The rise of the research university in America saw its eclipsing the more traditional collegiate establishments, the professionalization of the sciences—and especially importantly, the social sciences—and the increased specializations in the social sciences that would come to create the separate disciplines of economics, sociology, and political science out of what formerly was known more broadly as political economy.¹⁹

¹⁸ Robert Crunden, *Ministers of Reform: The Progressive's Achievement in American Civilization, 1889–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); John Rutherford Everett, *Religion in Economics: A Study of John Bates Clark, Richard T. Ely, and Simon N. Patten* (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1982); Sydney Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865–1901* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York: Vintage, 1955); Eliza Wing-ye Lee, "Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American Administrative State," *Public Administration Review* (1995): 55; Gary North, "Millennialism and the Progressive Movement," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* (1996a): 12, and *Crossed Fingers: How the Liberals Captured the Presbyterian Church* (1996b: http://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/a_pdfs/gncf.pdf); Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of the American Public Administration* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984); Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

¹⁹ Adam Smith, arguably the founder of classical-liberal political economy, held a chair in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Whether called "political economy" or "applied moral philosophy," the positive principles of the Scottish Enlightenment, applied

The history of higher education in America is inseparable from its Protestant, and especially New England Reformed, heritage. The oldest educational institution in America is Harvard University, founded as Harvard College in 1636. The other colonial colleges include the colleges and universities now known as William and Mary, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, Brown, Rutgers, and Dartmouth. William and Mary and Columbia (then called King’s College) were founded under the auspices of the Church of England, and Brown under the auspices of the Baptists, with no religious requirement for admission. The remaining institutions were explicitly Reformed (either Congregationalist or Presbyterian), although not all made a formal confession a requisite for study. The function of these institutions was, in the earliest days, the training of new clergymen.²⁰ The classical curriculum, although modified from the precise *trivium-quadrivium* model of near-universal liberal education prior to the Reformation, still largely informed core studies in the arts. Given the legitimating principles of Reformed Protestantism, Reformed clergymen were generally well educated and in much higher proportion than their Catholic counterparts until some time after the Council of Trent and the Counter-Reformation. The “priesthood of all believers” freed the Reformed tradition (and other non-Catholic, non-Anglican traditions) from clericalism but came with the requirement of significant instruction, especially in theology and the sacred languages (Hebrew, Greek, and Latin), for believers to understand the intended meaning of the Bible.

to social issues, suggested a broad outlook that is in significant tension with current disciplinary specialization.

²⁰ The distinction between “private” and “public” was understood much differently than it is today. Both Church and State, spiritual and civil authority, were held to be public institutions, and it was regarded as not only normal, but obvious, that in Puritan New England they should mutually support each other. This was part of the later struggle over setting the boundaries between Church and State, which was a significant source of controversy in the development of American higher education.

Following the American Revolution, there was significant sectarian competition for control over existing educational establishments and creation of new ones. The most powerful factions were the Congregationalists and the Presbyterians, sometimes opposed, sometimes engaged in strategic alliances against rationalist humanitarians who wished to insulate the public square from religious controversies. The rationalist humanitarians abhorred factionalism and sought to found education as a vital series of public institutions built upon liberal Enlightenment principles.²¹ Competition among these factions within and across educational establishments for students resulted in a temporary truce: public (State) schools, both precollegiate and collegiate, would not be committed to any particular denomination or confession, while the religious colleges, and specifically their faculties of theology and divinity, would continue to enforce confessional piety within themselves. Given the growing public perception of increasing tensions between orthodox Christianity²² and Enlightenment principles, especially in the early nineteenth century, this equilibrium was unstable. The increasing importance in the mid- and later nineteenth century of technical training and preparation for careers in industry would see changes in the educational establishment that steadily decreased the prominence of explicitly denominational institutions committed to orthodox Christianity.

The forces that resulted in the creation and eventual dominance of American universities began in the mid-nineteenth century, although they did not fully develop until after the Civil War. In the early nineteenth century, educators looked primarily to Scotland for their educational and philosophical models. By the mid-nineteenth century, Prussia had become the guiding light. The Prussian university system, and especially the

²¹ Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*, chs. 3–4.

²² This is not to be confused with the Eastern Orthodox Church. “Orthodox” (lower-case *o*) Christianity refers to the denominations that affirm the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. On this definition, Deists and Unitarians are not orthodox Christians.

University of Berlin, emphasized advanced education by scholars conducting original research. Preliminary study in a *gymnasium* (roughly equivalent to a baccalaureate degree in America) was required for admittance. In America, where reason, science, and civic virtue were coming to eclipse Christianity as the legitimating principles for public life and institutions, educators eagerly looked to apply what worked in Prussia to America, albeit in ways that did not undermine the American civic religion. The transformation of American higher education began with the significant number of Americans who took their graduate courses in Prussia (or the Germanic polities more generally). From 1815 to 1914, between nine and ten thousand Americans studied in the Germanic polities. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, “it would be rare to find either a university leader or a major scholar who had not spent some years studying in Germany.”²³ Americans returned to their country greatly influenced by the Prussian model and were determined to apply it domestically.²⁴

Initially, the atmosphere at the new research universities, and the existing colleges such as Harvard and Yale that would successfully transform themselves into world-class universities, was amenable to Christianity. While denominational conflicts were frowned upon—with the exception of Catholicism, which was regarded within most establishments with suspicion—a spirit of “liberal Protestantism” was formally established or informally (culturally) enforced. Attendance of religious services was frequently mandatory, and service-attendance requirements sometimes persisted well into the twentieth century. But the spirit of Christianity at the universities was ultimately superficial.²⁵ Religion was compartmentalized, such that explicit religious instruction was relegated to schools of theology or divinity, and was no longer part

²³ Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*, 104.

²⁴ North (1996b, ch. 10) explores how Presbyterian clergymen-in-training were also sent to Germany, which was the leading seat of theological liberalism at the time.

²⁵ Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*, prologues 1–3.

of the standard arts or sciences curriculum by the early twentieth century. The emphasis was on morals—virtuous living, especially applied to the stewardship of the republic—rather than dogma. The spirit of liberal Protestantism at these universities primarily focused on improving the world through technical and moral education. As discussed in the previous section, religion was used primarily as a means for advancing the “Kingdom of God on earth.” Eventually, as increased developments in the natural sciences and biblical criticism developed, the cultural mandate of liberal Protestantism remained, but Protestantism itself was jettisoned.²⁶

Americans returning from graduate study abroad brought not only enthusiasm for the Prussian university model, but also Prussian intellectual fashions regarding the theory and practice of political economy. Starting in the 1870s and 1880s, the (younger) German historical school’s approach to political economy, and especially its positive view of the State as an instrument of social control and improvement, began to filter into American political economy and the scholarly institutions within which political economy was practiced. American economists of this era rejected the ideas, as in classical economics, of universal economic laws and of economics as a value-free and deductive science. Instead they proclaimed an inductive and historically relative economics that explicitly engaged ethical concerns.²⁷

Many new universities, such as Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, and the University of Chicago, were founded beginning in the 1870s with donations from wealthy capitalists interested in philanthropy and social reform. Political economy gained heightened prominence in this new landscape for higher education: “In 1880, college courses in Latin

²⁶ Cf. Marsden, *The Soul*, 265: “The fatal weakness in conceiving of the university as a broadly Christian institution was its higher commitments to scientific and professional ideals and to the demands for a unified public life. In the light of such commitments academic expressions of Christianity seemed at best superfluous and at worst unscientific and unprofessional.”

²⁷ Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State*, ch 7.

outnumbered courses in political economy by ten to one.... At leading schools in 1900 there was parity. By 1912, only English had more undergraduate majors than did economics at Yale University."²⁸ Thus the American passion for practical, technical, scientific, research-oriented higher education not only affected new institutions, but the old and venerable colleges as well.

Economics as a scholarly discipline was largely constructed in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Previously, social science was typically the domain of "gentlemen scholars" outside of an explicit university establishment. But with the founding of the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1885, along with the rapid adoption of economics—the older term "political economy" was largely out of use by 1900—into university curricula, the stage was set for the rise of a recognizably modern economics profession, specializing in technical writing for peers and the education of new generations of graduate students.²⁹ Further, "the American university gave the economists more than academic chairs, a decent library, and students. The American university gave the economists *scientific authority*."³⁰

Importantly, there was great homogeneity in the values of the social scientists and educators who oversaw the rise of the American university, the development of economics within the university system, and the professionalization of economics through the formation of bodies such as the AEA.³¹ These men and women were Progressives. Many were

²⁸ Leonard *Illiberal Reformers*, 17–18.

²⁹ Coats, "The First Two Decades of the American Economic Association"; Coats, "The American Economics Association and the Economics Profession."

³⁰ Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*, 20, emphasis added.

³¹ Richard T. Ely, social gospeler, economist, and institutional entrepreneur par excellence, pushed for the American Economic Association to be an explicitly anti-laissez-faire, pro-state-control professional body. However, after pushback from other founding members who wanted the AEA to primarily be a scholarly professional society, this element was discarded (Sidney Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865-1901* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956], ch 7). The

committed liberal Protestants, but even those who were not were fully on board with liberal Protestantism's cultural mandate and the role of social scientists in advancing this mandate. They saw their discipline as an essential component of improving society using the tools afforded by an increasingly "scientific" economics. Thus, just as it is crucial to understand the scholarly institutions and practices that would come to define economics in its recognizably modern form, we must understand the relationship of liberal Protestant ethics to Progressivism, and the latter's eventual discarding of the former, to appreciate why today's economics discipline looks the way it does.

III. PROGRESSIVISM AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL: FROM ALLIANCE TO OBSOLESCENCE

Just as the developments of American higher education and religion are inseparable, the rise of Progressivism in America cannot be separated from its religious foundation. To be clear, Progressivism is not reducible to applied liberal Protestantism. But in terms of the development of ideas, there is a definite similarity, and without the influence of liberal Protestant³² social ethics, including its then-evangelical zeal for

importance of the professionalization of economics, and especially the AEA, lies not in its *direct* effect in linking economists to efforts at social control, but its *indirect* effects in facilitating the transformation of the discipline along scholarly networks centered in universities. On this point, see Rothbard, *The Progressive Era*, chapter 13, sections 6 and 7.

³² On the term, see Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Today, the label "liberal Protestantism" is usually associated with mainline denominations (e.g., PCUSA, United Methodist, United Church of Christ, etc.). This is differentiated from "evangelical" denominations, such as the Baptists, Evangelical Free, Reformed, Wesleyan, or Southern Methodists. But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the growing separation between theological liberalism and evangelical activities across denominational lines, "evangelical" often referred to liberal Protestants.

"immanentizing the eschaton,"³³ Progressivism would not have had nearly so strong a social base.

Progressivism had many strands that were not always perfectly compatible. Nonetheless, there was a core set of beliefs in Progressives' calls for reform and the means by which reform would be achieved. Not all people who identified as Progressives, or all those we could classify as such in retrospect, had all these beliefs. But especially in the context of the professionalization of economics and the role of economics in supporting the managerial-administrative state, these core beliefs are frequently expressed. They are the beliefs (a) that laissez-faire had resulted in widespread inefficiency and an unjust distribution of income, (b) that it was the duty of the state to rein in the "anarchic" market economy using modern techniques of management and administration, and (c) that these techniques would be studied, developed, explicated, and applied by expert social scientists and public policy specialists, who would be trained in the universities.³⁴

The rise of Progressivism and its impact on society through scholarship and politics can be traced back to the New England intellectual tradition:³⁵ "Nearly all [of the first generation of Progressive

³³ On the relationship between various forms of millennialism and Progressivism, see North (1996a, 1996b).

³⁴ Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State*; Lee, "Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American Administrative State"; Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*; Waldo, *The Administrative State*. See also Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization*; Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*; Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920*.

³⁵ This tradition is more rich and variegated than our contemporary positions of liberal and conservative; hence mapping it onto either of the contemporary positions entails some discrepancies. For our purposes, the generalizable features of the New England tradition are its extraordinary emphasis on moral development and the reformation of society in ways that exhibit, and instill in future generations, civic virtue. The latter is an evangelical, if not messianic, project. John Adams, for example, is a quintessential representative of the New England tradition, but his thinking is much closer to Anglo-American conservatism than the antecedents of Progressivism. See Russel A. Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Elliot* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, [1953] 2001), ch. 2, for the classic statement of

scholars and activists] descended from old New England families of seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay background....More often than not, Progressives were the children of protestant ministers or missionaries, fired with an evangelical urge to redeem America."³⁶ The social mission of these activists and scholars was conceived as an act of redemption. However, the object of redemption was not the individual soul, as in orthodox Christian soteriology, but society itself. Salvation was perceived as a social effort because sin was perceived as "social in cause."³⁷ This was the underlying principle of the social gospel, which emphasized the worldly and natural vocation of the Christian activist and diminished the importance of the spiritual and supernatural aspects of salvation. Dedicated to social improvement and armed with the modern techniques of science and administration, the social gospel held that Christian activists could, and in fact were called to, build the Kingdom of God on earth.

The social gospel greatly impacted the men and women who oversaw the professionalization of economics and its situation within the new American university: "The American Economic Association ... embodied the social gospel's distinctive amalgam of liberal Protestant ethics, veneration of science, and evangelizing activism of pious, middle-class reformers."³⁸ While social-gospeler Progressives did not neglect the voluntary institutions of civil society, their primary concern in seeking means of social improvement was the state. The economists who were active in the early days of economics' professionalization and re-situation within the university were, almost uniformly, hostile to laissez-faire and saw the state—guided by the latest advances in economic theory—as the

Adams's social and political thought as well as the Anglo-American conservative tradition more generally.

³⁶ Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*, 11–12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 12. See also Everett, *Religion in Economics*.

proper tool for correcting the ethically unacceptable consequences of the "anarchic" market economy.

Eventually, the social gospel, and liberal Protestantism itself, would fade in importance in sustaining Progressive causes. This was partially caused by the First World War: "The Great War's slaughter and uncontrolled irrationality mocked the Progressive idea of spiritual and social progress through enlightened social control."³⁹ However, by this time, Progressivism had become institutionalized through its entrenchment in the Academy and through the de facto and de jure constitutional innovations of the Wilson administration. Growing concerns among subsets of Catholics and Jews that social improvement via control was needed resulted in the next generation of Progressives distancing themselves from religion. By the time John Maynard Keynes and, slightly later, Paul Samuelson captured the imagination of the economics profession, the Christian roots of the quest for social improvement through social control were held in mild contempt by many social scientists and public policy experts. What remained was a quasi-religious belief in the powers of science applied to the study of man to improve the human condition through the deliverance of material abundance.⁴⁰ Experts in economics and public policy would continue to wield their scientific knowledge and the apparatus of the managerial-administrative state to bring about social improvement, without the now-unfashionable justificatory requirements of liberal Protestantism's eschatology and soteriology.

IV. ECONOMICS, ACADEMY, AND STATE: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP

The New England intellectual tradition and the early roots of Progressivism in the social gospel together explain the forces behind

³⁹ Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*, 15.

⁴⁰ Nelson, *Economics as Religion*, chs 3-4.

economics' professionalization and how, in alliance with sympathetic politicians such as Woodrow Wilson, the political machinery was established that economists would then study and wield. These are the antecedents of the modern economics profession, but we still need to build a bridge between economics as it developed up until approximately the Second World War, and as it is currently structured. This is a story of intellectual revolution accompanied by an implicit (and hence little recognized) normative shift in the role of the social scientist.

Interestingly, an observer of the economics profession in the early twentieth century would not necessarily have bet on the Progressive economists. In the 1910s and 1920s, American economics began to shift in a manner more receptive to the neoclassical economics of the kind practiced by Alfred Marshall or Ludwig von Mises.⁴¹ The case of John Bates Clark is particularly noteworthy. Initially sympathetic to the "new" political economy he learned while earning his doctorate in Germany during the era of the younger German historical school, he made an about-face in his most famous work, *The Distribution of Wealth*. Clark eschewed the historicist approach of his contemporaries, developing what we today recognize as the marginal-revenue-product theory of factor pricing, which showed that the factors of production tend to earn the value they add to production processes. Instead of radical social reform, Clark recommended the comparatively modest program of the state promoting competition by enforcing a level playing field, such as by preventing the formation of trusts. As Clark's example shows, historicist and

⁴¹ A self-consciously Austrian school of economics (except in the limited context of opposition to the German historical schools) had not yet developed. That would not take place until after the Second World War. Instead there were Anglo-American and Continental variants of neoclassical economics. The variants had their differences, but both were committed to the project of rebuilding economics along the line of subjective value and marginal analysis.

institutionalist political economy was on the retreat; neoclassical economics, whether in its English or Austrian variants, was on the rise.⁴²

But the machinery was already in place for the economist to assume the role in society most similar to that of today: that of the scientific expert. Ironically, the retreat from explicit reformist activism in the interwar years facilitated economists’ coming to have a far greater role in public policy. The discipline’s fading enthusiasm for activism and reform was replaced by the desire to develop the neoclassical paradigm as a value-free science. By eschewing an explicitly ideological orientation, economics bolstered its claim to scientific expertise. Thus economists, due to their self-consciously scholarly and academic orientation in the 1920s and the 1930s, could be incorporated into later state planning efforts—such as those that would follow with the New Deal, the Second World War, and the beginning of the Cold War—without raising ideological flags. Economists were no longer seen as Progressives seeking to reform society using the state, but experts—more often than not credentialed with PhDs from elite universities—helping to conduct the ordinary business of running the mid-twentieth-century social machinery.⁴³

A confluence of events beginning in the 1930s resulted in the development of modern scientific (model-and-measure) economics. In the midst of the Great Depression, Keynes published his *General Theory*, which argued that markets in the aggregate were unstable because of the fickle behavior of investors. Markets would not self-regulate. Instead the economy could get stuck in a costly unemployment equilibrium characterized by widespread resource under-utilization. John Hicks would later attempt the first formalization of Keynes’s literary theory, but it was Paul Samuelson, with the publication of *Foundations of Economic Analysis* and *Economics*, for graduates and undergraduates respectively, who initiated the revolution in how economists practiced their craft. It was

⁴² Sidney Fine, *Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956/1964), ch 7.

⁴³ Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*, ch 2.

through Samuelson, in these foundational texts and his later writings, that the macroeconomics of aggregate-demand management and the microeconomics of market failure came to dominate the profession. Importantly, Samuelson and his contemporaries saw themselves as providing a purely scientific foundation for economics, eschewing the political agendas of the first generation of Progressive economists. While we have no reason to suspect their intentions were anything but sincere, the methodological transformation of economics did in fact have significant political implications.

The Second World War and afterward the Cold War were also watershed events in the development of economics. With the outbreak of the war, many mathematicians, statisticians, and social scientists entered the service of government, both in the armed forces and as civilian consultants, working on problems related to the optimal allocation of resources in the wartime economy. It was during the Second World War, within the armed forces and at institutions such as the RAND Corporation, that operations research and linear-programming models were developed and refined to best serve the war effort. The development and refinement of these models would be taken up in the aftermath of the war by the economics profession on a mathematical track parallel to, but distinct from, the mathematical foundations pioneered by Samuelson. The transition from the Second World War to the Cold War ensured an environment in which the public sector would perpetually require social scientists to work on problems in the service of US tactics, strategy, and grand strategy.⁴⁴

By the beginning of the Cold War, the economics profession's self-understanding had shifted to one of professional scientists conducting

⁴⁴ Fourcade, *Economists and Societies*; Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana, "From Social Control to Financial Economics: The Linked Ecologies of Economics and Business in Twentieth Century America," *Theory and Society* 42:2 (2013): 121–59; Mitchell, "Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century"; Mirowski, "How Positivism Made a Pact with the Postwar Social Sciences in the United States."

value-neutral research. Economists employed by the public sector plied their trade in the service of the New Deal State’s managerial apparatus, while the last meaningful resistance to that apparatus among the American public and intellectuals was quickly evaporating. This complemented the practice of scholarly economics within the universities. With the rise of constrained optimization, comparative statics, linear programming, and econometrics, university-based economists developed the practical tools that their counterparts in public policy would use in staffing the bureaucracy. By developing theory and putting new discoveries to work, economists assisted politicians and bureaucrats in governing the postwar economy, both at the micro level and the macro level. Economists came to be seen as important sources of expertise in making sure markets operated as efficiently as possible. Efficiency and material prosperity thus became the implicit formative justification for the administrative state and the role of the economic expert within it.⁴⁵ Economists both ensured the best possible operation of the market mechanism and, to the extent they were employed in strategic concerns, contributed to the effort of allocating manpower and material in the standoff with the Soviet Union.

V. THE INSTITUTIONS OF ECONOMICS EXAMINED: LIVING WITH THE MANAGERIAL STATE’S “EXTENDED PRESENT”

The above bird’s-eye history of the economics profession and its relationship to the Academy and society at large explains how economics came to be the way it is. Entire books can be, and have been, written on the numerous claims I presented in the narrative. My purpose in the streamlined presentation was to show that *the situation of economics scholarship within research universities, and that scholarship’s close relationship to public policy, is not the appropriate place to begin an exploration of how*

⁴⁵ Nelson, *Economics as Religion*.

economists practice their craft. To wit, the relationship between economic scholarship and public policy is unthinkable without the former's situation within the university and its claims to scientific authority based on mathematical and statistical rigor. The university setting and economics' claims to authority are unthinkable without the early Progressive economists and the drive to professionalize the discipline and create out of the antebellum collegial setting of higher education a genuine university system. And these late-nineteenth- to early-twentieth-century movements are unthinkable without reference to the earlier controversies over higher education in the United States, and especially the role of religion in higher education. In each case, the culture and ideas then prevalent structured the actions of those who would engage in social entrepreneurship, changing at the margin the way social scientists and reformers engaged the separate but overlapping spheres of scholarship and statecraft.

The formalization of economic theory, and the development of advanced statistical techniques for ascertaining causality in the absence of controlled experiments, obviously constituted a revolution in the practice of economics. This has already been explored extensively by many of the authors cited in the previous sections. It is also a significant part of the explanation for the "superiority of economists":⁴⁶ the source of their discipline's dominance among the social sciences, their greater material rewards, and their significant influence on public policy. As Leonard⁴⁷ shows, the first generation of Progressive economists played a nontrivial role in the creation of the managerial-administrative state in the Wilson administration. But economists played a far greater role in developing the New Deal State in the Roosevelt administration as well as staffing various public policy positions within the State and within related organizations such as think tanks and NGOs that also play an important part in the policy process. The transformation of economic theory and practice along

⁴⁶ Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan, "The Superiority of Economists."

⁴⁷ Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers*.

nominally scientific lines provided the justification for economists having such heavy influence. Whereas the Progressive economists of the first generation were overt reformers, those in the generation beginning with Samuelson were reformers in disguise. They were not engaged in politics, a practice of questionable repute. Instead they were scientists conducting value-free scholarship, or they were implementing public policy, an activity that, in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson⁴⁸ came to be seen as an administrative, and hence apolitical, task. But, as Levy and Peart⁴⁹ show, the selection of social values by deliberation and their implementation by experts have never been, and probably can never be, realized. Economists, like everyone else, respond to incentives, and in their role as experts they have certainly not been apolitical. Values inform the politics even of experts, and experts respond to the changing constraints afforded by political environments, much as we would expect from standard rational choice theory.⁵⁰

Nelson⁵¹ shows how the values of Samuelson and Samuelson’s generation of economists continued the Progressive tradition. These scholars, who all had first-class minds, saw no contradiction between advancing values they saw as crucial to equality and democracy while overseeing the methodological transformation of their discipline in a way that made economics uniquely suited to guiding the ship of State. In fact, there is no contradiction, in the sense that these projects are not incommensurable. But when they are actually operationalized within the institutions comprising Academy and State, any claims to the clear separation of fact and value—and, in the realm of practice, between (interest-sensitive) politics and (disinterested) policy—are untenable.

⁴⁸ Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” *Political Science Quarterly* 2:2 (1887): 197–220; Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics* (New York: Meridian Books, [1885] 1956).

⁴⁹ Levy and Peart, *Escape from Democracy*.

⁵⁰ Levy and Peart, *How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur-Text of Racial Politics*, 12. See also Levy and Peart, *The “Vanity of the Philosopher.”*

⁵¹ Nelson, *Economics as Religion*.

Samuelson, his contemporaries, and his successors were still trying to “immanentize the eschaton.” But the eschaton had become secular. Progression toward the Kingdom of God on earth had been replaced with progression toward ever-increasing material prosperity. Economists claimed scientific expertise in the ability to understand and manage the “market mechanism” to ensure its maximal efficiency and the equitable distribution of goods. The former was perceived as purely scientific, whereas the latter, while admittedly a value judgment, in the postwar climate had become almost universally held among the most prominent intellectuals. In fact, both were ultimately normative commitments, and while they may be separable in a purely intellectual sense, in reality they are entwined.

We can now return to the puzzles discussed in the introduction. The puzzles centered on particular practices by economists that, if pressed, economists will acknowledge are questionable at best and inconsistent with basic theory at worst. The reason these practices persist is the peculiar “entanglement”⁵² between the institutions of Academy and State. The entanglement began in the earliest days of the university, was driven by the religious concerns and controversies within US higher education since the beginning, and went hand-in-hand with the early ascendancy of Progressivism. By the time of the Wilson administration, it was solidified; by the time of the Roosevelt administration, each was put to work in the service of the other. The practices of State reinforced and promoted the social role of Academy, and the practices of the Academy promoted the efficacy and reach of the State. In other words, there was a mutually reinforcing feedback loop between Academy and State. This feedback loop also served as a filter, promoting certain kinds of economic explanations and practices and retarding others.⁵³

⁵² Richard E. Wagner, *Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy* (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2016).

⁵³ Rushdoony (1995 [1963], p. 169) is worth quoting at length on this point: “Not only must the university, if it be consistent, reject statism internally and externally, but it must

As Tarko⁵⁴ explains, any successful scientific community is governed by a host of overlapping institutions, including informal norms, which give scientists the information and incentives necessary to contest each other's findings. It is this contestability, rather than narrow falsifiability, that results in scientific progress and the tendency toward accumulation of genuine knowledge. But these information flows and incentive structures will change if the institutional structure of science changes. In the context of economics, involvement with statecraft did not only provide economists another outlet for applying their findings. The growing entanglement of Academy and State changed the institutions within which scientific discourse took place. Thus the choices of economists in terms of theory development and method selection⁵⁵ must be explained not by the influence of Academy and State as separable institutions, but by an overlapping institution that arose from their overlapping social networks.

This overlap also was characterized by a reward structure that promoted Samuelsonian economics in the service of the administrative state. The prospect of public funding, public sector employment, and the

recognize that the free university can exist only in a free society, and that it has an obligation to promote that society. The university cannot shirk its cultural and sociological obligation without ruin to itself. A major and insistent threat to academic freedom today is the decline of private giving to education. The mainsprings of freely given financial support are drying up as a result of the rise of statism. A confiscatory system of taxation and a policy of government encroachment on a free economy increasingly render it difficult for the university to command a financial support from a financially free population. Lacking these sources, the university finds very tempting the constant flow of government funds. Today, atomic research, and, with it, allied avenues of study, has largely passed into the hands of the government and its subsidized allies. The temptation grows to emphasize the value of research in terms of governmental needs."

⁵⁴ Vlad Tarko, "Polycentric Structure and Informal Norms: Competition and Coordination within the Scientific Community," *Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science Research* 28:1 (2015): 63–80.

⁵⁵ Felipe Almeida, Eduardo Angeli, and Renato Pontes, "An Institutional Explanation for Economists' Theoretical and Methodological Choices," *Review of Political Economy* 29:1 (2017):80-92.

prestige that comes with making public policy changed the reward structure economists faced not for giving specific answers to a preordained set of questions, but for changing the questions themselves. Involvement with statecraft altered the universe of discourse. Relatedly, the practices of the managerial-administrative state had their objectives given, in part, from the theories promulgated by university-trained economists. Objectives such as the maintenance of full employment or the provision of nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods were granted legitimacy by the apparent status of economics as objective social science, and allowed the various executive organs to expand their mandates in line with advances in economic theory and history that showed new ways to solve existing problems, or new problems to be solved. Like Scott,⁵⁶ we may say the success of postwar economics as a developing scientific community with significant influence on public sector outcomes is attributable to economics generating the kind of information required for administrators to “run” the economy as if it were a business organization or a piece of industrial machinery. Aggregate-demand-failure macroeconomics and market-failure microeconomics provide the technical solutions to mechanical problems the state is uniquely positioned to remedy. These kinds of economics “objectify” or “rationalize” the economy, an otherwise complex system, such that it can be governed.

If this is correct, the organs of public policy are part of an Academy–State institutional network derived from two separate groups of institutions that happen to be working in tandem. Economists govern, governors use economics, and individuals within this institutional complex often practice both roles, perhaps even simultaneously. The reason this institutional morphing was so effective is due, in part, to what the State institutions brought and continue to bring to the relationship.

⁵⁶ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

The government is a “big player,”⁵⁷ which means it gets to play the social game by a different set of rules than other social groups. The most obvious rule is the government’s monopoly on coercion. But the most relevant for the Academy–State story is the government’s soft budget constraint. The public sector simply is not bound by the same kind of fiscal constraints as the private sector. It has much more wiggle room. This enables the public sector to mobilize significant resources and direct them to activities that, had they been undertaken by private organizations (whether for profit or not) would not be sustainable.

This surely plays a prominent part in explaining the rewards structure modern economists receive for asking questions and offering answers that are useable, in a broad sense, by the managerial-administrative state. Examples include the salaries and benefits for public sector employment, the creation and endowment of public universities, and providing research grants for scholars whose positions are nominally private. Economists who are outside the mainstream either in research topic or method of investigation face a competitive disadvantage against their scholarly peers in acquiring the necessary resources for conducting their projects. Out-of-step economists thus are less adaptively successful in this environment because, within prominent scholarly organizations, they receive less support, or because (and this is probably far more likely) they are never hired by prominent scholarly organizations, since the scholar-evaluators know the potential hiree cannot contribute to the health of the organization, which is achieved in part by accessing those resources.

Finally, potentially out-of-step economists make a rational choice to engage in conventional projects at the margin. The combination of these factors explains why economists are pursuing scholarly lines of questionable internal consistency, and why, despite this, alternative paradigms within the Academy and government are rare. These

⁵⁷ Roger Koppl, *Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

alternative paradigms are simply less competitive in the Academy–State institutional complex.

The last, but certainly not the least important, feature of the overlapping institutions of Academy and State, which underlies modern economic discourse, is that it was not intended by any of the individuals or groups of individuals who took part in the social changes discussed in sections 2, 3, and 4. The positive feedback loop between mainstream economics and the practice of the administrative state is a spontaneous order: to quote Adam Ferguson, “the product of human action, but not of human design.” This is decidedly not a conspiracy theory of economics, because there are no conspirators. Perhaps some of the social, political, and intellectual entrepreneurs who took part in this process had designs on power, and perhaps some envisioned something like the final result. But, for the most part, these movements were advanced by individuals of high intellect with a sincere desire to do good, who in no way intended the result, by which I mean they did not have as a goal the positive feedback loop between managerial-administrative economics and economics-informed administration. At each step, from the early days of higher education in the United States to the postwar mainstream consensus, the *intentions* of the relevant actors can best be explained as altruistic, but the *results* of their actions can best be explained as adaptive. It is in this sense we are living with the extended present not just of the managerial-administrative state, but of the nondenominational liberal Protestant ethos of the university, and the New England religious intellectual tradition more generally. This is why, in spite of the importance of Samuelson’s generation, the expansion of the State under the New Deal, and the bidirectional support networks between the most prestigious universities and the practice of public policy, I spent comparatively more time on the historical antecedents of these events. Their success simply cannot be explained in a vacuum. History, culture,

and ideas matter,⁵⁸ especially when these spheres are important centers of the various feedback loops and adaptive filters that promoted the various reform efforts.

Boettke and Bedard,⁵⁹ in their discussion of the determinants of economic policy, provide a way to think about these claims in simple game-theoretic terms. They conceive the interaction between Academy (economists) and State (governors) as follows: Economists can position themselves as either “students” or “saviors” of society, and governors can position themselves as “referees” or “players” in the social game. Unstable equilibria arise when economists are students and governors are players, or when economists are saviors and governors are referees. Of the stable equilibria, the one relevant to my thesis is the one in which economists want to be saviors of society and governors want to be active participants in the social game. This results in the mutually reinforcing roles chosen by economists and governors, where economic experts derive positions and give advice to experts, and experts employ and support economic experts. To understand why this equilibrium is stable, however, we need to understand the institutional forces at work in shaping the information and incentives of economists and governors, and thus their historical context. Rather than isolated decisions that happened to congeal in the postwar United States, the roles embraced by economists and governors, which yielded mainstream economics as we observe it today, are historically path dependent. To understand the equilibrium, we need to understand the ideas that give structure to the tradeoffs faced by the actors within Academy and State; to understand the ideas, we need to appreciate that ideas do not develop in a vacuum, but are themselves the result of the interactions among theorists and practitioners in a specific institutional context. This is why we cannot answer the puzzles set out in the introduction without recourse to the New England intellectual tradition

⁵⁸ Rodrik, “When Ideas Trump Interests.”

⁵⁹ Peter J. Boettke and Mathieu Bedard, “Towards a Theory of Economic Policy: A Contemporary ‘Austrian School’ Perspective,” working paper, 2017, 23.

and the path the carriers of this tradition took when they interacted within other institutions. The events may be far removed, but they cast a long shadow.

VI. CONCLUSION: SO WHAT?

Alchian famously argued that modeling firms as profit maximizers, as a heuristic, was coherent ultimately because of the institutions within which firms competed.⁶⁰ Those firms that failed to make realized profits as large as possible would lose market share to their competitors, and so at any given instant, observed firms would be the ones most likely to have succeeded at maximizing profits. The emphasis was not on behavioral characteristics or internal motivation, but on the formal survival characteristics of firms that managed to be adaptively successful.

This is how we ought to think about modern economics. Behavioral and intentional considerations aside, the economics profession too has its filters that promote certain kinds of economics and discourage others. Modern economics has “passed the market test,” but once we pay attention to the filtering mechanisms that characterize this particular market, we have good reason to suspect the market test isn’t testing for what it claims. How? *Due to the entanglement of Academy and State, the economics profession and the administrative apparatus of government form a mutually supporting network. Economics that can be applied to the practices of the managerial-administrative state is promoted; economics without such ease of application is discouraged.* This means modern economic practice can be explained by the adaptive value of certain kinds of economic scholarship, where that value is not clearly related to what is true (i.e., actually the case).

⁶⁰ Armen A. Alchian, “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory,” *Journal of Political Economy* 58:3 (1950): 211–21.

Other scholars⁶¹ have also come to the conclusion that entanglement with some other social sphere has resulted in the institutions within which economic scholarship competes and qualities other than truth are selected for. At risk of oversimplifying and creating the impression of more commonalities than actually exist, I believe these scholars' arguments suggest that private interest, and in particular that implicit in economists' penchant for what might be called neoliberal scholarship beginning with the rise of the Chicago school, has resulted in scholarly economic institutions selecting for models that suggest an unrealistic degree of market efficacy. Scholarship sponsored by private business plays a different role in each of these explanations, but it is always a worry.

I share these scholars' concern for the influence of outside institutions on the practice of economic scholarship. But I disagree with *what* is the primary source of this influence. Most obviously, the economics profession is not the bastion of *laissez-faire* it is often portrayed as. Within economics, faculty voter registration at elite universities leans significantly Democrat. There are 4.5 registered Democrats for every Republican among economists at these universities, which admittedly is smaller than in the fields of (in increasing order of Democrat–Republican ratios) law, psychology, journalism, and history, but still is nowhere near the kind of free market consensus often imagined.⁶² Even stronger contrary evidence is supplied by Klein and Stern,⁶³ who show that among AEA members, only approximately 8 percent can be classified as

⁶¹ For example, Michael A. Bernstein, *A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in 20th Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Avner Offer, and Gabriel Söderberg, *The Nobel Factor: The Prize in Economics, Social Democracy, and the Market Turn* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Zingales, "Preventing Economists' Capture."

⁶² Langbert et al., "Faculty Voter Registration." It is admittedly questionable whether Republicans' behavior matches their stated positions. They certainly employ the *rhetoric* of *laissez-faire* and hostility to the managerial-administrative state. Their *actions* on this front once in power are far less clear. Nonetheless, the stark difference in public perception means the skewed ratio probably does convey some real and useful information.

⁶³ Klein and Stern, "Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House?"

supporters of free markets, and 3 percent strong supporters of free markets. Lastly, Boettke and O'Donnell⁶⁴ give numerous reasons why, in the context of the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, the corruption of economic scholarship by private business interests is unlikely. Compared to public influence in the form of research support, public-university jobs, and positions directly in the public policy apparatus—all underpinned by a soft budget constraint, a piece of institutional technology that private interests cannot access qua private interests—the effects of private interests in skewing economic scholarship are, in my view, only of secondary importance.

The question of public vs. private interest in changing the institutions governing scholarly economic discourse is fascinating, but I do not want to go more into that distinction here. My goal was to provide some evidence, and convey my personal opinion, that private interests were not the *chief* source of influence over the institutions of economic scholarship. I do not mean to run a horse race between Corporation and State. I certainly do not want to suggest that my argument solely implies bias against laissez-faire economics. The whole point of the Academy-State filter is that it simultaneously selects for managerial economic bureaucrats and an economics of managerial bureaucracy. This means that any economics that cannot be used to administer the State apparatus will be selected out for reasons other than validity. This situation is troubling also to those economists on the far left for whom the administrative state is a tool of capitalist exploitation. There is little room for *genuine* radicalism in economics these days; Marxists, even those who have moved beyond contentious theories of value and into the interesting propositions Marx made concerning the trajectory of “late capitalism,” are marginalized just like Austrians. Post-Keynesians too have a hard time in the current environment due to important theoretical concepts such as the “Minsky moment” not lending themselves well to the model-and-measure

⁶⁴ Boettke and O'Donnell, “The Social Responsibility of Economists.”

methodological positivism that has proved so beneficial for the health of the Academy–State relationship.

The economics profession does have moments of self-reflection, wherein its contributors acknowledge some problem and vow to perform better in the future. Monetary economists eventually recognized Fed complicity in putting the “Great” in “Great Depression”; comparative economists eventually realized economic efficiency could not come from central planning; methodologically savvy economists eventually admitted the poverty of logical positivism, and admitted that model-and-measure economics was not the sole avenue to Truth; macroeconomists following the Great Recession acknowledged that dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium models frequently use superficial rigor to mask their paucity in shedding light on important macro transmission mechanisms. These moments of honest self-criticism are valuable and proper for a scholarly and scientific discipline. But they are also transient: few if any of the above moments of enlightenment resulted in anything more than a surface-level change in how economics was practiced. This is difficult to explain if we see economics as governed by institutions that we would classify as best promoting critical scholarship and only critical scholarship. It is much easier to explain if we recognize that there is some feature of scholarly economics institutions that are selecting for explanations on margins other than truth.⁶⁵ This does not, by itself, imply that the explanations are themselves untrue. But for those who are dedicated to the search for truth (or whatever can be legitimately known of it), the fact that some kinds of economics have strong adaptive value for reasons unrelated to truth should be frightening.

So what, if anything, should be done about this? Hopefully I have made a strong enough argument that my readers are convinced that the market for ideas in economics is not free of institutional distortions. But

⁶⁵ For a perspective on the problem from an alternative paradigm than classical liberal political economy, but nonetheless arrives at many of the same diagnoses, see Steven Payson, *How Economics Professors Can Stop Failing Us* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017).

the complexity of the topic means a single research paper is not going to be anywhere near definitive. We need an ongoing scholarly effort devoted to the durable institutions of economic science, how they have changed, and how those changes may have distorted the playing field on which economic ideas compete. If my thesis is wrong, at least we will have a new body of institutional history and history of thought that adds to the stock of human knowledge. If my thesis is right, things become much more complicated.

One of my graduate school mentors is fond of saying, “Institutional problems demand institutional solutions.” I see no reason why that ought not hold here. We must seriously think about the requirements necessary to enable scholars to produce ideas that have parity on the intellectual field of battle. So long as big players are entangled with the institutions of economic scholarship, I do not see how that can be the case. In the extreme, we must recognize, demand, and ultimately realize the separation of Academy and State. I hold no illusions about this being possible within the foreseeable future and without a great deal of hard work. But, as they say, the first step is recognizing that you have a problem.

ORIGEN’S INTERPRETATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE BOOK OF JOSHUA

Mark Chenoweth¹

Abstract: If libertarians advocate for a highly restricted use of violence in society, it is incumbent upon Christian libertarians to offer a hermeneutic approach to scripture that is at least compatible with this ethic. Origen of Alexandria’s exegetical method, although very strange from a modern perspective, is a consistent biblical hermeneutic compatible with the libertarian restriction on violence. This article examines Origen’s interpretation of violence in the book of Joshua. I begin by looking at his exegetical method as a whole, which he describes in his *On First Principles* and then move on to his allegorical interpretation of Joshua. Although I do not intend to offer a systematic defense of Origen’s approach, simply introducing the Christian libertarian to Origen’s take on the violence opens up the current Christian debate on the interpretation of the conquest narratives to a hermeneutic world that goes far beyond (without negating) the findings of historical criticism.

Keywords: Origen, allegory, violence, hermeneutics, Joshua, conquest narratives

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there have been a number of different attempts from scholars of multiple disciplines to make sense of Old Testament violence, particularly the killing of innocent women and children in books like

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Joshua.² Although most of these books *refer* to Origen of Alexandria's (185-254 CE) interpretation of Old Testament violence, few of them offer an in-depth look at what exactly Origen was doing when interpreting the violence.³ Given Origen's incalculable influence on theological heavyweights like Athanasius of Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzus,⁴ Origen's approach to the violence passages in Joshua represents far more than a single individual's idiosyncratic reading of a "difficult" biblical text. We are essentially looking at the beginning of a hermeneutic legacy that dominated a large swathe of Patristic exegesis for the next several

² For recent Christian attempts to interpret the killing of innocents in the Old Testament, see Gregory A. Boyd, *The Crucifixion of the Warrior God: Interpreting the Old Testament's Violent Portraits of God in Light of the Cross* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017); Paul Copan, *Did God Really Command Genocide?: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God* (Grand Rapids, MI.: Baker, 2014); C. S. Cowles, *Show Them No Mercy: Four Views on God and Canaanite Genocide* (Grand Rapids, MI.: Zondervan, 2003); Douglas S. Earl, *The Joshua Delusion?: Rethinking Genocide in the Bible* (Cambridge.: James Clarke & Co., 2011); L. Daniel Hawk, *The Violence of the Biblical God: Canonical Narrative and Christian Faith* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2019); David T. Lamb, *God Behaving Badly: Is the God of the Old Testament Angry, Sexist, and Racist?* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2011); Eric A. Seibert, *The Violence of Scripture: Overcoming the Old Testament's Troubling Legacy* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012); Kenton L. Sparks, *Sacred Word, Broken Word: Biblical Authority and the Dark Side of Scripture* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012); Thom Stark, *The Human Faces of God: What Scripture Reveals When it Gets God Wrong (and Why Inerrancy Tries to Hide It)* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011); John H. Walton, *Lost World of the Israelite Conquest—Covenant, Retribution, and the Fate of the Canaanites* (Wheaton, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2017).

³ One welcome exception to this passing curiosity about patristic interpretations of violence is Hans Boersma's *Scripture as Real Presence: Sacramental Exegesis in the Early Church* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018), 105-130.

⁴ Origen's influence was so great among the Cappadocian fathers that Gregory of Nazianzus referred to him as "the whetstone of us all." Similarly, Athanasius refers to Origen as the "labour-loving" individual who argued for the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. These quotes were taken from John Behr, *Origen: On First Principles*: Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xvi, and are originally found in Athanasius, *Decr. 27*; Gregory Nazianzen, *Suida Lexicon*, ed. Adler, 3.619.

hundred years.⁵ His second-century interpretation of the book of Joshua is the first place to begin when trying to understand Patristic exegesis of the violence passages due to his wide-ranging influence.

In order to better understand what Origen does in his Joshua homilies, we will begin by first looking at Origen’s exegetical method in book four of his *On First Principles*. We will then look at Origen’s allegorical understanding of the book of Joshua as a whole. After this, Origen’s first and third homilies on Joshua will be analyzed, particularly his allegorical treatment of the characters Joshua and Rahab. Finally, we will look at his understanding of the function of violence in the book as a whole. This article is not so much an argument in favor of Origen’s approach to Old Testament violence (though I admit that I am sympathetic to it, as will be evident throughout the article) as much as it is an attempt to thoroughly understand why and how Origen makes the exegetical decisions that he does.

II. ORIGEN’S EXEGETICAL METHOD

In the second chapter of book four of *On First Principles*, Origen deals with what he deems the incorrect interpretations of scripture offered by heretics.⁶ He spares no harsh words for those who interpret scripture

⁵ As an example of Origen’s far-reaching legacy, patristic scholar Peter Bouteneff points out that Methodius of Olympus, who helped lead the heretical charges against Origen, still implemented Origen’s spiritual interpretation of the scriptures. See Bouteneff’s *Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 121.

⁶ Because the fourth book of Origen’s *On First Principles* is only preserved in its fullness in Rufinus’ translation, a very brief word should be said about its accuracy. In Rufinus’ preface, he tells the reader that he has omitted or edited anything he suspects is not Origen’s only with regard to core doctrines like the Trinity. Because Rufinus specified the changes he made, one could assume that had he made great alterations to the content of *Princ. 4*, he would have said so. See “Preface of Rufinus,” in Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. G.W. Butterworth (Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 2013), lxxix.

“according to the letter,” and even blames the crucifixion of Christ on the failure to look beyond the letter (or the literal meaning of a text):

Seeing none of these things visibly happening in the sojourn of him believed by us to be Christ, they [in this case, the Jews who rejected Christ] did not accept our Lord Jesus, but they crucified him as having improperly called himself Christ. (*Princ.* 4.2.1)⁷

At the very least, Origen believes that a refusal of Christ is the logical outworking of a rejection of the spiritual aspect of scripture. Later in the section, he says that his interpretations are “speculations” and that the Holy Spirit’s words are confined and “shut up within the frail vessel of the common letter” (2 Cor 4:7) (*Princ.* 4.3.14).⁸ He simply does not see a need to provide an interpretation for every single Bible verse in *On First Principles* because it is more important to him *that* there is an allegorical meaning than *what* that meaning is.⁹ He goes on to say that heretics err by interpreting in a literal manner passages that speak of God’s anger or jealousy. Although these heretics would still affirm that these passages are “scriptures of God,” (*Princ.* 4.2.1), they deny that these passages are speaking of the same God proclaimed by Christ. For these heretics, Christ

⁷ This article uses John Behr’s new translation of Origen’s *On First Principles*, 487 (already cited above). In this instance, I am using Behr’s translation of the Greek text. In any instance where the Greek text is not available, I will specify that I am using Behr’s translation of Rufinus’ Latin translation of the Greek.

⁸ Latin text.

⁹ Origen’s understanding of scripture and allegory has been the subject of many monographs over the years, and this article only briefly highlights the most recent work on Origen. For more on Origen’s exegetical method, see e.g. David Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Henri DeLubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007); Richard Patrick Crosland Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), Elizabeth Dively Lauro, *The Soul and Spirit of Scripture Within Origen’s Exegesis* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Pub, 2005); 112; Peter Martens, *Origen and Scripture: The Contours of the Exegetical Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

came to proclaim “a more perfect God, who they say is not the creator” (*Princ.* 4.2.1). For Origen, a literal interpretation of scripture ascribes to God attributes that He does not possess and leads people into heresies which pit the God of the Old Testament against the God of the New. However, Origen still sees these passages as having an important purpose. He says that these depictions and absurdities in the law are inserted by the Holy Spirit as “stumbling blocks” (σκάνδαλα) in order to direct the reader to the more divine meaning of a passage (*Princ.* 4.2.9). Because of these contradictions in scripture and these troubling depictions of God, we can be directed to contemplate spiritual realities.

Origen goes on to state that scripture will always have a spiritual sense, but there are occasions in scripture where no “bodily sense” is to be found (*Princ.* 4.2.5). The ensuing example he gives of the six stone jars at the wedding at Cana only having a spiritual meaning is perplexing, but he provides other examples throughout *Princ.* 4 that are easier to comprehend. He points to the days in Genesis as not having occurred according to their narrative meaning because there was evening and morning without a sun or a moon (*Princ.* 4.3.1). He then points to the tree in the garden of Eden as another example of a “type” that points “toward certain mysteries.” It seems absurd to Origen that eternal life was literally available by eating “with corporeal teeth” from a tree. After turning to the gospels and asking how it was that Jesus could view all the kingdoms of the world by simply going up a high mountain, he says,

The careful reader will observe innumerable other passages like these in the Gospels so that he will be convinced that with the narratives of things which happened according to the letter are interwoven others, which did not occur. (*Princ.* 4.3.2)

One may, of course, wonder why Origen believes he has the right to interpret passages in this way. From where does he derive his notion of the spiritual sense of scripture? His understanding certainly has

resonances in Alexandrian Judaism, especially Philo,¹⁰ but he draws the main thrust of his argument from the Apostle Paul. He cites Paul's odd use of Deuteronomy 25 in order to prove that Paul believed there was a spiritual sense to the scriptures that went beyond the mere letter. This particular passage in Deuteronomy forbids the Israelites from muzzling an ox when it is "treading out the grain" (Deut 25:4). Origen comments on Paul's use of scripture:

Then explaining this precept, he adds: 'Is it for the ox that God is concerned? Or does he speak altogether for our sake? It was written for our sake, so that he who ploughs ought to plough in hope and he who threshes in the hope of partaking.' And most of the interpretations in circulation, being adapted to the multitude and edifying those unable to understand the higher meanings, have somewhat the same character. (*Princ.* 4.2.6)

For Origen, the most important part of this passage from 1 Corinthians 9 is Paul's assertion that the commandment was written "entirely (πάντως) for our sake" (1 Cor 9:10, NRSV). Neither Paul nor Origen make a concession that God originally gave the commandment for the Israelites. The certainty of Paul that these Old Testament commands were written for us gives Origen warrant for his own certainty. Origen goes on to cite many other passages from Paul to illustrate his point. Paul spoke of Christ as the rock which followed the Israelites in the desert (1 Cor 10:4) and also said that the story of Sarah and Hagar was an allegory (ἀλληγορούμενα) for those born "according to the flesh" (Hagar's son) and those born "through the promise" (Sarah's son) (Gal 4:23-24, NRSV). Paul's use of the participle form of ἀλληγορέω (literally meaning to speak allegorically) in Galatians leaves the door open for Origen to use the word to describe other Old Testament passages.

¹⁰ See Henri DeLubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture according to Origen* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007), 182-188.

Origen also sees Paul putting forth a distinction between “Israel according to the flesh,” and “Israel according to the spirit” (*Princ.* 4.3.6-4.3.8). Origen takes Paul’s phrase “Israel according to the flesh” in 1 Corinthians 10:18 to imply there was also an Israel according to the spirit (*Princ.* 4.3.6). Because Paul also speaks of a “Jerusalem which is above” (Heb 12:22-3), Origen postulates that “whatever, then, is either narrated or prophesied of [earthly] Jerusalem...[is to be understood], in accordance with [Paul’s] mind, to have been said of that city, which he calls the heavenly Jerusalem, and of all those places or cities, which are said to be cities of the holy land, of which Jerusalem is a metropolis” (*Princ.* 4.3.8).¹¹ According to Origen, whenever we see a narrative about the earthly Jerusalem, it is, more importantly, a narrative about the heavenly Jerusalem. However, it is not just benevolent things and events that correspond to earthly realities. He also believes that “it is possible” that there also exist malevolent regions like Egypt and Babylon close to the “heavenly Jerusalem and Judaea” (*Princ.* 4.3.10). According to patristic scholar John Behr, this earthly and heavenly correspondence is part of Origen’s “apocalyptic vision created by the intersection of eternity and time, with the former opened up to us in and through the Passion of Christ, while we yet remain in the latter.”¹² We will see Origen work with this notion of earthly and heavenly correspondence later in his homilies on Joshua.

At times, Origen seems to base his exegetical method in more abstract principles. For example, he says that scripture has a threefold sense (a bodily sense, a “soulish” (my word) sense and a spiritual sense) because it mirrors the trichotomy of the human person: body, soul and spirit (*Princ.* 4.2.3). Yet, as we will see with his homilies on Joshua, he rarely treats scripture this way. Instead, he usually draws out a twofold sense of scripture: its bodily and spiritual sense, which correspond to his

¹¹ Latin text. Both the Greek and Latin make the same exact point but Rufinus’ translation helps to make the point more pointedly than the Greek.

¹² Behr, lxxxviii.

conception of “Israel according to the flesh,” and “Israel according to the spirit.” His reasons for doing this are quite simple: He believes St. Paul interpreted scripture in this manner. In order to eventually see exactly how he uses the Apostle Paul as his guide to scriptural exegesis, we must now turn to his interpretation of the book of Joshua with some brief notes on Rufinus’ translation and date.

III. ORIGEN’S HOMILIES ON JOSHUA

Background

Like some parts of *On First Principles*, Origen's homilies on Joshua exist only in Rufinus' Latin translation (other than a few fragments found in *The Philokalia* of Origen and Procopius's *Catena on the Octateuch*).¹³ However, these homilies differ from *On First Principles* in that they are assumed to be a more literal translation from Origen's Greek originals.¹⁴ In Barbara Bruce's introduction to her English translation of the homilies, she cites Annie Jaubert, who translated Origen’s homilies into French, in support of this claim:

[Jaubert] noted constructions that were more dependent on Greek than Latin syntax and a curttness of speech and density of expression that gave the feel of unpolished notes [Rufinus] may have been working from. Her careful comparison with extracts from Procopius's *Catena on the Octateuch* even substantiated the validity of the trinitarian passage in Homily 3.2 that has been considered an interpolation of Rufinus."¹⁵

¹³ Barbara J. Bruce, “introduction,” in Origen, *Homilies on Joshua*, trans. Barbara J. Bruce, ed. Cynthia White (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 17. As stated above, this article has mostly been able to use Origen’s Greek text of *On First Principles*, and we have not needed to refer hardly at all to Rufinus’ translation.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

There are clues within Origen's homilies on Joshua and Jeremiah that lead most scholars to date the Joshua homilies to around 249-50 CE.¹⁶ In his homilies on Jeremiah, Origen speaks of missing the days when martyrdom served to intensify the believer's faith, which leads most scholars to date the Jeremiah homilies to shortly after persecution lessened around 240. In his Joshua homilies, he refers to his homilies on Jeremiah, and there also seem to be indications that Christians were once again undergoing a persecution. These factors point to a date around the time of the Decian persecution (249-50), during which Origen died, which means that his homilies on Joshua are among his last works. To consider the homilies "works" however, does not mean to imply that Origen ever wrote them down. The presbyter Pamphilus, a devoted follower of Origen, reported that Origen gave his homilies extemporaneously while scribes wrote down what he said.¹⁷

The Allegorical Plot Within Joshua

Old Testament scholar H.J. Koorevaar neatly divides the book of Joshua into four sections. In order to put Origen's "allegorical plot" into a simple description, I will use Koorevaar's divisions, then draw out the allegorical meaning from these different divisions. The following divisions are Koorevaar's: Joshua 1:1-5:12 (cross), 5:13-12:24 (take), 13:1-21:45 (divide), 22:1-24:33 (serve).¹⁸ For Origen, the *crossing* of the Jordan river is a figure of baptism (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 4.1). Christians leave behind the things of this world (Egypt) and cross over into a life that was promised to them by Moses, who died (who symbolizes the law). Those about to be baptized are led into the promised land by Jesus (Origen rarely refers to him as Joshua; an exegetical practice that we will look at later). Origen's spiritual

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Pekka Pitkänen, *Joshua* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010), 25.

interpretation of the *taking* of the land transforms violence against human kings, armies, women and children into spiritual violence against the passions and the demons (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 12.1*). For Origen, the division and inheritance of the land is the inheritance of the kingdom of God that the believer inherits when Christ distributes the “land” to “the true and spiritual Israel” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 18.1*). He differentiates between Moses' distribution of inheritance and Jesus' distribution by highlighting Joshua 14:15, which says that the “land ceased from wars.” When Moses distributed land, Origen notes that the text never says that the “land ceased from wars.” He immediately allegorizes Joshua 14:15, which he takes to mean that the “land of the flesh” can only inherit the kingdom of God when it has conquered the passions. He exhorts his listeners to be “fortified in every respect and surrounded by a wall of continence,” so that they might become a “city of God” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 19.4*). The last division that Koorevaar makes — verses 22:1-24:33 (serve) — is only touched on in the second half of Origen's final homily. When the sons of Reuben, Gad and the half tribe of Manasseh built an altar across the Jordan, Origen points to the altar being a “shadow” of the true altar, who is Christ (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 26.3*). He ties the story of the altar to Hebrews 5:6, which states that Christ is “the *true* high priest, according to the order of Melchizedek,” who offers *true* sacrifices on behalf of the *true* Israel (the Church) (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 26.3*).

Origen divides Joshua to correspond to the progression of the spiritual life. We begin our spiritual life by crossing over from death and sin (Egypt) into life through baptism (the crossing of the Jordan), after which we are led by Christ into battle with the passions the demons. If we have successfully rid our flesh (the land) of the passions, Christ distributes to us eternal life (the promised land). Our flesh can then cease from battle and worship the true high priest at the true altar in the heavenly or eschatological Israel of God. If Koorevaar's divisions of the book are *cross*, *take*, *divide* and *serve*, Origen's allegorical divisions might be *baptism*, *struggle* (a struggle against the flesh and the demons), *inherit* and *worship*.

We will now look at a few isolated people and events within Origen’s allegorical plot—particularly Origen’s treatment of Joshua as Jesus in his first homily and his allegorizing of the story of Rahab in his third homily. A close look at these characters and their role within Origen’s allegorical interpretation will help to flesh out how Origen transforms the physical violence in the book into spiritual violence.

First Homily: Joshua as Jesus

In his first homily, Origen introduces the main character of his allegorical plot: Jesus his Lord: “[The book of Joshua] does not so much indicate to us the deeds of the son of Nun, as it represents for us the mysteries of Jesus my Lord” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.3). Although the book of Joshua is literally about a Jewish military leader, for Origen, it is primarily about Jesus, who leads Christians into battle against passions. Origen uses a number of different arguments to support his Jesus/Joshua typology. Although he does not explicitly state it, Joshua and Jesus are spelled exactly the same in the Greek: Ἰησοῦς. Origen also points to the way that Joshua is introduced in scripture, which is as a great military leader, “not as one with whom Moses joined his leadership, but the one to whom Moses granted primacy” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.2). This “primacy” is understood in terms of the New Testament’s fulfillment of the Old Testament. For Origen, the event of Moses’ death symbolizes the death of the law. Later in his homily he says, “‘Moses, the servant of God, is dead,’ (Deut 34:5) for the Law is dead, and the legal precepts are now invalid” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.3). However, Moses is not always a symbol of the passing of the law. This is evident in Origen’s explanation of the raising and lowering of Moses’ hands in warfare (Exod 17:11). As Moses raised up his hands, Jesus:

grows stronger and conquers. When Moses, however, did not lift up his hands but let them sink downwards, the people were conquered by

Amalek. Such people are those to whom Jesus said, 'if you believed Moses, you would certainly believe me.' (*Orig. Hom. Jos.*, 1.2) (John 5:46)

While Moses remains a symbol of the Torah, this symbolism is much more positive. In this case, Moses leads us to Christ. Moses often stood for the Torah when Jesus refers to it in the gospels, and Origen follows Jesus in this regard. The Old Testament's (Moses') words are necessary to lead us to Christ, and if we do not accept them, then neither will we accept Christ's words. Also notable in this passage is the ease by which Origen moves from the Old Testament to the New Testament. He does not see a need to differentiate at all between the Old Testament Jesus (Joshua) and the New Testament Jesus. As we will see below, the best way to make sense of the way Origen moves back and forth between the Old and New Testament is by seeing the earthly Joshua correspond to the heavenly Jesus in the same way that "Israel according to the flesh" corresponds to "Israel according to the spirit."

Origen does make a distinction between the Old Testament Ἰησοῦς and the New Testament Ἰησοῦς in the very next part of his homily, but his reasons for doing so quickly become clear. He draws attention to the fact that Joshua was called the son of Nun (which obviously differentiates him from Jesus Christ who has no human father):

But why is it that when Jesus is first mentioned, the name of his father is not indicated, even in the second or third time? But when his father, Nun, is mentioned, Jesus is not called Jesus, but Hoshea. For his name is written as Hoshea among the list of those who were sent to spy out the land. It seems to me that possibly for the purpose of his office of spying, he is called Hoshea, not Jesus, and he is named the son of Nun. But when he returns after that work is completed and all the people are terrified, and when he alone encourages the people who stumbled and raises up their despair, then he was named Jesus by Moses. Not the son of Nun, but the one to whom Moses had said, "Lead the army and fight with Amalek." (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.2)

The human ancestry of Joshua, or more precisely, of Hoshea, is brought up only to maintain the correspondence between Joshua and Jesus. Joshua is called Hoshea in one particular instance in scripture (Num 13:8, 16) “for the purpose of his office of spying” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.2). Since spying is usually connected with a secret or hidden identity, Origen seems to be implying that Hoshea the son of Nun is a designation concealing Joshua’s true identity as Jesus Christ. When Joshua “encourages the people who stumbled and raises up their despair,” then “he is named Jesus by Moses...not the son of Nun, but the one to whom Moses had said, ‘Lead the army and fight with Amalek’” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.2). Origen seems to be toggling back and forth between the Ἰησοῦς “from below” and the Ἰησοῦς “from above.” It is Joshua or Hoshea who leads “Israel according to the flesh” into battle, while it is Jesus Christ who leads “Israel according to the spirit” into spiritual warfare. This level of correspondence is made clear in the latter part of the homily when Origen discusses the promises that Joshua made to Israel. After “expelling the unworthy inhabitants” from Canaan and other regions, Joshua promises Israel that it will take the land as its inheritance (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.5). When Origen considers “what is promised to us in these words,” he says that Christians are to wage war against “certain diabolical races” and to “seize their territory, their provinces, and their realms, as Jesus our Lord apportions them to us” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.5). This description corresponds perfectly to what he says in *On First Principles* regarding the battles of the heavenly realms. In book four, Origen says that when a narrative describes warfare, many times the events described could not have occurred in a “bodily sense,” so we must see “in what way [the events] are more appropriate to those nations of souls who dwell in that heaven which is said to pass away, or who may be supposed to dwell there even now” (*Princ.* 4.3.10). For Origen, the events of Joshua are not merely symbolic; they are events which actually occur, in some way, in the heavenly realms. Once we understand this, the force of many of his words intensifies.

For example, at the beginning of his first homily when he says that “[The book of Joshua] does not so much indicate to us the deeds of the son of Nun, as it represents for us the mysteries of Jesus my Lord” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 1.3*), he means that it represents the heavenly wars that Christ is fighting with Christians in the spiritual realms. As difficult as this concept is to grasp, one must not interpret Origen with preconceived notions of what the contemporary reader thinks he is saying just because the face value of his words seems so strange to our modern sensibilities.

Implications

Origen’s treatment of the person of Joshua has important implications for his overall understanding of the violence portrayed in the book. The violent Hoshea is transformed into Jesus Christ the warrior of peace. Joshua is not merely the symbolic leader of symbolic wars against the devil and the passions; the book of Joshua describes the actual Jesus Christ as our leader in real spiritual battles. It is important to remember that whether or not Origen always mentions Jesus as the leader in our battle against our own flesh, his allegory is *not* simply an allegory for our individual fight against our passions. It is primarily an allegory of Christ *leading us to victory* against our passions. This “Christocentricity” keeps Origen from both an arbitrary hermeneutic and a semi-Pelagianism. Christ’s spiritual military leadership through his death on the cross is made explicit in one of Origen’s homilies on 1 Kings:

It is necessary for us to have those ‘horns’ that can rightly refer to the points of the cross of Christ, *so that by means of them* [emphasis added] we may destroy and cast out of our soul the powers of the enemy. Once those powers have been laid low and expelled, the vine can be planted within us (*Hom. 1 Reg. 1.10*).¹⁹

¹⁹ This quote was taken from DeLubac, *History*, 214.

It is by the *means* of the cross of Christ that we are victorious in the battles of the soul. Behind each spiritual interpretation of Origen stands the crucified messiah.

Whether or not the historical Joshua actually fought every battle described in scripture does not keep Origen from allegorizing what he believes did not occur. It became commonplace with Diodore of Tarsus (330- 390 CE) to insist that any such spiritual or allegorical interpretation of scripture must be attached to something that actually occurred in history,²⁰ but it is clear that Origen does not think in this manner at all. For example, at the end of his fifteenth homily, he states he does “not see that Jesus the son of Nun took possession of all the earth. For how much of the earth does one take who seizes only Judea?” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.7). Yet he goes on to say that “our Lord Jesus truly took possession of all the earth, because a multitude of believers from all over the earth and out of all the nations flock to him” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.7). Patristic scholar Hans Boersma is correct when he says that Origen did not *disregard* the historical aspect of scripture, but it is difficult to fully agree with Boersma when he seems to imply that for Origen, a historical event *must* occur in order for a there to be a concrete “spiritual reality” connected to it.²¹ Although Origen most often *grants* that the historical events in scripture occurred, it is clear from our discussion of *On First Principles* that it is not always *necessary* for them to occur in order for a spiritual reality to be connected to the “event” depicted in scripture. Although it would be reductionist to deny that there is a spiritual reality present in a historical event that *does* occur according to scripture, we can much more readily account for Origen’s exegetical method by seeing the *words* of scripture as carrying within them a spiritual

²⁰ Cf. John Behr, *The Case Against Diodore and Theodore: Texts and Their Contexts*, OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 66-82.

²¹ Boersma, *Scripture as Real Presence*, 125. Boersma writes: “if it is *historical events* that carry a sacramental dimension, then this means that the spiritual reality is present *in historical events*.” It is not clear how Boersma reconciles his statement with his acknowledgment that Origen still ties spiritual realities to events Origen believes *did not occur* in history.

reality rather than the earthly events of which the words speak. As Origen says in *On First Principles*, “wherever the Word found that things that have happened according to the narrative could be harmonized with these mystical events, *He made use of them* [emphasis added]” (*Princ.* 4.2.9). Almost opposite Diodore of Tarsus, Origen states later in *On First Principles* that “with respect to the whole of the divine Scripture all of it has a spiritual meaning, but not all of it has a bodily meaning” (*Princ.* 4.3.5).

Surprising as it may be to the modern reader of Joshua, Origen never deals at length with the question of whether God *did* order Joshua the son of Nun to destroy so many people, but this is probably because Origen sees himself as following Paul’s example of treating the Old Testament as written “entirely (πάντως) for our sake” (1 Cor 9:9-10). Origen seems to dismiss an exhaustive inquiry into what we would probably today call the historical-critical meaning of the book of Joshua at the very beginning of his homily when he says (quoted above) that the book “does not so much indicate to us the deeds of the son of Nun, as it represents for us the mysteries of Jesus my Lord” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 1.3). Given that Origen does not believe that every event in scripture had to occur, we are left somewhat in the dark as to what he thought God did and did not command Joshua the son of Nun to actually do, which is certainly frustrating and understandably off-putting to today’s Hebrew Bible expert. However, for Origen, answering what the book of Joshua originally *meant* would distract from his main exegetical goal, which is to show his listeners how the book is primarily about Jesus Christ, our leader in spiritual battles. Now that we have looked thoroughly at Origen’s treatment of the character of Joshua, we can move on to consider his treatment of Rahab, who is another key player in his allegorical plot.

Third Homily: Rahab

Rahab is introduced in Origen's third homily through reference to the New Testament and a quotation of Matthew 21:32: “Because the scribes and Pharisees did not believe [Jesus], the Lord spoke concerning the baptism of John and said that the ‘prostitutes and publicans who believed’ were baptized. The same thing is fulfilled in the fact that the prostitute received the spies of Jesus and is snatched away and brought back from the destruction of every hostile nation” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.3*). Once again, it is striking how easily Origen moves back and forth between the New and Old Testament. There is no sense of chronology. Rahab is grouped in with the prostitutes who believed Christ. In the next section, Origen follows a similar hermeneutic route when he says that the one who is “snatched away and brought back from the destruction of every hostile nation” is the Church. According to Origen, who was most likely borrowing from Rabbinic sources,²² Rahab means “breadth” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.4*): “What is breadth, therefore, if not this Church of Christ, which is gathered together from sinners as if from prostitution?” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.5*).

Like other Christian writers before him,²³ Origen takes the scarlet cord that Rahab hangs from her window to save her family as a symbol of Christ's lifesaving blood shed on the cross. Sounding similar to Cyprian of Carthage in his ecclesiology, Origen remarks that it is only in the house of the one “who once was a prostitute” that sinners can be saved (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.5*). Just as everyone outside of Rahab's house perished, so does anyone who lives outside of the Church. It does not seem that Origen is endorsing or denying an exclusivist or “Cyprianic” ecclesiology; rather, he is allowing the context to dictate his allegorical interpretation.²⁴

²² See footnote 42 in Bruce, *Homilies*, 47.

²³ The interpretation of the scarlet cord as the blood of Christ is found in Clement, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, and also Ambrose and Augustine. See Sidney Greidanus, *Preaching Christ from the Old Testament: A Contemporary Hermeneutical Method* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 72.

²⁴ See footnote 62 in *ibid.*, 50.

Rahab is not only a symbol of the Church, but also of the engrafting of the Gentiles. Rahab, who was not an Israelite by birth, is "joined to Israel up to this very day" (Josh 6:25). While the historical-critical method sees the phrase "to this day" as an etiological device, Origen takes the phrase to imply the present attachment of the Gentiles to Israel (which in other places, he takes to mean the Church):

If you want to see more plainly how Rahab is bound to Israel, consider how 'the branch of the wild olive tree is implanted in the root of a good olive tree.'²⁵ Then you will understand how those who have been implanted in the faith of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob are rightly called attached and 'joined to Israel up to this very day' (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 7.5*).

Although Origen's interpretation of the events surrounding Rahab are far removed from an historical-critical exegesis, his interpretation nevertheless highlights the role of identity in the story of Rahab, which is a theme that modern scholars have also pointed out.²⁶ The difference between the modern interpretation and Origen's interpretation obviously rests on the question of *which* identity is being referred to. While the historical-critical method would rightly see Israelite identity being referred to, Origen draws on the story of Rahab for a discussion of Christian identity and sees the story as an illustration of Paul's theology of the engrafting of the Gentiles.

The Function of Violence in the Allegory of Rahab

It should be pointed out that violence is the main component that shapes Rahab's identity within the narrative and also within Origen's interpretation. Without the extreme violence, Origen's interpretation of

²⁵ Rom 11:17.

²⁶ See Carolyn Pressler, *Joshua, Judges, and Ruth* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 25; Ehud Ben Zvi, *Imagining the Other and Constructing Israelite Identity in the Early Second Temple Period* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 129-30.

the meaning of Rahab would fall flat. It is only because Joshua commanded the Israelites to destroy everyone except Rahab that she can be a symbol of the Church. If the Israelites would have spared some of the people of Jericho, then Origen could not say, “if anyone wants to be saved, let him come into the house of this one who was once a prostitute” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.5*). This sentence would not have any rhetorical force. If we can imagine an alternative literal history where the spies would have told a righteous old man in Jericho to hang a blue cord out of his window and a righteous young boy to hang a black cord from another window so that these individuals would be spared, the red cord of Rahab would have lost its allegorical significance. Origen could not say, “no other sign would have been accepted, except the scarlet-colored one that carried the sign of blood” (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 3.5*). We can imagine that Origen would have been able to draw a different spiritual meaning from this sparing of two individuals rather than one, but the meaning would not have been bound up in the exclusivity of Christ’s saving work or the exclusive saving power of the Church. Similarly, the killing of everyone else in Jericho except Rahab highlights Rahab’s faithfulness to God, which is a major point of the allegory for Origen. The “completeness” of the violence enables Origen to set up Rahab as a symbol of the Gentiles whom Christ saves from destruction because of their faithfulness. The identity of a Christian is bound up in a person’s faithfulness to God, and outside of that faithfulness and love of God, there is no salvation.

Now that we have seen the way Origen interprets the violence in two of his homilies, we will look at his interpretation of violence throughout the book as a whole.

IV. ORIGEN AND VIOLENCE

The beginning to Origen’s fifteenth homily shows us just how important it was to Origen that the violence in Joshua be taken spiritually. He says that “unless the physical wars bore the figure of spiritual wars, I do not

think the books of Jewish history would ever have been handed down by the apostles to the disciples of Christ, who came to teach peace, so that they could be read in the churches" (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 15.1*).²⁷

Two major points emerge from this beginning to his homily. First of all, Origen's reference to Jesus' statements about "teaching peace" implies that Origen interpreted Jesus to be endorsing at least a quasi-pacifist ethic.²⁸ If he only took Jesus to be speaking of peace within interpersonal relationships, he would not use the passage to argue against the literal interpretation of warfare in Joshua. Origen does not say anything here that implies he finds some wars defensible and other wars indefensible. In his *Against Celsus*, Origen affirms a pacifist approach more explicitly. According to Origen, Jesus taught his disciples that they were never

justified in [murdering] a man even if he were the greatest wrongdoer...no longer do we take the sword against any nation, nor do we learn [the art of] war any more, since we have become sons of peace...through Jesus who is our leader.²⁹

The second point that emerges from Origen's statement in his fifteenth homily is that he firmly believes that the disciples read the wars in Joshua as figures referring to spiritual realities.³⁰ As he said, if they did not interpret the wars figuratively, they would not have believed the book of Joshua should be part of the Christian scriptures. He reiterates this point again a few sentences later when he says that the Apostle Paul approved of reading the wars of Joshua in churches only because they were figures of spiritual wars (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 15.1*).

²⁷ As was mentioned above, it is uncertain how many of these "spiritual wars" also had physical correspondents, according to Origen.

²⁸ For more on Origen's pacifism, see George Kalantzis, *Caesar and the Lamb* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 136.

²⁹ These quotes are taken from the translation of *Contra Celsum* 3.8 and 5.33 in *ibid.*, 136.

³⁰ I will argue below that Origen does not just see the wars as "figures" but as corresponding to heavenly realities.

Origen is only reiterating what he made clear in homily 14, where he says, “when that Israel that is according to the flesh read these same scriptures before the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, they understood nothing in them except wars and the shedding of blood from which their spirits, too, were incited to excessive savageries and were always fed by wars and strife” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 14.1). This text coincides with statements he made in *On First Principles* that the scriptures were not understandable until the advent of Christ (*Princ.* 4.1.6). What he says here however is more polemical. He argues that not only did the Jews misunderstand the scriptures before the advent of Christ, but their literal interpretation of the wars of Joshua actually led them to savagery. For Origen, those who interpret the wars on the literal level are actually “incited” to hurt each other.

Moving back to the introduction to his fifteenth homily, we can see a hint of the paradigm in which he interprets the violence. He continues:

in short, knowing that now we do not have to wage physical wars, but that the struggles of the soul have to be exerted against spiritual adversaries, the Apostle, just as a military leader, gives an order to the soldiers of Christ, saying, 'Put on the armor of God, so that you may be able to stand firm against the cunning devices of the devil.' (Eph 6:11) (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.1)

He links the nations that physically fought against Israel to the “swarms of opposing powers” in the heavens (demonic forces) and links the historical Israel to the “Lord's Church, which is the spiritual Israel” (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.1). Once again, this language brings to mind his discussion of “Israel according to the flesh” and “Israel according to the spirit,” and the correspondence between an earthly and heavenly realm in *On First Principles* (*Princ.* 4.3.8- 4.3.9).

As is evident from this passage, the Apostle Paul helps to re-contextualize the violence in Joshua for Origen. This is not the first time nor the last that Origen applies the military imagery in the New Testament

to the warfare in Joshua. In his fifth homily, he quotes Paul extensively in order to make his case for a figurative interpretation of Old Testament war:

Do not learn from me but again from the Apostle Paul, who teaches you saying, "For our battle is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in the heavens" (Eph 6:2). For those things that were written are signs and figures. For thus says the Apostle, "For all these things happened to them figuratively, but they were written for us, for whom the fulfillment of the ages has come" (1 Cor 10:11). If therefore, they were written for us, come on! Why delay? Let us go forth to the war. (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 5.2*)

Although it is possible that Origen is linking together the Pauline ideas of the spiritual nature of the Old Testament law and spiritual warfare in order to form the basis for his allegorical interpretation of Old Testament wars, Origen may be doing something much simpler. When Paul says that "our battle is not against flesh and blood," Origen may take the negation in Paul ("not against flesh and blood") to be specifically referring to the battles of the Old Testament. In other words, unlike the physical wars in the Old Testament, our battle is now against our own flesh and against the demons.

Origen may see Ephesians 6:12 as Paul's endorsement of reading the wars of the Old Testament allegorically. He may only use the verse from Paul in 1 Corinthians ("All these things happened to them figuratively....") to support what he already thinks Paul made clear in Ephesians. If this is true, Origen does not see himself as linking together two separate Pauline ideas. If he takes the Apostle Paul's battle "against flesh and blood" as primarily a reference to Old Testament warfare, it makes sense why he says that Paul saw it as necessary to read books like Joshua in a spiritual manner when in the churches (*Orig. Hom. Jos. 15.1*). Origen most likely believed that Paul thought of these wars as invaluable explanations of

spiritual warfare and that such explanations could not be found anywhere else but in the Old Testament.

From looking at Origen's fifteenth and fifth homilies, two main sources for his allegorical treatment of the book of Joshua emerge: Jesus and Paul. Christ provides the ethical basis for Origen's hermeneutic. Because Christ taught that it was wrong to kill regardless of circumstances,³¹ the narratives of violence in the Old Testament cannot reveal the true character of God at the literal level (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.1). Paul provides the symbolic grid to make sense of Joshua on a spiritual level with his many verses about spiritual warfare.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Some very important points emerge from looking at Origen's exegetical strategies in *On First Principles*, then watching Origen put these strategies to use in his Joshua homilies. We saw that narratives of violence, like the stories we find in Joshua, sometimes have no bodily sense (*Princ.* 4.2.5) and point to higher spiritual realities (*Princ.* 4.2.9). Origen takes the Apostle Paul's statement that scripture is "entirely (πάντως) for our sake" (1 Cor 9:9-10) to imply that all scripture has a spiritual meaning and therefore has a relevant meaning for all Christians at all times. Origen also sees Paul as making a distinction between Israel "according to the flesh" and "Israel according to the spirit"; the Jerusalem from below and "the Jerusalem above." It is the correspondence between these two "realms" that helps Origen work out his allegorical interpretation of the book. Joshua (or Hoshea) is the earthly leader of Israel who corresponds to the heavenly leader of the Church. Rahab identifies as a true Christian because she was faithful to Jesus and his armies. Her life as a prostitute and then protector of Joshua's spies makes her an ideal figure of the Church, since it is only in her house (the house of the prostitute) that one

³¹ *Contra Celsum* 3.8 and 5.33 in Kalantzis, 136.

can be saved. Unlike some modern apologists, Origen does not downplay the extent of the violence in the narrative.³² As we saw before, he may question whether some of the events narrated actually occurred, but he nevertheless accepts that the Holy Spirit inspired the writers to include such violent events. Rather than downplay the violence, he *transforms* the violence into spiritual violence so that it constitutes Jesus' war *in us* against the passions and the "swarms of opposing powers" in the heavens (*Orig. Hom. Jos.* 15.1). It is only *because* Origen takes the violence in the narrative at face value that the imagery of Rahab as the Church "works." If the violence had not been total, there would have been other avenues by which we could be saved. Origen takes his framework for interpreting the violence from the Apostle Paul, who said that "our battle is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers...against spiritual wickedness in the heavens" (Eph 6:2). For Origen, the "battles of flesh and blood" refer to the Old Testament wars where the "Israel of the flesh" wars against earthly armies. Our new battles against "spiritual wickedness in the heavens" are the battles of the "heavenly Jerusalem"; of "Israel according to the spirit." Jesus our Lord kills the passions in us, leading us into the promised land so that we can take hold of the red cord of Jesus' blood and remain safe in the house of the Harlot till Christ tramples every enemy under his feet (1 Cor 15:25) and comes triumphantly to save the Harlot and those who are in her house.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to argue *in favor* of Origen's interpretation of Joshua, simply presenting it shows the reader an entire hermeneutical world that modern historical criticism has all but forgotten. Origen's interpretation makes the book of Joshua entirely relevant to the


³² See Paul Copan, and Matt Flannagan, *Did God Really Command Genocide?: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2014), 61-109. Copan and Flannagan point out instances where they believe hyperbolic language is being used. They offer evidence of such hyperbolic language by pointing out instances in the text where a group that is said to be entirely annihilated shows up later as if nothing had occurred (for instance, compare Joshua 10:39 with 11:21).

modern Christian life while offering a unique way of maintaining the unity of scripture and recontextualizing the troubling violence throughout Joshua. If the book is about Jesus our Lord conquering the powers of heaven that oppose us and allowing us a safe-haven in the Church, it becomes easier to see how all of scripture could be written “entirely for our sake” (1 Cor 9:9-10).

BOOK REVIEWS

Laura Weinrib. *The Taming of Free Speech: America's Civil Liberties Compromise*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. Pp. i + 461. ISBN 978-0674545717. Hardcover \$45.00.

Few recent Supreme Court decisions are as notorious as *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*. The 2010 ruling says that free speech law prevents the government from restricting corporations' independent political spending. Viewed as a major setback for campaign finance reformers, *Citizens United* has even triggered calls for a constitutional amendment to overturn the ruling. The slogan *free speech for people*, rather than for big business, has become a rallying cry.



But what if *free speech for people* is itself the novel suggestion? What if *Citizens United* didn't substantially upend the American free speech tradition, but simply carried it to a logical conclusion?

In a provocative recent history of free speech law, University of Chicago law professor Laura Weinrib mentions *Citizens United* by name only once, but its shadow looms large nonetheless. In her telling, the intellectual groundwork for *Citizens United* was laid nearly a century ago, through early labor activism and an uneasy consensus between the ACLU and the entrenched economic interests of the late 1930s. By agreeing to this bargain, Weinrib contends, the ACLU evolved into a uniquely respected defender of civil liberties, while abandoning its roots in the labor movement.

The Taming of Free Speech: America's Civil Liberties Compromise chronicles the emergence of modern free-speech doctrine, tracing the doctrine's roots back to the early struggle of the labor movement against wealthy industrialists. Weinrib's volume is a sweeping work that encompasses three distinct narratives: the development of the concept of "free speech," the role played by organized labor in pushing for civil liberties, and the ideological history of the ACLU. At times the breadth of her storytelling leads the book to lose its focus, as when she launches into extended discussions of the Scopes "monkey trial" regarding evolution or the development of obscenity law. But the book remains engrossing throughout, with a surprising thesis: in recounting the long history of governmental efforts to suppress "seditious" and "disruptive" speech, Weinrib makes clear that current popular ideas about free speech—such as the view that constitutional speech rights are both universal and nearly absolute—are far more historically novel than many Americans likely believe.

Her story begins in the early 1900s, shortly after the Supreme Court's controversial decision in *Lochner v. New York*. *Lochner* invalidated a worker-protection law on the grounds that it violated "liberty of contract" between companies and their workers, ushering in an era of pro-business Court rulings that led to longstanding skepticism about the judicial system among organized labor.

With the courts seemingly closed to them, labor activists pursued direct action in the form of protests and disruptions. These early civil-liberties advocates articulated an expansive vision of free expression—including concepts like the right to strike and agitate publicly against employers—that was closely linked to belief in the urgent need for economic redistribution. In an ironic quirk of history, the first ideas about modern civil liberties emerged from a radical collectivism that was deeply hostile to contemporary liberal notions of individual autonomy.

The *Lochner* line of cases came to a screeching halt when the Great Depression struck. As business interests issued a range of challenges to

Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposed New Deal, Roosevelt and his administration knew they needed the judiciary to approve their progressive reforms. By threatening to expand the membership of the Court and staff it with pro-New Deal appointees, Roosevelt successfully goaded the Court: Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes beat the Court-packing plan with the "switch in time that saved nine." A new Court majority would uphold Roosevelt's New Deal reforms.

Enter the ACLU, which had begun life as a pro-labor activist group that shunned the prospect of "impact litigation." Now, facing a chastened Court willing to lend a constitutional imprimatur to Roosevelt's reforms, the organization began advancing novel arguments for civil liberties—arguments that could be powerfully grounded in the American tradition, but that also led to unforeseen social consequences.

Weinrib's tale reaches its historical climax in 1940, when a major internal conflict broke out within the ACLU. Following a spate of company-sponsored violence against union protestors, the National Labor Relations Board issued an order barring the Ford Motor Company from distributing anti-union literature to its employees. The ACLU faced a dilemma: stand with labor, in the tradition of the early radicals who had birthed the organization, or defend Ford's right to express itself freely? When the ACLU decisively came down on the side of "free speech for everyone"—even powerful, prosperous speakers like the Ford Company—it heralded a sea change in the ACLU's popularity, and bridged a longstanding divide between the ACLU and political conservatives. A subsequent internal purge of Communist sympathizers from the ACLU's rolls further cemented this transition and cultivated even more public goodwill.

Subsequent free speech cases in the 1960s and 1970s would go on to enshrine a view of the First Amendment as a vehicle of individual expression, sharply contrasting with earlier perspectives. Today's outraged reactions to *Citizens United* are a testament to just how deeply this newer view has penetrated the American cultural consciousness.

Flag-burning is protected by the First Amendment, the modern argument goes, but corporate involvement in the political process is something different: free speech is about *people*, not groups, communicating their views.

Yet the earliest labor activists and the ACLU had pushed for free speech to be viewed as a *group*-oriented right: shorn of its leftist politics, this original theory—that free expression must be understood as a right exercised by collective groups, *including wealthy businesses*—lies at the heart of *Citizens United*. Given the free speech doctrine’s genesis in the labor movement, *Citizen United*’s holding takes on a deeply ironic dimension.

That irony underlies the provocative question at the heart of *Taming*: did the ACLU “sell out” by taking Ford’s side? In one account, the 1940 debate was the moment the ACLU first found itself, emerging as a genuinely nonpartisan organization admirably willing to stand on principle in the face of severe pressure. From a different standpoint, the ACLU’s decision to recognize “employer free speech” was a compromise of longstanding ideals, a sacrifice of labor interests on the altar of mainstream respectability. That free expression must be understood as a right that may be exercised by collective groups, *including prosperous businesses*, lies at the heart of *Citizens United*; to the opinion’s liberal critics, this is the bitter fruit of the ACLU’s long-ago betrayal.

In depicting the ACLU’s internal dilemma, Weinrib highlights—whether intentionally or not—a persistent tension between competing visions of American justice: must law be based on principles that are blind to and impartial about the beneficiaries, or is it ultimately inextricable from its social and economic context? One might call these the philosophies of the late Justice Antonin Scalia and of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, respectively, and they are not easily reconcilable.

Weinrib’s tone is often mournful, wistfully recalling a time when the ACLU was unabashedly pro-worker. But given the seminal impact of the organization after 1940, this regret is shortsighted. While the ACLU’s

rejection of judicial consequentialism sits uneasily alongside modern progressive legal thought, that willingness to stand zealously on constitutional principle laid the groundwork for transformative victories to come, including *Brown v. Board of Education*. Any argument that would potentially subordinate constitutionalism to perceived economic inequities is a two-edged sword: judges become merely agents of either the “powerful” or the “powerless,” transforming the legal landscape into a zero-sum battlefield, and the balance of power can change dramatically.

By consistently arguing that constitutional protections apply to *everyone*—Ku Klux Klan protestors and labor radicals alike—the modern ACLU resists political classification along easy lines. And on net, the disadvantaged still benefit from this regime: adopting the “Scalian” notion that constitutional principles must be applied with absolute consistency—civic consequences be damned—cuts sharply against potential reactionary arguments that society must be protected from a threatening “other.” If the government cannot seize a major corporation’s property without due process, neither can it seize an immigrant’s property without due process: equal rights are equal rights.


With its controversial 1940 decision to defend the Ford Company, the ACLU morphed from a special-interest group to a national proponent of civil rights and civil liberties. And no matter one’s views on *Citizens United* itself, that transition has helped construct a social order in which virtually all Americans—wealthy and poor alike—have the freedom to speak up without fear.

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Fred Van Geest. *Introduction to Political Science: A Christian Perspective.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2017. Pp. xv + 315. ISBN 978-0830851805. Hardcover. \$40.00.

In Christian higher education, it is a common question of what to do with secular textbooks. There are very few Christian textbooks, or textbooks that are compatible with a Christian worldview, a fact which often leaves professors and instructors to supplement the secular textbook with faith-based readings. I remember my own undergraduate experience at a small, Christian liberal arts university, where as students in Political Science 101, we used a workbook written by our own professor.



Fred Van Geest, chairman of the political science department at Bethel University, attempts to provide a solution for Christian political science courses and the faculty who teach them with his textbook, *Introduction to Political Science: A Christian Perspective*. As one endorser of the book says, “[T]hinking about the study of politics from a Christian perspective usually entails holding a secular textbook in one hand and the Bible or your favorite ‘faith-and-politics’ book in the other. Van Geest offers students an introduction to political science...that highlights how various theological traditions within Christianity have weighed in on the same questions and concepts that attract the scholarly focus of our secular counterparts.”²

This is certainly Van Geest’s aim for the textbook, and he notes in the preface that “this book is designed to introduce you to the world of political science from a Christian perspective” (p. vi). However, the

² Peter Baker, American Studies Program, Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, as published on the front matter of the book

Christian perspective that he presents throughout the book is one that is decidedly pro-government and oddly anti-libertarian.

Not only is it obvious that Van Geest disagrees with those who would identify as libertarian, he goes so far as to intentionally criticize and belittle them throughout the book. His poorly-cited slights are sprinkled throughout the book, even in places where they are not relevant, and he included several factual errors about libertarianism and prominent libertarians. He undoubtedly is the type of Christian college faculty who would make libertarian students feel unwelcome, which is all too common, and is why my co-authors and I wrote *Called to Freedom: Why You Can Be Christian and Libertarian* (Wipf and Stock, 2017).

Chapter 1 is titled “What is Government? Why do we need it?,” and immediately we see the author’s pro-government bias. To answer the title’s first question, the author explains in a very Obama-esque way, that “government is an institution that helps us make collective decisions” (p. 4). This is an insufficient answer, because obviously there are plenty of institutions that help us make decisions that are not government. Our churches help us make decisions about our spiritual and personal lives, our families help us make decision and plan for our futures, and our banks help us make decision about our money, just to name a few examples.

Political economist Max Weber identifies the following two characteristics of government that differentiate it from these other kinds of institutions: 1) it maintains a territorial monopoly over lawmaking and enforcement and 2) it collects revenue through compulsory taxation.³ This is the definition of government my co-author, Jason Hughey, uses in our book, as it clearly differentiates government from other social institutions.⁴ One doesn’t have to be a libertarian to see the differences between this definition and the amorphous one offered by Van Geest.

³ Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, pg 77. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946

⁴ Jason Hughey, “What Does The Bible Say About Government?” in *Called to Freedom: Why You Can Be Christian and Libertarian*, ed. by Elise Daniel (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2017), 38.

However, his answer to the second question is more concerning. Without even entertaining a serious debate about whether or not we “need” government, he makes the bold claim that such questions are unbiblical, saying “anti-government rhetoric, the kind that disparages the idea of government in general, is inconsistent with the Christian view.” He even goes so far as to say, “government is a gift from God, even though it may not always feel that way!” (p. 5).

An odd thing about his pro-government position in this chapter is that he includes a brief discussion of rational choice theory, the idea that “political actors are good at pursuing their self-interest and will reliably do so” (p. 15). However, he attributes this behavior primarily to voters, and instead of looking at what happens when politicians or bureaucrats act selfishly, he asserts that these people “may also be motivated by less selfish desires such as a desire to seek justice” (p. 15). This would have been an excellent place to discuss that some Christians support limited government because of what can happen when sinful, selfish people are given the ability to use force over others. However, Van Geest passed on giving that position representation.

Finally, in the chapter’s “Study and Discussion Questions” he asks students to respond to the question, “[W]hat might happen if we were to have no government at all? What does your answer imply about the specific functions of government?” This is interesting because the idea of “no government” was not really addressed in the chapter. The primary examples he gives throughout the chapter of what services government provides are road-building and public education. The conclusion the question is leading students toward is that if there were no government, there would be no roads and no schools. Hopefully some students reading this textbook have pointed out in their class discussions that just because the government currently builds the roads and runs the education system doesn’t mean they always have or should or that no one else could do so.

Chapter 3 introduces different “political ideologies,” starting with classical liberalism. While he points out that “the root concept in liberalism

is liberty or freedom,” (p. 47) he gives no discussion to what the Bible has to say about liberty. He also correctly points out that “classical liberals tend to have a minimalist view of government. According to them, government should simply do its best to get out of the way of individuals and should only intervene if other individuals threaten citizens’ basic rights, such as, for example, the right to private property” (p. 52). However, he again gives no conversation to what the Bible would have to say about these ideas, and offers only disparaging remarks about how classical liberals used to think that freedom only applied to “white, property-owning men” and that they currently think government should not be concerned with wealth inequality or race, although he provides no citations for any of these.

To add insult to injury, Van Geest goes on to make some bizarre and inaccurate remarks about libertarians. Particularly interesting was his comment that, “Ayn Rand (1905-1982), an avowed atheist, is one of the intellectual heroes for many libertarians today. In fact, libertarian US congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul named his son Rand Paul after Ayn Rand” (p. 53). The younger Paul’s full name is Randal Howard Paul, which is easily discoverable from a quick internet search, and is not named after Ayn Rand.

Since he was on the topic of libertarians, he added, “some of the positions taken by the libertarian party of the United States might be unpopular with many Christians (see sidebar)” (p. 53). In the sidebar which spans two full pages, he included some of the 2016 positions of the Libertarian Party. At no point does he explain that libertarian philosophy is not synonymous with the Libertarian Party, nor does he explain why some of these positions would be “unpopular” with many Christians.

While he does go on to briefly discuss other ideologies such as socialism, communism, and nationalism, he returns to classical liberalism with his closing thoughts for the chapter:

In short, secular ideologies are based on a flawed understanding of the world, how it was created, and how God is redeeming it. For instance, liberalism, the most dominant ideology in many places in the world today, is based on the principle of the sovereignty of the individual. Clearly this principle is directly at odds with the idea of God's sovereignty, which is at the very core of a Christian perspective. (p. 61)

Again, he provides no citations for these claims and no discussion of why it is at odds with Christianity. It is a reasonable position for a person to hold that God is sovereign, but that as far as government is concerned, human beings who are made in God's image are of utmost importance.

Chapter 4 provides a fairly straightforward explanation of how different democracies are structured. However, he chose to include another little jab at a couple prominent libertarians in the chapter's "For Further Exploration" section with the following prompt:

Watch the movie *Citizen Koch*. Do you think the political influence of the Koch brothers is a threat to democracy? What might be significant about the fact that the Koch brothers are financial contributors to PBS, and PBS chose not to air the film after it was complete? (p. 85)

While the Koch brothers and their political involvement are certainly fair game for analysis, this prompt is remarkably misleading. Could students not be given examples from a variety of political backgrounds? There are certainly plenty of billionaires to go around. Are we supposed to understand the prompt as saying that the Koch brothers are a "threat" to our country? This sort of singling-out of prominent Christian libertarians is concerning for a textbook claiming to offer a Christian perspective.

Chapter 5 is supposed to be an explanation of the different institutions that make up governments, but much of it is spent defending government employees from negative stereotypes. "Bureaucracy" he notes, "has often come to connote a corrupt, unresponsive, rule-bound, inflexible group of people who don't care much about their work" (p. 90). This is unfortunate,

he says, because “many government employees, rightly called *civil servants* or *public servants*, are extremely devoted to providing services in a responsive and efficient way” (pp. 90-91, emphasis original). He argues that we should use the term “public service” rather than bureaucracy, because it “more effectively convey the wide range of opportunities Christians have to demonstrate their love to their fellow neighbors” (p. 91).

This would have been a great opportunity to return to the discussion of rational choice theory, and look at what happens when government employees do not act in the best interest of the people they serve, intentionally or unintentionally. Instead of a thoughtful discussion, he briefly acknowledges that “we need virtuous public servants,” because “when they lack democratic values, things can go horribly awry” (p. 102). However he only uses two examples of politicians who lacked democratic values and they are Richard Nixon and disgraced former South Carolina governor, Mark Sanford—two examples which are neither timely nor the most obvious, yet are both Republican. The latter is often identified as a libertarian for his free-market positions. These two men certainly had their public scandals, but they are not alone. They are just alone in being criticized by Van Geest as lacking democratic values.

Chapter 8 deals with funding governments, and specifically addresses libertarians again, saying, “many people have strong feelings about taxation - some libertarians even call it theft, a position clearly at odds with scriptural teaching.” Instead of pointing to scripture, he explains this by saying that “taxation is essential if we wish to pay for services such as national defense, healthcare, social security, parks, garbage collection, police services, education, and so on” (p.156).

While it should be obvious that there are many ways to fund these kinds of activities, Van Geest doubles down on his claims in his discussion of social policy in Chapter 9. Focusing on education, he says,

From a Christian point of view, failing to provide education for all would also be a tremendous loss because citizens with God-given abilities would be unable to develop and use those abilities for the benefit of others. In the Christian tradition, believers are told in Genesis 1:22, 28 to “be fruitful,” and in today’s modern world, it is extremely difficult to do this without an adequate education. (p. 182)

This is particularly odd because education is one area where we see a variety of funding strategies, such as private education, homeschooling tax credits, and private scholarships. One of the other areas he mentioned, such as national defense, may have made his case better, but still would have been noticeably biased.

Continuing to support government spending, Chapter 10 on economic policy includes a lengthy introduction to the theories of John Maynard Keynes. He so takes for granted that Keynesian economics is correct that he says, “in difficult economic times, it is tempting for governments to do the opposite of what is recommended under Keynesian economic theory because government revenues also declined in bad economic times, motivating governments to lower spending or raise taxes to improve worsening deficit situations” (p. 198, 200). Concerningly, there is neither equal treatment of opposing theories nor an equally robust explanation of laissez-faire economics. He merely waves off capitalism saying that “while capitalism has quickly become the dominant type of economic system in the world, it can’t survive without government” (p. 202). This statement ought to have been accompanied by an explanation, or at least a citation, about why capitalism has dominated and why he claims it can’t survive without government, yet the chapter includes neither.

While he begrudgingly admits that capitalist economies “are clearly superior to communist, planned economies,” he laments that they are “based on the idea of self-interest” (p. 210). He goes on to say, “it is not an economic system that has at its heart a concern for meeting human needs and creating opportunities for people to flourish. It is not an economic

system based on human love and compassion” (p. 210). There are many Christian economists at places like the Acton Institute and the Institute for Faith, Work & Economics who would disagree, and who regularly make thoughtful and compelling cases for how free markets do in fact promote human flourishing, but they aren’t given a voice here.

Chapters 11 and 12 look at international relations, the United Nations, and other international organizations meeting the needs of the world’s poor. The presentation of the different institutions is pretty straightforward, except there are a couple of glaring omissions: there is no discussion of how access to the global free market has raised billions of people out of destitute poverty, nor is there an acknowledgement that corrupt governments in many countries limit human flourishing. Van Geest’s focus is entirely on promoting governmental bodies and the not-for-profit organizations that work with them.


In conclusion, Van Geest’s textbook provides one Christian perspective—one that happens to be considerably pro-government and negative towards libertarians. Given its evangelical orientation, this textbook suffers from insufficient citations, especially from scripture. There were far too many places where Van Geest claims to speak for the Bible, or all Christians, without referencing a particular passage when it would have been appropriate to do so. For this reason, he certainly has failed in his goal of providing a solution to the problem of holding a secular textbook in one hand and the Bible in the other. Any Christian college faculty wanting to use this textbook in their political science course, will still need to hold the Bible in their other hand to make up for the lack of scripture. They may also want to supplement with free market and Christian libertarian readings so their students get a fair presentation of that viable Christian perspective which is unfairly maligned in Van Geest’s textbook.

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Sathianathan Clarke. *Competing Fundamentalisms: Violent Extremism in Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism.* Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2017. Pp. viii + 246. ISBN 978-0664259884. Paperback \$30.00.

The relationship between religion and violence is a touchy one. This is especially true in a context where national hopes and tribalistic politics finds convenient validation from the eternal throne of God (i.e., “divine authorization”). But something has emerged to scholars of religion that can help untangle this subject—namely, the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.¹



Sathianathan Clarke’s new book *Competing Fundamentalisms* seeks to unfold this subject and explain why it (not simply “religion” or any religious tradition in particular) is cause for public concern. Three major religious traditions (Christian, Islamic, Hindu) are examined separately and then together (instead of just one or two). Along the way, Clarke crafts a deeply insightful historical narrative behind contemporary fundamentalisms from each religion which, interestingly enough, all emerged in the early 1900s. The latest scholarship is implemented without falling off balance in his assessment of each tradition (even while being a Christian professor). The final result is a remarkably concise, readable, and discerning volume.

Clarke is by no means the first to spotlight the many harms caused by religious fundamentalism. Even narrowing to the Christian tradition, the

¹ Note that David Harrington Watt, *Antifundamentalism in Modern America* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2017) offers an alternative narrative that questions the legitimacy of the “fundamentalism” category, or at least its supposed neutral status. But his argument is uphill given the five-volume *Fundamentalisms* project by the American Academy of Religion in the 1990s, and field studies like Josie McSkimming, *Leaving Christian Fundamentalism and the Reconstruction of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

Oxford and Vanderbilt scholar James Barr wrote three heavy-hitting volumes on the subject in the 1970-80s²—interestingly, a period of “resurgence” (p. 38) for global religious fundamentalism. But, what is it? Clarke patiently positions himself towards the end of the book to provide this basic definition. His concise summary is found below with insertions of key words (to help readers grasp its depth):

Religious fundamentalism is a communal mind-set [separatism, in/out dynamics] steeped in a revealed Word-vision [biblicism, Qu’ranism, literal interpretation, fixed textual foundation], corroborated by a definitive ethical system of world-ways for human living [includes patriarchalism, practical dos and don’ts in contrast to godless world], and calibrated by an aggressive movement [statism, nationalism, militancy] that labors toward the goal that such a global order will govern the social, political, economic, cultural, and religious lives of all human beings [universal in scope; colonization/proselytization]. (p. 154)³

The first chapter of the book unfolds the complex dynamics of religion and public life, giving priority to “four theories that underestimate the role of religion” (p. 9). Most of these theories (social and psychological) tend to be secular, and don’t give credit to the role of religion itself in fundamentalism. “I submit that it is irresponsible, especially for nonfundamentalist religious practitioners,” Clarke concludes, “to blame the violent manifestations of religious fundamentalisms exclusively or

² James Barr, *Fundamentalism* (Louisville: WJK, 1978); *Beyond Fundamentalism* (Louisville: WJK, 1984); *Escaping Fundamentalism* (London: SCM, 1984). The content from most of these books can be found in the more recent publication, John Barton, ed., *Bible and Interpretation: The Collected Essays of James Barr*, vol 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

³ Cf. McSkimming, *Leaving Christian Fundamentalism*, 40: “In short, Christian fundamentalism may be understood as a totalizing and highly influential social movement, thoroughly adept in the acculturation of its participant members through embracing and promoting a defensive collective identity, suspicious of ‘the other’ but also committed to mission and evangelism. It is apparent that a guarded, fortified and self-perpetuating inward focus (with requisite identity specifications) emerges.”

primarily on nonreligious spheres or forces. We must be honest with ourselves: religion is part of the problem" (p. 32). He further qualifies, "I do not claim that religion can be distilled from and extracted out of the rest of reality....religion cannot help but be expressed though [*sic*] cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological dimensions of our twenty-first-century world. Yet neither can religion be fully emptied into these other facets of human life" (p. 33).

The next three chapters (2-4) look at Christian, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalisms, respectively. After sketching out the 20th century origins, he summarizes Christian fundamentalism in three headings:

1. Biblical Absolutism

- a. "Modernity threatens to let assured reason and liberal reasoning shake the secure foundation of the Bible as absolute authority in the life of the community of believers as they seek to bring about the divine purposes for world history. The other sacred narratives jeopardize the fundamentalist myth that as a 'Christian nation' the United States must be grounded upon and guided by God's Word as revealed concretely, historically, and literally only in the Bible." (p. 49)
- b. "...Christian fundamentalists find their own purpose organically and missionally connected to the nature of God's powerful and even violent works in the Bible." (p. 49)

2. Cosmic Struggle between Good and Evil

- a. "fundamentalists espouse and disseminate imagery that bespeaks the clash between powers of good and evil. Thus, battle symbolism permeates individual Christian's thought..." (p. 51)
- b. "...this dualistic worldview marks the overflow of such conflicting language and symbolism from the mind of individuals and communities into real life [e.g., suspicion and antipathy towards Muslims]." (p. 51-52)
- c. "...this cosmic conflict between good and evil will end in a cosmic showdown in which God will completely crush and conquer Satan and all the forces of evil...[this] apocalyptic end

that involves the whole cosmos makes this dualistic drama pregnant with meaning for fundamentalists.” (p. 52)

3. “Chosenness” and God’s Rule over the Whole World.
 - a. “When the absolute God ‘whose name is Jealous’ acts against those perceived as a threat to this ultimacy in the world, we humans see ourselves as authorized to commit violence.” (p. 56; as a case in point, Clarke quotes Liberty University President Jerry Falwell Sr., who cited the Bible to legitimize the Iraq War in 2003)
 - b. “...the United States has been chosen by God...[as such] the nation must engage in beliefs and actions that demonstrate its fidelity to God, justifying its status as chosen” (p. 57)
 - c. “...the United States must embrace its calling to be ‘the Redeemer nation’ within the world.” (p. 58)

Clarke’s account incisively identifies how, through politics and belief, Christians came to be known for *legitimizing* large-scale violence instead of opposing it. He also rightly notes (as other scholars have), that fundamentalism is an unwitting, negative *extension* of modernism, not an alternative to it (p. 61). All of this affects Christian perceptions of Islam in global affairs, doing theology, and self-perception as the Christian community—especially in connection to statism.

The alliance between neoconservative political ideology and religious fundamentalism swept the country, which believed it was under massive and violent threat, both from secular and liberal “pagans” within and religious and anti-Christian “terrorists” abroad...[T]he justification for violence and responsibility for war was effectively transferred by Enlightenment modernity from the church to the nation-state...On the other hand, Christian fundamentalists became much more vested in gaining control of the nation-state. I have highlighted the way in which the Bible, flag, and God were entwined by fundamentalism to forge an imagined “deification of the nation.” On the other hand, Christian fundamentalists could utilize the state to carry out violence against those who were demonized by religious and political leaders of the chosen

nation....[M]ythical appeal to the privileged status of “redeemer nation” is fused at the with engaging the myth of “redemptive violence.” (pp. 45, 61-62)

The chapter on Muslim fundamentalism begins with background dynamics of Islamic violence and traverses into the Ottoman Empire and ultimately the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1900s. Like Christian fundamentalism, Muslim fundamentalism is a response to Western, modern secularism and an uncomfortable, shifting sense of cultural identity. Clarke traces the contours of the movement in three cords: “(1) complete surrender to the one God and conforming to Allah’s will made available in the Sharia; (2) absolutist Scripture interpreted by authoritative leaders committed to a divinely scripted view of the world; and (3) promotion of global religious civilization that extends the Muslim way of life in a world of westernization and modernization” (p. 81). The Qu’ran and role of tradition, concepts of *jihad*, and the present-day situation (ISIS, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) are also covered.

The chapter on Hindu fundamentalism is particularly interesting for Western readers (being restricted to India). Since the goal is to establish a nation-state based on a particular race and set of ideological principles, the whole enterprise felt awfully similar to Jewish Zionism. In any case, the three contours of Hindu fundamentalism Clarke assembles are (1) “strongly cultivated scriptural identity” (based on the Vedas), (2) body-emphasis (“the objective of Hinduism is for human beings to reflect the harmonious order of god’s body in the world”), (3) “hegemonic politics and monistic philosophy” (nationalist aspirations, also rooted in Hindu theologies, e.g., *atman*, *dharm*a, etc.). Clarke concludes: “Many fear that the dual tactics of persuasion through Vedic education and coercion through violence will succeed in uniting Hindu fundamentalism’s short-term goals of ‘intimidation of the minorities, especially Muslims and Christians’ with its long-term one, that of ‘Hinduization of the whole of India’” (p. 126).

The next chapter then connects the dots from all three traditions without doing injustice to their distinctives. Clarke identifies three overlapping connections in this respect:

1. "Unwavering confidence in and complete submission to the Word-vision" (the Real and true is definitively revealed in revelatory, textual form)
2. "Fixed and straight-forward world-ways" ("rigid and uniform ways of living" p. 134)
3. "Global order in conformity to an absolute word-vision and in compliance with fixed world-ways" (world domination)

Clarke provides numerous case studies to make all of these themes come alive. He also looks at "intra-religious" and "interreligious" competitions, concluding the chapter with a discussion on fundamentalism's common enemies: secularism and modernity (p. 159ff).

Finally, the concluding chapter looks for positive ways in dealing with fundamentalism, such as "unleashing religion's constructive power" (p. 165), "detoxifying scripture" (p. 167), being "stewards of God's mysteries" and, above all, being proclaimers of "the gospel of peace" (p. 177). Religion in general is not the problem. In fact, he finds redemptive threads (especially within Christianity) that can disarm the destructive mayhem of 20th- and 21st-century Islamic, Hindu, and Christian fundamentalisms.

There are other particular features in Clarke's insightful analysis. In reconciling violence in the scriptures with Christian theology, he essentially takes the view of John Crossan, saying,

Jesus represents the radical and inclusive nonviolent version of ushering in God's vision for the world that subverts the contending vision of God pursued by the elite establishment, which depends on violence. I believe that this third approach, with its emphasis on embrace peace with 'distributive justice,' offers up a credible conception of sacred Scripture as a whole that both delegitimizes violence and validates nonviolent action on behalf of the well-being of all human beings. It manages to keep

the traditional canon as a mark of respect...without ignoring the contest between violent and nonviolent strands woven into the metanarrative. (p. 172)

Unfortunately, Clarke doesn't draw the connection between the economic concept of "distributive justice" and how its enforcement almost always requires the kind of empire and coercion that is being critiqued. Liberal-democratic and socialist applications of any kind of economic or moral "justice" necessarily (and historically) terminate in, ironically, the "elite establishment, which depends on violence."⁴ A sharp distinction between the role of the church and the role of the state would have been very helpful here—especially as one sees Caesar's head popping up all over the place.⁵

Clarke also highlights an important, anti-intellectual feature of fundamentalism when discussing fundamentalist Hindu education: "Acceptance of the idea that the Vedas are divinely revealed scripture, *even if one does not know what they contain*, undergirds the fundamentalists' aspirations to Hindu unity" (p. 115, emphasis original). How many people have been compelled by Christian fundamentalists to believe in the

⁴ One recalls that a "state" is, by definition, a territorial monopoly on violence. See Anthony Giddens, *Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 2:121; Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Muenchen, 1921), 396-450; Franz Oppenheimer, *The State*, trans. John Gitterman (Black Rose Books, 2007, originally published New York: B and W Huebsch, 1908), 15; Murray Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* (Auburn: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2006), 56-68; David Friedman, *The Machinery of Freedom*, 3rd ed. (David Friedman via Createspace, 2014), 108. Despite confusion about this subject in Clarke's account, he nevertheless brilliantly observes that "Capturing the nation-state to implement the Master's metanarrative within the country across the whole world, as human history marches toward the end times, becomes an important goal for Christians in the United States" (p. 54).

⁵ The same can be said of a similar, recent volume: Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson, eds. *Violence in the World's Religious Traditions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), as noted in my review published by *Reading Religion* (November 8 2017).

truthfulness (or “inerrancy”) of the Bible without even having read it? One should never forget the remarks of the popular Christian rapper, Jahaziel, after leaving his faith: “When I first joined Christianity, I was told ‘you must believe this book is God’s infallible word...Before I’d even read the book!! How can one decide for themselves whether a book is accurate and true BEFORE they have even read & investigated the book thoroughly?!”⁶ Clarke doesn’t mention it, but he might as well have said it: Christian fundamentalism (along with its dominant form, American evangelicalism) is one of the leading *causes* (not guardrails) of apostasy.⁷

Competing Religious Fundamentalisms is arguably one of the most important works of contemporary religion. Bombings, wars, and other acts of violence is serious business; most human beings living on earth today are affected, in some way, by Islamic (think 9/11 and America’s endless “war on terrorism”) and Christian fundamentalism (think literal Bible interpretation and bans on women teachers). And if the driving motivations underneath all of this are *theological*, then an informed, level-headed, and constructive assessment of this topic is extremely valuable. This is the kind of assessment found in Clarke’s work.⁸

It’s also encouraging that Clarke’s own Christian tradition has neither been alienated (flawed as it has been throughout history) or rendered powerless to deal with these notoriously complex problems. In fact, he plainly says at one point: “...tolerance is not enough...much more is required of Christians, who are called and commissioned to transform the

⁶ Jahaziel, cited in Billy Hallowell, “Christian Rapper Renounces Christianity, Citing ‘Human Errors of the Bible,’ ‘Brutal Nature of Its God’ — and There’s More.” *The Blaze* (January 5, 2016).

⁷ This is pointed out by the many volumes on this subject, including those in apologetics such as Craig Evans, *Fabricating Jesus* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008).

⁸ There are at least two typos in the manuscript: “absolutism” (p. 46); “though” (instead of “through,” p. 33).

broken world that God loves so much" (p. 177).⁹ He ably unfolds the nonviolent Christian vision of the world by revisiting theologians, popular texts, and ideas that maybe need dusting off for some readers. He shows how in Ephesians Paul "was drawing from the imagery of the Roman Empire even as he was spiritualizing such military symbolism by infusing it with the ethic of nonviolent resistance of the people on the Jesus way" (p. 182), how a sound doctrine of the Trinity demolishes selfish monarchy and "reveals and authorizes self-emptying love" (p. 180), and most of all, how an ethic of peace is not just a popular theme in Christianity, but a central feature of Christian identity.

Clarke is also careful not to dismiss God's work in other religious traditions. He realizes the futility of some pluralistic attempts at simply collapsing religious traditions together by saying "we're all on the same page," but also realizes that people of different faiths have positive contributions to offer one another. In the end, one either embraces fundamentalist religion or peaceful religion:

The difference between fundamentalist religion on the one hand and peace-embracing religion on the other, can be seen in the *competing* propensity of the battlefield with the *completing* possibility of the flower garden. On God's behalf, violent fundamentalists are competing in a battle to take over the world....Competing names, competing peoples, competing lands, and competing lifestyles are all needed in this cosmic dualistic struggle to make One God to be Lord over all. By contrast, the nonviolence implied in the restorative Word, inclusive ethical practices, and all-encompassing world of *completing* religions serves to make room for God's overflowing plenitude. God is the richer communion into which the whole human family is made free to enter. Names, peoples,

⁹ Cf. the nonviolent ethic of libertarianism compared to the nonviolent *and* constructive ethic of Christian libertarianism in Jamin Andreas Hübner, "Christian Libertarianism: An Introduction and Signposts for the Road Ahead," *The Christian Libertarian Review* 1 (2018): 15-74.

lands, and lifestyles complete each other in this divine-human communion of abundant life. (p. 186)


This is an encouraging end to the book, especially for those who struggle to see how world religions might peacefully coexist in an ever-globalized age.

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James Halteman and Edd Noell. *Reckoning with Markets: Moral Reflection in Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xvi + 218. ISBN 978-0199763702. Hardcover \$40.95.

Reckoning with Markets attempts to reintroduce a broader approach to economics that faded with the rise of the neoclassical synthesis in the early-to-mid-20th century. By explicitly engaging moral questions, the authors push back against (narrow, scientific) economics in favor of (broad, humane) political economy. But as we will see, there are some issues regarding execution that limit the force of the authors' arguments. Furthermore, it is questionable whether students of economics, who are this book's primary audience, can benefit from such a broader perspective unless they are already highly competent practitioners of rational choice.



Unusually for books in the social sciences, and in my view refreshingly, the Preface is not a mere preview of coming attractions. The authors describe their experiences attempting to craft market-friendly academic programs in post-Communist Russia, including their unfortunate failures. They believe this failed due to, in part, a lack of appreciation for the mutual impingement of moral values and economic forces. This impingement is the subject of the book. Chapter one explores how the greatest minds in the Western canon have thought about the relationship of ethical conduct to commercial life. The bulk of the chapter is written as an imaginary plenary session with debates between Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx, Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and other giants of political economy. The purpose is to show just how varied are the various theories and frameworks for exploring morals and markets, as well as to set up the

detailed investigations into those theories and frameworks in the following chapters.

Chapter two focuses on moral reflection in the ancient Mediterranean world. The writings and philosophies of the ancient Greeks (Plato and Aristotle, with Hesiod playing a supporting role), the Old and New Testaments, and the Stoics are the three main traditions surveyed. The chapter outlines their basic thought, discusses how each relates to the other, and highlights differences with conceptions of human welfare in modern economics. Although I think there are some small mischaracterizations of F.A. Hayek and Adam Smith, this an informative chapter that lays important historical groundwork.

The third chapter covers the economic thought of the Scholastics. The bulk of discussion focuses, understandably, on St. Thomas Aquinas, but later thinkers such as Cajetan are also discussed. The themes receiving the most attention are justice and exchange and usury. The authors do a good job of showing how Scholastic thinking evolved as the medieval commercial revival spread throughout Europe. They conclude with a discussion of the 2007-8 financial crisis that shows how Scholastic moral reasoning about commerce can be applied.

Chapter four is on Adam Smith, the ‘founding father of modern economics.’ Unsurprisingly given the themes of the book, it is Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* rather than the *Wealth of Nations* that receives the majority of the authors’ attention. The chapter discusses the moral underpinnings of commercial society, including the importance of moral sympathy and impartial reflection. At times this chapter made me uncomfortable, such as when the authors repeatedly refer to Smith’s positive theory of political economy as “mechanistic,” without it being clear from the context whether this view is the authors’ or that of scholars in the secondary literature. But overall it is a reasonable treatment of the evolution of economic thought in the Enlightenment era, and its Scottish manifestation in particular.

In chapter five we reach a crucial turning point: the transition of political economy from a humane study to a naturalistic and quasi-mechanical science. This is the era economic systematization, and the rise of concepts such as the “laws of the distribution of income.” The authors do a good job of presenting the material, considering the brevity of the chapter in comparison to its surveyed time horizon. But there are certain times, such as in their discussion of Malthus and Marshall, where the authors’ skepticism regarding this transformation comes through.

Chapter six explores moral reflection in heterodox schools of economics. The authors pick three thinkers who are frequently associated with prominent heterodox schools—Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, and Friedrich Hayek—and describe their contributions to social science, as well as how each treated ethical reflection in their systems of political economy. The chapter concludes with another interlude on the financial crisis but engages only the Marxian perspective on what went wrong in markets. I would have liked to have seen an Old Institutional and Austrian perspective on the crisis as well.

In chapter seven, the authors move beyond exploring particular thinkers or schools of thought. They turn their attention to the entirety of modern economics, by which they mean rational choice theory. Unsurprisingly, the authors find it wanting, and argue that rational choice theory cannot cope with important factors such as genuine uncertainty, entrepreneurship, and change in economic systems that is both sudden and radical. This chapter is simultaneously interesting and frustrating. While I am highly sympathetic to the motivations behind the authors’ critiques, I do not think economically informed readers will find them persuasive. The authors acknowledge that economists usually defend rational choice on predictive grounds, rather than ontological, but then they proceed with critiques whose force depends on economists holding the ontological view. Objecting to rational choice by saying, “But people aren’t really like that!” is neither insightful nor helpful. Furthermore, the authors completely neglect more robust and generalizable forms of

rational choice. In particular, the work of economists such as Armen Alchian, Gary Becker, and Vernon Smith has provided a strong case for locating rationality at the systemic level, rather than at the level of individual psychological motivations. Economists rely on prices and incomes to explain *impersonal* phenomena, not personal. Furthermore, the authors' insistence that economics, at a deep level, is not truly a value-free science fails to appreciate that economists can occupy many social roles, such as scholar, policy analyst, and political activist, in which economics is certainly coupled with value judgments, but the essence of the economic way of thinking itself (*ceteris paribus* demand curves slope down) remains valid.

Both the troubling and promising themes from this chapter are expressed in the final two chapters. Chapter eight critically surveys the extension of rational choice analysis to non-market decision making, such as law, politics, religion, and the family. The authors still do not appreciate the difference between rational choice as a motivational assumption, and rational choice as engine of analysis. More promisingly, however, they do recognize the artificially narrow bounds economic discourse was forced to occupy due to the profession's predilection for scientism.

The concluding chapter outlines a broader approach to political economy, one more commensurate with the great political economists of the classical and early neoclassical eras. The authors conceive the individual as occupying a series of moral communities that range from high degrees of personality, such as the family, to high degrees of anonymity, such as the state. They then describe how the systems of moral discourse surveyed throughout the book can help economists understand individual choice depending on the particular moral community. This is not at all objectionable from the standpoint of applied economics, or economic history. But it still does not impugn rational choice, because rational choice is not about motivations.

Overall, I believe the book's goal is a noble one. The science of economics should be broadened once again into the science of political

economy. Room should be made for moral discourse and reflection on how commercial institutions relate to virtuous living and human dignity. I am less satisfied with the project's execution, however. The book feels like it was written to be a compendium to an undergraduate course on economics and ethics. But aside perhaps from a senior-level elective or capstone course, such a course is more likely to do harm to students than good. The economic way of thinking is already bitterly resisted by scholars and policymakers, even by those who purport to be economists. An economics education should instill the fundamentals in students' minds through repeated, persistent, and thorough application of the first law of demand to all social spheres. This is precisely because students of economics far too often will use any excuse to stop thinking like an economist. Only for an economist who can explain the best arguments for hard-line rational choice is it safe to begin reflecting on these more complicated issues. For those who are only "nine to five economists," it is more appropriate to focus on the counterintuitive ways in which rationality, prices and incomes, etc. *can* explain so many disparate social phenomena. If students cannot pass a Turing Test as Gary Becker, it is probably not a good idea for them to start looking for excuses to ignore human purposiveness and the omnipresence of tradeoffs.


I share many of the concerns that motivate the authors' project. I think their approach to political economy is ultimately correct. But the road to the authors' desired destination is long, winding, and uncertain. Just as only Nixon could go to China, only a believer in the economic way of thinking can safely explore moral reflection in economics.

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Moshe Halbertal and Stephen Holmes. *The Beginning of Politics: Power in the Biblical Book of Samuel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. Pp. xiii + 211. ISBN 978-0691191683. Paperback \$27.95.

Two lawyers from New York provide an unusually brilliant and persuasive reading of the book of Samuel in their new monograph *The Beginning of Politics*. In contrast to run-of-the-mill Old Testament scholars who emphasize the political nature of ancient literature (e.g., royal propaganda), Halbertal and Holmes contend that the author (singular) was perhaps the first person in history to write a book focusing on politics and power itself. In their words, "...the book of Samuel does not display a one-sided allegiance to any of the political factions that competed for power at the time. Its author didn't write a political book, therefore, but rather a book *about* politics" (p. 2).



This thesis is provocative and persuasive in countless ways. Consider, for example, what this suggests about the literature compared with its surrounding culture:

The biblical political theology that preceded the dramatic events recounted in the Book of Samuel upended this ancient Near Eastern formula. Rather than declaring that 'the king is a God,' the new theology postulated instead that 'God is the king.' The sole or exclusive kingship of God was fundamentally irreconcilable with a consolidated political monarchy....In the Samuel narrative, both the shift away from the political theology of the Book of Judges and the initial appearance of monarchy in Israel are presented as events occurring in human history. They do not belong to the mythic past. The biblical king, enthroned before our eyes, is a thoroughly human being, not a God. He is not a pillar of cosmic order. He plays a negligible and wholly dispensable role in

religious ritual, does not convey divine commands to his people, does not maintain the order of nature, and is not the prime lawgiver. (pp. 5, 8)

Kingship was always a problem in the Old Testament, and (the book of) Samuel specifically addresses the notorious hazards of political authority in general—such as its aggressive and coercive nature.

Samuel's catalog of the king's onerous privileges, proclaimed at the very moment when the unified Israelite polity came into being, introduces the reader to the fundamentally problematic nature of mankind's political project. For one thing, if the sovereign amasses enough power to provide security for the people against their enemies, he will also be strong enough to threaten and oppress the people he is supposed to protect. Indeed, the very act of organizing the people for self-defense inescapably involves a painful degree of tyrannical subordination, resource-extraction, and unfreedom. (p. 11)

Halbertal and Holmes do not attempt to legitimize violence as so many authors do today in their popular discourse about government. "The privilege to tax...means to confiscate their subject's property, and to draft, which means the right to enlist able-bodied young men whether they wish to serve or not" (p. 12). This is what it means to possess political authority: to initiate violence against people and their property. This, presumably, is one of the reasons why Yahweh has a problem with monarchy and the political structure of power it represents in the first place.¹

Indeed, "the Book of Samuel provides us with our earliest account of the arduous, contested, and historically contingent emergence of this-worldly sovereignty. The centralization of political-military authority is

¹ The authors see Yahweh as having the following attitude toward kingship: "*I did not recommend that decision. It wasn't the initial plan I had for you. Human kingship was your choice, which you insisted upon even after being warned. You wanted it and I couldn't refuse you. So let us see how it unfolds, and what it means. And what will be my place in it*" (p. 15, emphasis original).

admittedly accompanied by priestly anointment and bestowed by the grace of God” (p. 14). With Saul, David, and Solomon, one witnesses all the great hopes and energy of a modern-day political rally—as well as the most primitive problems of a “state-church” combination. The state and its political apparatus are fundamentally opposed to the progressive, peace-making vision of God. So no matter what the rhetoric at the time, it’s just not going to last.

In going through the whole narrative of Samuel to Saul to David, the authors marvelously uncover the insightful details of the narrator—and how they are just as relevant today as they were over three millennia ago. The book’s “anatomy of sovereignty applies not only to dynastic kingship in a tribal society but, with suitable modifications, illuminates important features of every political order, including the welfare state, the liberal state, and so forth” (p. 167). Here are the key highlights of this discussion (in no particular order).

1. *The path to power is not actually glorious*: “sovereign authority is actually consolidated much less sacramentally, through a hard-fought struggle, by tactically ingenious applications of force and fraud deployed to overcome considerable human resistance” (p. 14).
2. *Power corrupts; means become ends*. “Whenever retaining hold on high office, rather than realizing an ideological vision or implementing a political program, becomes the dominant aim of politics, sovereign power becomes for its wielder an end in itself, even while being publicly justified as a means for providing collective security....As power becomes an end for a sovereign clinging desperately to it, other intrinsically worthy ends turn into disposable means. Rulers who wield their authority in the service of power as an end in itself regularly convert such ends as love, loyalty, the sacred, and moral obligation into mere means for

eliminating dangerous rivals and staving off the loss of power, a loss that they morbidly dread" (p. 18).

3. *Power corrupts even those who are determined to avoid it.* "Saul did not covet power. Power coveted him...why exactly does the author of Samuel make sure that we see Saul as wholly devoid of lofty ambition and craving for power? It is sometimes said that the only one who can be trusted with power is the one who doesn't seek it. Yet our author, in these passages, obviously wished to convey a diametrically contrary thought. The account of Saul's first two coronations prepares us to see how intoxicating appeal of supreme power will overtake even a character as naturally uncalculating, unassuming, and unenterprising as Saul" (pp. 20, 22).
4. *Committing violence naturally prepares one for political office.* [On 1 Sam 11] "This was the moment Saul began to act like a king. He established a permanent court with a small standing army; he would no longer be found plowing his fields. Military victory gave him a taste for power and the confidence to assume it" (p. 23).
5. *Political power always depends on the willingness of others to kill—and more.* "...no ruler, no matter how strong, can rely solely on coercion to dictate the behavior of those who wield the means of state coercion on his behalf. When ordering violence against his own subjects, therefore, a sovereign is necessarily constrained by the likely unwillingness of his security forces to obey any order to massacre kinsmen, their own flesh and blood, who, in this case, were also men of God" (p. 75).
6. *Unpredictability is a strategy of maintaining power over others.* "Opaqueness is intrinsic to the mystique of charisma. Screening David's subjective intentions and sentiments from the reader's view is one of the ways in which the genius of our author constructed David's aura. But the general illegibility of David's

motives did not prevent Saul from foreseeing that David, too, would have no qualms about using Michal's love as a stepping-stone to power" (p. 33-34).

7. *"Justice" is often used by those in power to legitimize purely political actions. "one of our author's central themes: the invocation of justice to palliate, excuse, or rationalize conduct undertaken for reasons of pure political expediency is a possibility that haunts all genuine political action" (p. 157).*
8. *Those with political power do not see their role as the same as those who elected them. "But the sovereign who has gained [power] and those around him who compete for it do not see supreme political power exclusively from the public's point of view, as a means for organizing collective defense. The seekers and wielders of sovereign authority inevitably see it from a more personal perspective. The privileges and status of the highest political office can be intoxicating, transforming sovereign authority all too easily into an end-in-itself, a stand-alone goal which becomes the very raison d'être of those seeking to gain or maintain it" (p. 167).*
9. *Hierarchies of power create distance between those in power and those "on the ground," which leads to self-deception. "An increase in political power often spells a decrease in understanding, because political power inevitably attracts disinformation or highly selective information from those who want to use it for their own ends. The powerful will always have trouble deciphering the sincerity and reliability of the indispensable information that backroom counselors whisper in their ears, disorienting their decision making and adding to their isolation" (p. 116).*
10. *Hierarchies of power forge internal competition destined to end badly. "Wielding sovereign authority is dangerous, above all, because supreme power is an irresistible magnet attracting ruthless competition from ambitious and talented rivals to its exercise... supreme authority can breed a distrust of subordinates so extreme*

as to verge on paranoia. It is undoubtedly true that even paranoids have enemies" (pp. 44, 69).

11. *Permitting the state's monopoly on violence will always result in more violence than intended—and come back to bite. "In our view, the subtly constructed details of the story of the massacre of the priests of Nob reveal how the anonymous author of the Book of Samuel excavates the deepest underpinnings of political violence, uncovering structural themes that emerge when a sovereign turns his capacity for violence, originally bestowed to fend off foreign threats, against his own subjects and subordinates. The Israelite people had knowingly accepted the burdens of taxation and conscription as the price of collective self-defense. But they had not agreed to the massacre of innocent members of their own community, for no legitimate national purpose, by a mentally unhinged and paranoid king" (p. 77).*
12. *The state's monopoly on violence is inherently contradictory; politicians represent the will of the people and do this by forcing their will over the will of the people: "A loose-knit confederation of disputatious tribes was especially vulnerable at its frontiers, where territorial disputes with neighboring peoples were most acute. Such vulnerability explains the legitimate aspiration to overcome strife inside a tribal confederacy and to enforce unity. Yet this rationale for pooling collective resources by centralizing the power to command is fraught with a deep contradiction that lies at the core of political life and that our author brings us into focus with exceptional artistry and theoretical force" (p. 166).*
13. *Systematic, collective violence is far more difficult to stop than individual acts of violence because no one needs to claim ultimate responsibility. "In distributing the various components of his conduct along a chain of agents, not only the sovereign but each link in the chain can find some way to disassociate itself from the*

crime. State action, especially when it is oppressive and inhumane, becomes anonymous. It has no face" (p. 88, cf. 97).²

14. *The true heroes are not those in office or those wielding power, but those without power willing to treat even the most corrupt individuals as human beings.* "Saul's last supper was served to him by a socially marginalized woman who was as disconnected from political power as can possibly be imagined. Moved by the shattered king lying inert on her floor, a persecuted sinner proved capable of a pure act of compassion seemingly beyond the moral capacities of the powerful heroes populating the Book of Samuel. The resentful prophet Samuel had only harsh, unforgiving words for Saul on the last night of his life. David and his band were securely hiding in Achish's territory. The only person willing and able to provide Saul with some measure of warmth and care, feeding him from what little she had in her own home, was the woman of En-dor. Her uncalculating compassion is luminous in a narrative replete with moments of questionable piety and political duplicity. The unambiguously noninstrumental nature of her charitable act is the measure of her distance from the equivocal ways of power-seekers and power-wielders. She is a rare moral hero in a world where morality can rarely escape from the cloud of ambiguity that pervades political life" (pp. 65-66).

I can't recommend *The Beginning of Politics* enough. It is a tremendous volume that blends sound biblical study with honest and penetrating thoughts about the nature of political authority and the government's

² God, in the narrative, is apparently aware of this given the prophecy of Nathan: "Cold blooded murder, it turns out, even when committed at arm's length, remains cold-blooded murder. Despite all of his attempts at distributing the violence through the causal chain, David was the one who killed Uriah with the sword of the Ammonites. This is what Nathan says" (p. 96).

power. It would be an excellent “bridge” to Christian libertarianism for those ensaturated in modern, democratic readings that are uncritical of statism, nationalism, and politics in general.³

The book, however, left me with a gnawing question in the back of my mind: Can the authors’ purpose in the book of Samuel be restricted to the book of Samuel, or could it be extended to 1-2 Kings—and perhaps even to the Enneateuch as a whole? A good case could be made that Genesis-2 Kings maintains the same critical perspective of political authority (e.g., the Tower of Babel, Joseph’s refusal to assume power over his boss’s wife, the civil disobedience of the Egyptian midwives, Pharaoh and the Exodus, Moses’ inability to judge so many cases in the primitive Israelite community, etc.). If Genesis-2 Kings was largely composed/compiled by the same group of scribes in the 500s BCE, then a unified perspective would be somewhat expected. Perhaps this is a proposal needing further exploration.⁴

Whatever the case, there is room to doubt Thomas Hobbes’ assertion that the Bible could never be used to criticize political authority.

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³ The book’s thesis also strongly resonates with that of Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly* (New York: Knopf, 1984).

⁴ Cf. Jamin Hübner, “Israel’s History as a Post-Exile Critique of Political Power,” 2018 Canadian-American Theological Society annual meeting, Wycliff College, Toronto. For a recent scholarly treatment of this topic, see Jan Gertz, Bernard Levinson, Dalit Rom-Shiloni, and Konrad Schmid, eds., *The Formation of the Pentateuch: Bridging the Academic Cultures of Europe, Israel, and North America (Forschungen Zum Alten Testament)* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016) and Thomas Dozeman, Thomas Römer, and Konrad Schmid, *Pentateuch, Hexateuch, or Enneateuch?: Identifying Literary Works in Genesis Through Kings* (Society of Biblical Literature. Ancient Israel and Its Liter) (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011).

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
Alan Kreider. *The Patient Ferment of the Early Church: The Improbable Rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016. xiv + 321 pp. ISBN 978-0801048494. Paperback. \$26.99.

Violence is the product of a habitus of impatience.

So writes Alan Kreider in his recently-published study of early Christian history, *The Patient Ferment of the Early Church*. Impatience is the way of the world, and it characterized human interaction in the Roman world of antiquity as much as it does in our own today. It's what drives us to lie, to cheat, to steal, and to kill. We frantically grasp for what we want in fear of our own death that draws ever nearer.

There was something different about the early Christians, however—something that allowed them to grow, most unexpectedly, from a minor mystery religion on the outskirts of the Roman Empire to its dominant religion by the fifth century.

This thing which set them apart from the world around them was patience, a patience that springs forth from faith and hope and is modeled on the example of Christ. Impatience, the early Christians wrote, was at the heart of human sin and produced self-destructive violence. Patience, and therefore peace, however, was the fruit of faith and hope in the resurrection. Distinguishing his approach from scholars who argued that the dramatic rise of Christianity was due to the power of their ideas, or to psychological and physical force (namely Michael Green, Edward Gibbon, and Ramsay MacMullen), Kreider locates the source of early Christianity's appeal in the distinctive behavior of its adherents. He breaks this down into four interrelated factors which have heretofore been ignored by historians: patience, habitus, catechesis and worship, and ferment. He builds his case by establishing the importance of the virtue of patience in



early Christianity, demonstrating that for early Christians this patience necessarily had to be embodied (a *habitus*, a concept derived from French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu). This *habitus*, we learn, was formed through lengthy catechesis followed by communal worship. As outsiders observed the distinctively patient behavior of their Christian neighbors, some were drawn to inquire about this unusual religion. And so Christianity grew, not by force but by ferment.

Kreider's first chapter establishes the surprising and unlikely growth of Christianity during the first three centuries, "despite the opposition of laws and social convention" (p. 8), despite little interest in missions and evangelism, and despite the churches' restricted access to baptized members only. The priority, rather, was living the patient model set forth by Christ. In stark contrast to the imperial world that viewed patience as a virtue suitable only for subordinates, Christians considered patience (the focus of chapter 2) to be the chief of all the virtues, and "crucial to their churches' life and growth" (p. 15). It was so important that three treatises were written on it: Tertullian's *On Patience* (*De patientia*; ca. 204), Cyprian's *On the Good of Patience* (*De bono patientiae*; ca. 256), and Augustine's *On Patience* (*De patientia*; ca. 417) (p. 14). Drawing from Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Lactantius, Kreider reveals widespread agreement that early Christians were to live out their faith by embodying patience, thereby emulating God's character as revealed through Jesus Christ and making it visible to those around them. Not only were words and deeds to match, behavior was even more important than words: Christianity is by its very nature incarnational. And so Christ-followers were to embody patience through trusting God during times of struggle and persecution, and also by interacting with others in nonviolent, noncoercive ways. They repudiated violence and killing in all its forms, including abortion, infanticide, capital punishment, gladiatorial games, and war.

In the third chapter, Kreider defines Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, which is a "'corporeal knowledge,' a 'system of dispositions' that we carry

in our bodies," formed by social conventions, example, story, and repetition—and it, in turn, shapes our identity (p. 39). *Habitus* is extremely difficult to change, but not impossible, and a transformation of *habitus* is precisely what conversion to Christianity required. The Christian *habitus* then served to attract others by offering them something the empire couldn't: worth. Whereas Roman civic religion and pagan *collegia* served to reinforce the power of the state and its "steep social stratification" (p. 42), Christian behavior, particularly with respect to fictive kinship, effectively subverted empire. Christian associations challenged imperial power structures by accepting members from all strata of society, including women and slaves, any of whom could participate by offering a song, prayer, vision, scripture reading, or testimony (p. 61). Their love for one another spilled out of their worship services into the public arena, from providing compassionate care to victims of plague to their behavior as martyrs in the literal arena.

In chapter 4, Kreider argues that ordinary Christians were responsible for the spread and growth of Christianity, and they accomplished it simply by living their lives, which often required them to move to new locations for work, and by organically establishing new Christian communities in the process. Early Christianity was domestic: gatherings were frequent and took place in the home, and members shared their resources and treated one another as family. The domesticity of early Christian communities contributed largely toward developing the Christian *habitus* among its members, as well as making it visible to outsiders—specifically, their neighbors. Early Christianity, Kreider argues, was also a "women's movement," claiming that "from an early date the majority of Christians were women," and that their "greatest significance was their energetic involvement as community builders, providers of service, and practitioners of humble evangelism" (p. 83). For women, as marginalized members of Roman society, the message of the gospel was one of empowerment, of individual worth and dignity, and

their new Christian communities offered opportunities for them to exercise greater influence than what was available outside.

In chapter 5, we learn that early Christian communities ("when Christians were at their best") were distinctive for their sense of "a dynamic interplay between indigenizing and being pilgrim, between affirmation and critique" of the cultures in which they lived (p. 98). They understood that their "commitment to the local culture [was] clear but conditional" (p. 99). Out of love, they sought to allow the gospel to bring healing and flourishing to their cultures through restoration of wholeness to individuals and communities, and they did this through healing and exorcism, caring for the poor, and promoting peace through reconciliation and honest, ethical, and noncoercive behavior. Their ability to maintain an appropriate balance between indigenization and being pilgrim was due, likely, to the patient formation of habitus through catechesis and worship. As we read in chapter 6, the third-century *Apostolic Tradition* reveals that it was difficult to become a Christian, with the catechetical process leading up to baptism lasting possibly years, and entry into the community taking place only after scrutiny of the catechumen's habitus and character. As the early Christians viewed their behavior as the primary mode of evangelism, "admitting new people too quickly whose behavior compromised the Christians' distinctive attractiveness" would "undercut this approach to mission" (p. 149). Following catechesis, a new Christian could participate fully in worship, the focus of chapter 7. Early Christian worship served to transform habitus through example and bodily repetition; one of the most characteristic examples was interpersonal reconciliation expressed by the kiss of peace. Based on Jesus's instruction in Matthew 5:23-24, early Christians understood that reconciliation was nonnegotiable if prayer was to be accepted and effective.

In chapter 8, Kreider explores the picture of early Christian communities related to us through the third-century Syrian *Didascalia Apostolorum*. The *Didascalia* reiterates the essential role of peace as a

precondition for worship and prayer. However, from the bishops' point of view, maintaining the peace increasingly resembled top-down control of the community. During the third century, it became evident that Christianity was gradually taking a turn toward greater indigenization, "making it more like the patriarchal Greco-Roman society" (p. 105). Communal evening meals were replaced by more formal morning services with tokenized elements, and in which the words spoken became increasingly monopolized by male clergy rather than shared by all in attendance. The worshipers no longer sat facing each other, but rather they began to sit in rows with women made to sit by themselves farthest from the bishops and presbyters—an arrangement "which can lead to a habitus of anonymity and inequality" (p. 192). This transition is reflected in the *Didascalia's* frustration regarding the activities of widows: they wandered between houses, interacting with others and sometimes receiving direct financial support. The widows also engaged in ministry by laying on hands and praying for people, as well as baptizing new converts. They were "uncoordinated, unauthorized, and out of control" (p. 238). In reaction, the *Didascalia* restricted the ministry of widows to the home "where they prayed and weaved wool under the authority of the bishops and presbyters" while their earlier roles of "visitation and outreach" were delegated to deaconesses. As Kreider tells us, "By the late fourth century, when women were still in the churches they were unequivocally under the authority of men...Their evangelistic verve and compassionate caregiving, so much a part of the life of the earlier Christians, had been stifled" (p. 106).

The *Didascalia* also reflects the shift in the focus of catechesis from the more difficult and lengthy task of developing Christlike behavior to the relatively quick and painless job of instilling orthodox belief—a transition from patience to expediency for the purposes of attracting and placating converts from the aristocracy (p. 239). The most famous of these was, of course, the emperor Constantine, the focus of chapter 9. To avoid the trouble of reforming his habitus, Constantine chose not to become a

catechumen or to be baptized until days before his death. Despite the best efforts of the theologian Lactantius, who in the *Divine Institutes* urged Constantine to rule with Christian patience by caring for the poor, rejecting all forms of killing, and defending religious liberty, Constantine chose to do things his own way. Constantine asserted that there was more than one type of habitus a Christian could adopt: he made exceptions for war, torture, capital punishment, religious coercion, and he even arranged for the executions of his son Crispus and his wife Fausta. From his impatient point of view, Christianity was to be advanced instrumentally through the power of the state, valuing "numbers more than lifestyle, rationality more than habitus" (p. 268). The shift in catechesis from behavior to orthodox belief became more entrenched under Constantine, thereby effecting the conversion of ambitious, impatient people to Christianity while converting Christianity from a nonviolent religion to one that allowed for anything deemed urgently necessary.

Constantine's influence also accelerated the widening gulf between clergy and laity, as bishops, "courted by the court, found it hard to keep their values or their habitus intact" (p. 279). Kreider imagines that the elevated social standing of clergy also made it increasingly difficult for them "to keep their biblical exegesis sound and their theological thinking straight" (p. 279), thereby introducing us in chapter 10 to the novel definition of Christian patience articulated by Augustine. Although not entirely without its merits, Augustine's *On Patience* was likely written "to justify his own impatience" (p. 283), using "love" to "justify strong-armed policies—state-imposed fines, confiscation, and exile—that seemed urgently necessary to him" to combat "heresy" (p. 285). Beginning with Constantine and continuing under Augustine, we witness the development of a two-tiered Christian ethic: patience was only for those specially called to religious vocation, not for laypeople. It was not only permissible, but also desirable, according to Augustine, for political rulers to exercise force in pursuing such "Christian ends" as an empire unified by faith (p. 295). As Kreider points out, Augustine's perspective was the

fruit of unchecked indigenization: it was concerned only with an inward disposition, not behavior, and so "patience no longer functioned...as a countercultural habitus to be formed by catechesis" (p. 290).

This book tells the story of how the Christian habitus transformed during the first four centuries "from patient ferment" to "impatient force," which has led many to the not-unwarranted "assumption that...in its essence Christianity is violent, and that Christian mission—however loving its professed intentions—is essentially an exercise in imperialism" (p. 296). If we Christians wish to reclaim our "lost bequest" of patient nonviolence, Kreider counsels, then our response must be a patient one: to seek "the reformation of our habitus by the work of the Holy Spirit and by catechesis rooted in the teaching and way of Jesus" (p. 296). In an environment in which Christian worship services are often designed to be "seeker-sensitive," in which missions and evangelism are pursued with instrumentality, in which the number of new converts who pray the sinner's prayer is considered more important than either character formation or theological instruction, it seems, not surprisingly, that American evangelical Christians have fully embraced the two-tiered ethic of Constantine and Augustine in their approach toward politics and their favored politicians. As white Protestants, including evangelicals, are on the decline in America's religious landscape,¹ their instinctive response seems to be an increased focus on evangelism in both the street and the sanctuary, as well as an increase in political activism with the goal of "putting God back in government/our schools/society" via legislation.

However, Kreider's study indicates that this approach, much like Augustine's desperate and incontinent grasping for control (p. 290), is self-defeating, just as Tertullian and Lactantius observed of all violence. Augustine's sense of urgency in combating heresy gave way to concessions and compromises, "practical measures" that he deemed

¹ "America's Changing Religious Identity," Public Religion Research Institute, published September 6, 2017, <https://www.prrri.org/research/american-religious-landscape-christian-religiously-unaffiliated/>.

permissible due to extenuating circumstances—but these "exceptions" always become the norm—*habitus* (p. 295, note 66). Thus the very nature of Christianity has changed—the salt has lost its saltiness, and is now good for nothing (Mt 5:13). Accordingly, it is self-destructive for Christians to utilize impatient means, such as government force, to accomplish what they believe to be godly goals. The ends and means are inseparable: the only way to achieve God's purposes is to truly be remade in the image of Christ, who did not draw a distinction between God's Word and his own behavior, but rather embodied it completely.

Kreider's metaphor of fermentation is borrowed from scripture: Jesus uses the analogy of yeast to explain the growth of both the kingdom of heaven as well as the toxic teachings of the Pharisees (Mt 13:33; 16:5-12). In microbiology, fermentation is the process by which certain microorganisms, deprived of oxygen, metabolize glucose. Because it's not as efficient as respiration, the growth is slower and more subtle—at first, but as these organisms can thrive without oxygen, they are capable of working their way throughout the entire medium, changing its character as they go: "A little yeast leavens the whole batch of dough" (Gal 5:9, NRSV). An invisible process that takes place on the microscopic level and beneath the surface, it only becomes evident as the organisms produce gas that creates cracks and fissures in the agar, or causes the bread to rise and the beer to bubble, meanwhile altering the pH or alcohol content of their environment. Just as the type of yeast determines whether you end up with an ale or a lager, so also imperceptible factors have huge potential to change our character without our conscious awareness of it. We might interpret Jesus's warning at Matthew 16:5-12 thus: If we aren't vigilant, the yeast of the world will find its way in and slowly transform Christians' *habitus* of patience back to our former impatient, violent *habitus*. Not surprisingly, we discover, Jesus's admonition was lamentably prescient. Yet this book provides a message of hope – hope that despite all outward appearances, there is still a remnant whose task is to remain true to their

calling, and God is using them to work beneath the surface, to change hearts and minds and save the world.


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Thomas R. Blanton IV and Raymond Pickett, eds. *Paul and Economics: A Handbook*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017. Pp. Xxxvi + 437. ISBN 978-1506406039. Paperback. \$39.00

Paul's social world, often thought to be buried or irrelevant, has begun to rise to the very top of New Testament scholarship. And the issue of the ancient economy is not simply an issue of monetary policy. Rather, in the case of *Paul and Economics* (hereafter *P&E*), we have explorations of slave labor, the reality of the scarcity of resources, Paul's collection, and the variegated characteristics of ancient methods of travel.



The stated goal of the editors of *P&E* is aptly and succinctly stated:

Taken together, the essays in this volume aim to lay a foundation and a framework for further exploration of the role of economic factors in the interpretation of Paul's letters and the formation and development of the assemblies (xxxv).

As with all edited volumes, there are essays of great value and essays of lesser value; such is the natural order of things in scholarship where more than two minds are brought together. I will first offer a brief survey of the work as a whole by focusing on each individual essay, followed by commendations and criticisms of the work as a whole, focusing specifically on several key areas that I believe to be either under-developed or over-stated in the book.

David B. Hollander, after his survey of various economic factors within the ancient Roman economy, concludes that the profits of the Roman economy were largely beneficial to Roman citizens. To those who were further away from Rome, there was greater paucity within the population. Hollander's detailed survey of labor and supply and demand

add to the credibility of his conclusion: “the Roman economy disproportionately benefited Roman citizens rather than the population of the empire as a whole” (p. 21). In a comparable manner, John T. Fitzgerald explores the activities of eating and drinking Roman social perspective. More precisely, Fitzgerald details the types of food and drink available to the poor among the various parts of the Roman Empire, which opens up several fresh interpretive avenues for the classic discussion in Rom 14-15 between the “strong” and the “weak” (pp. 241-242).

Jinyu Lui explores the nuances between “urban” poor and “rural” poor in the Roman Empire, with a precise emphasis on the ancient Roman diet and what was needed for survival. Her work explores various types of food and analyzes what was needed for a person to survive hard labor in the ancient setting of Rome. This includes various ways to alleviate Roman impoverishment including begetting children, and begging and reliance upon “the generosity of the passers-by to delay starvation” (p. 53). In essence, the life of the average citizen of Rome may be characterized in terms of “deprivation” (p. 54), and Lui invites scholars to consider further research on the “middling group” and the “poor,” as it relates to upward/downward mobility between socio-economic classes (p. 54-55).

In discussing various aspect of epistemology as it relates to interpreting ancient data, Timothy A. Brookins chapter on the economic profiles Paul's early communities spends a substantial amount of space on the methodology of interpreting facts. He writes, “facts do not speak for themselves, but interpreters speak for the facts” (pp. 58-63, 60). Brookins' assessment of the various “poverty tables” of the ancient world—where various social groups such as the “elites” and other less influential social classes are calculated according to the percentage of the population—is a helpful overview of the various proposals set forth by Peter Oakes, Walter Scheidel, Steven Friesen, and Bruce Longenecker (p. 67-80). The dynamic shifting of these scalar models remains a constant topic of debate amidst those who would desire to rigidly concretize the percentages of these various ancient groups. After Brookins concludes that most of the

population was at “near (at or above) subsistence level” (p. 81). That is, a majority of the population was teetering near, above or below the level of subsistence in the Roman Empire. He then briefly explores where early Pauline co-workers like Phoebe (Rom 16:1-2) and Erastus (1 Cor 16:14-16) would appear in his scalar model, believing that Paul’s churches had a “complete cross-section of society” (86) versus models that would argue that the Pauline churches were enmeshed entirely in poverty. Similarly, Zeba A. Crook contends in his essay “Economic Location of Benefactors in Pauline Communities” that there were perhaps membership fees in the Pauline churches. His work is based on various ancient inscriptions that illuminate his key point, and his essay coincides rather nicely with editor Thomas R. Blanton IV. Blanton’s essay centers on “the economic functions of gift exchange in Pauline communities,” however with minimal dialogue with John Barclay’s work *Paul and the Gift*. In any sense, Blanton’s argument for Paul’s theological reshaping of patronage/reciprocity into what can be called “fictive kinship” (304). Blanton highlights the interplay between theology and mutuality and reciprocity rather starkly and passionately—to sound effect.

Ulrike Roth’s essay “Paul and Slavery: Economic Perspectives” contends that the early Pauline mission was built upon the back of slave labor, prompting what John M.G. Barclay has called “the dilemma of Christ Slave-Ownership” in an influential *New Testament Studies* article. Roth summarizes: “Paul’s approach to the economic exploitation of slaves, and the ways in which the apostle sought to benefit from the slave-system at large, is likely to have been a systematic feature behind his missionary success” (p. 179).

Other contributors include Richard A. Horsley who investigates Paul’s motivations for declining or accepting financial assistance, believing that Paul was inconsistent in how he applied his trade (pp. 120-121), but this was often on the basis of “community formation” (p. 121). In a more direct socio-exegetical manner, Neil Elliott focuses in on the Lord’s Supper in 1 Cor 11:17-34. He writes in the end, based on other elements

woven throughout *P&E* and liberation theology (pp. 246-252), that Paul “wishes to safeguard in the Corinthian assembly a meal practice that embodies a shared mutuality among its participants” (p. 274).

Annette Weissenrieder, in an exceptional essay, digs into the archeological strata of the ancient Roman Empire—particularly in Corinth—and offers a resolution that perhaps the early Pauline communities met in the Appolloneion in Corinth (p. 149). She directly challenges the notion put forth by Edward Adams that the early Pauline communities met in houses, suggesting an alternative point of view that the *ekklesia* was more civically located rather than domestic.

Two further essays are linked thematically later on in *P&E*: John S. Kloppenborg explores Paul's collection for Jerusalem and Cavan Concannon fixes on the elements of ancient travel in the Pauline communities. Kloppenborg argues that “Paul's project” (the collection for the poor) “is transgressive” rather than “subversive” (p. 330). The fact that Paul's collection was ethnically and geographically particularistic underlies the issue of giving to others. For Concannon, the difficulties of intercity travel (pp. 341-344) and the problem of an “objective” Pauline chronology (pp. 338-339, n.25) results in possibilities and only possibilities: that is, “unless we find ways to account for the costs of connectivity, an accurate picture of the diffuse and shifting networks [documented in 2 Cor 9-13] of early Christians will elude us” (p. 358). Hence, Concannon's essay is centered more on epistemology and a critique of “objective” readings.

When it comes to various issues involving colonialism and critiques of capitalism, L.L. Welborn's essay on “Marxism and Capitalism in Pauline Studies” is perhaps the most philosophically dense of the book as a whole. Welborn critiques the capitalist reading of Paul (p. 365) extensively, desiring that an engagement with Marxist thought (typified by the work of Rancière) “may finally make it possible to reclaim from the clutches of capitalist interpreters” (p. 395). Finally, Ward Blanton's concluding essay on “A New Horizon for Paul and the Philosophers” is

attentive to areas of economic distress (9/11; the economic crisis in the United States in 2008: p. 399ff) from a philosophical perspective.

There are several key essays that rise above the rest in terms of quality of argumentation and intellectual investigation. For those desiring a wealth of archeological data, Weissenrieder's essay on various aspects of ancient housing yields substantial results: her idea of potential meeting places for the Pauline churches presses heartily against the notion of the "assembly" being confined to various houses. Similarly, Fitzgerald's work on ancient diets and the economic realities of food in the Roman Empire is worthwhile and sobering, especially for Pauline scholars. Timothy Brookins and his essay on epistemology is also the highlight for this reviewer as he seeks to reorientate epistemology with Pauline studies and human bias, yielding fresh results that press interpreters to recognize their own bias. When he writes, "despite their helpfulness...models cannot substitute for evidence, for they are based on evidence...models are tentative and revisable, and the interpreter must exercise the discipline not to force particularized data through too generalized a grid" (p. 61). More to his point, one ought to exercise a sufficient epistemological humility in relation to this difficult debate.

As for the rest of the book, most helpful are the select bibliographies at the end of each individual entry. Lacking any sort of scripture index and translation of German, however, makes navigating the handbook somewhat vexatious—the untrained audience will have a much more difficult time engaging with the material because of this. There is also significant conceptual and literary overlap, especially as it relates to the work of Steven Friesen. While perhaps unavoidable, it seems curious that Friesen himself—as often as his work is discussed and criticized—is not included as a contributor in this compelling handbook. Other voices like Justin Meggitt, Bruce Longenecker, and John Barclay are engaged with throughout and often critically, but the lack of response and interaction with the other contributors makes *P&E* a tonally narrow literary work.

The notion of an unbiased interpreter of ancient source materials has been rightly challenged; however, there is a rather overt lack of justification provided for Marxist readings of the New Testament by some of the contributors. Simply speaking and writing about power dynamics and issues of oppression does not make for a substantial commentary, nor does using the language excuse someone from providing justification for why he or she is using such language. Language, a major tool of ideology, requires exploration. For instance, Wellborn's essay attempts to draw a parallel between Marx's phrase "religion [is the] groan of the oppressed creature" (p. 365) with Paul's language in Rom 8:22: this parallel is asserted as one that "clearly echoes" (365) Paul's language. What makes this line of thought difficult to accept is the arguments from others in the book (Brookins, in some sense, Concannon in another)—both of whom are quite to criticize objective readings of a text. The assertion by Wellborn on the interpretive certitude reveals that objectivity is a notion some are clearly seeking—despite their own ideological critiques of other perspectives that attempt 'objectivity.'

It is also worth pointing out that the specter of the Capitalist boogeyman remains lodged within the definitional nebulae: the utter lack of providing sources and documentation for this "neoclassical" or "capitalist" reading of Paul suggests that at the heart of several essays is the ideological privilege of engaging with a straw man (c.f. Wellborn, 365ff; Horsley, 95-97). Another element of disagreement centers on the characterization of polar extremes: "neoclassical" economics versus "Marxist" theories. One is either one or the other: there is no room for crossover or nuance. However, just because someone takes theories of power and various dynamics into account (especially as these theories relate to gender and slavery) does not necessarily tie them to the Marxist option. Is a "capitalist" reader of Paul—whatever or whoever that is—unable to understand power dynamics as they relate to gender and class?

As a Christian Libertarian who rejects Marxism as an ideology, I believe my own conviction concerning economic justice and gender

equality is not in conflict. Horsley also argues stridently against what he believes to be the error of a “unified wheat market” and that “neoclassical” (a term Horsley never defines for us) economists “abstract the ‘economy’ from society” (p. 95). A few things should be noted: first, his argument finally concludes that the Roman economy was “political,” not a “market” (96). This assertion—which is a frequent talking point in Horsley’s other work,¹ appears to be a false dichotomy and needlessly separates politics from the market, assuming a static reality versus a more dynamic reality of the ancient Roman economy. It has also been recently refuted by Temin.²

P&E as a work is generally helpful and often incisive insofar as it attempts to propel Pauline scholars toward greater nuance and clarity in discussing the largely lost world of the New Testament—regardless of one’s conviction about Marxism or capitalism being the appropriate worldview for understanding Paul. However, the lack of a “capitalist” or “neoclassical” defender within the book suggests a lack of ideological inclusivity.

For those looking to understand the data and the contours of this discussion from a general Marxist perspective, one can scarcely find a better book. However, there is a general lack of methodological precision on display throughout the work that appears rather uncritical in accepting Marxist theories and talking points (Brookins forceful chapter notwithstanding). As but one example, several indeterminate criticisms are lobbed toward “Neoclassical economics” in a way that lacks nuance or substance (c.f. Horsley, p. 95): one is free to critique all things (and should critique everything!), but more substance would be helpful—not to mention less off-putting to some many readers. In any case, how much one can glean from this largely ideologically homogenous book is dependent upon his or her a priori ideology, which is both a robust

¹ E.g., Richard Horsley, *Covenant Economics: A Biblical Vision of Justice for All* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009).

² Peter Temin, *The Roman Market Economy (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

commendation of the work and perhaps my greatest critique of the book as a whole.


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Dylan Pahman. *Foundations of a Free and Virtuous Society*. Grand Rapids: Acton Institute, 2017. Pp. xiii + 145. ISBN 978-1942503545. Paperback \$14.95.

The Acton Institute is an organization that explores the connection between Judeo-Christian faith and liberty. Research fellow for the Acton Institute, Dylan Pahman, unpacks this connection in his winsome work *Foundations of a Free and Virtuous Society*. This “introductory work of Christian social thought” (p. xi) challenges the often-encountered view that loving thy neighbor in pursuit of economic justice requires, or is best accomplished through, interventionist or even socialist policies. Beginning with a forward by Samuel Gregg, Director of Research at the Acton Institute, *Foundations* goes back to the foundation of creation to ultimately clarify why free markets best enable humankind to reflect the creator God as those made in His image (Gen 1:27) and how free markets best enable humanity to live out the calling to “be fruitful and multiply” (Gen 1:28 NRSV).



The forward clearly sets forth the central thesis of this work, “How we understand God, the human person, and human society...will determine much of how we think about everything” (p. vii). From this thesis, this short book (something the author mentions multiple times throughout the work) seeks to “elucidate one common starting point that aims to promote a free and virtuous society” (p. xi). To accomplish this, Pahman divides the work into two parts. Part one consists of three chapters all titled after questions which serve to unpack the central thesis. In part two, the author provides an intellectual exercise asking the reader to imagine a world in which basic economic principles are rejected. Through this exercise

Pahman explores the effects on human flourishing when private property rights, free prices, and just inequality are abandoned.

The introduction plunges the reader into a real-world example that is easily grasped. The author cites the work of economist Victor Claar in examining the impact on human flourishing of the fair-trade coffee movement. Rather than provide a higher standard of living, this movement serves to keep poor farmers in poverty. Pahman grabs the reader's attention by having them reconsider their personal economic behavior and the effects it may have on others. Such thinking begins the examination of how moral motives on their own cannot be the sole basis for economic action; outcomes must be considered. The first three chapters help unpack the claim that a solid understanding of God, human nature, and society (p. xvii) must inform our thinking about economic and social matters.

Chapter one asks the question, "What Does It Mean to Be Human?" (p. 1). In what becomes characteristic fashion throughout the work, the author begins with a pop culture reference, in this instance to a *Calvin and Hobbes* comic strip. This comic points to what could be considered the somewhat absurd notion that humanity reflects God's image. In what way can humanity possibly reflect the omniscient, omnipotent, creator God? Ultimately, the author reveals, through an examination of Genesis 1-3, that we reflect God as rational, creative, and free beings but unlike God are corrupted by sin and death. Pahman asserts that rationality and creativity require freedom which he defines simply as "*able to make choices*" (p. 5). How then is freedom exercised in relation to others?

The following chapter looks at the question, "What Is Society?" (p. 25). As the previous chapter began with a pop culture reference, chapter two begins with humor which also characterizes the writing style of Pahman in *Foundations*. Pahman begins by noting that other people challenge our concepts and comforts which can be "a bit annoying, to be honest" (p. 25). While the previous chapter focused on Genesis 1, this chapter looks at what Genesis 2 says about how we are to live with others. Abraham

Kuypers' idea of "sphere sovereignty" comes to the fore in this chapter to reveal how human freedom should be lived out in community. This notion is reflected in Pahman's definition of society which is "*human persons in communities, within spheres, under just laws, for the common good*" (p.28). Each facet of this definition is further unpacked in the chapter.

The final chapter of part one, chapter three, seeks to "demystify and similarly destigmatize some basic economic principles and business practices that have unjustly acquired bad reputations" (p. 51). Here Pahman introduces the term "Economish" (p. 51) which he uses to refer to economic-specific terms. An example of what Pahman refers to as "Economish" is "division of labor" which he equates with "teamwork" (p. 59). Pahman therefore clarifies economic theory using layman's vocabulary. Reflecting Leonard Read's well-known work, *I, Pencil*, the author looks at what went into producing the very book the reader holds. From lumberjacks felling trees to the shipment of the final product, this example reveals all that goes into production and gives insight into the concept of division of labor. Chapter three wraps up with a clear summary of why free markets go hand-in-hand with Christian anthropology. Pahman notes, "Free markets are open markets...where people are best able to freely cultivate creation for the provision of human needs, for the good of their neighbors and themselves, and for the glory of God" (p. 71).

Part two, consisting of chapters four and five, poses the question "What If?" (p. 75). By this Pahman means, what if we did not have private property, profits, free prices, money, trade, technology, inequality, the rule of law, and free markets (p. 82)? The examples used, often with explicit reference to North Korea or Venezuela, hit home the idea that basic economic tenets are essential to living out our calling as those created in God's image made to be fruitful and multiply. The unifying theme of part two is Bastiat's notion of the "seen and unseen."¹ Pahman applies this concept to the Fall recorded in Genesis 3 writing, "this ...was the

¹ See Frédéric Bastiat, "That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Not Seen," in Bastiat, *The Bastiat Collection*, 2nd ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007), 1.

mistake of the man and the woman in the garden. God, being a good economist, foresaw the long-term effect of eating from the tree: death” (p. 81). All the “what ifs” of part two are unified by this theme. Ultimately, the second part of *Foundations* conveys the truth that helping one’s neighbors, particularly the poor, requires the factoring of unseen consequences of economic actions or policies. The author notes, “Considering the poor, however, requires *seeing* [emphasis added] more than the apparent, immediate gains of policies intended to help them” (p. 96). The general welfare and the dignity of people is best advanced or upheld when basic economic tenets are appreciated and lived-out by stewards of God’s creation.

While indeed a little book, *Foundations of a Free and Virtuous Society* offers readers a powerful, applicable, humorous, and easy-to-understand introduction to “Christian social thought...without steamrolling over the prudential insights of economic science” (p. 136). Pahman accomplishes this introduction through solid exegesis, explicit definition of terms, and a winsome writing style that is able to reach an audience as diverse as Advanced Placement high school students to students in PhD programs.

This work contributes to the discussion of faith and liberty by providing a brief account of what liberty means for a healthy society, while providing clear definitions and appropriate depth of analysis when necessary. Thus, *Foundations* can edify a high school student struggling with how best to serve the poor of their city or PhD students in Systematic Theology who may understand Calvin’s *Institutes of the Christian Religion* inside and out, but who through myopia have never contemplated their duty as Christians in the field of economics. Masters-level students in theology and ministry especially benefit from reading this work because of its synthesis of theological and economic truths. However, any Christian who desires to integrate God-honoring economic thinking into their life will derive value from this work.

To reach a variety of readers, the style in which Pahman wrote *Foundations* includes various literary devices including effective use of

questions. Throughout the text, Pahman uses a question–answer formula that addresses common concerns or objections as they arise in the text. Often, the very questions that come to mind are immediately addressed which helps the reader process the material. End-of-chapter discussion questions are also present. These questions either cause readers, in groups or on their own, to reconsider aspects of what was addressed. The author developed questions that challenge his definitions and assertions in what seems a desire to promote authentic engagement with the work and not simply rephrase what has been said in the best possible light.

At times, *Foundations* contained somewhat distracting or potentially misleading information. Repeatedly referencing the brevity of the book, particularly toward the beginning (pp. viii, ix, xii, xviii, 2), served to distract and even question the value of what was being communicated. This introduced some doubt about whether it was worth continuing to read the book. The length of the book is evident to the reader, so repeated mention of its brevity is unnecessary at best.

Pahman begins part two by stating that it will cover truly basic concepts in economics with which “for the most part, both the left-leaning Progressive Policy Institute and the libertarian Cato Institute would be in agreement” (p. 78). However, I question the extent to which this is truly the case. Considering the economists/philosophers cited (Frédéric Bastiat p. 81, Adam Smith pp. 92, 114, and Friedrich Hayek p. 97) and assertions made from the basic economic concepts, it is hard to see how this could be. An example is Pahman’s claim that economist Paul Krugman would agree in large part with his assertions (p. 78). In the last chapter, Pahman writes, “my inclination is to think that unfettered markets is something we need more of, not less” (p. 127). However, considering Krugman’s positions on regulations and legislation such as the Affordable Care Act, I wonder to what extent someone like Krugman would truly agree with the

basic tenet of “free markets” as unpacked by Pahman.² *Foundations* clearly approaches basic concepts from a free-market perspective. The intended audience, which is quite broad and may be unfamiliar with these people or concepts, would benefit from a more precise reference to the backgrounds of the individuals cited or positions held.

I highly recommend *Foundations of a Free and Virtuous Society* as an introductory text on the role of free markets in promoting the well-being and dignity of individuals and society. By following an exegetically-sound examination of Holy Scripture, Pahman reveals how we may more effectively love others and bring God glory, as those made in His image (Gen 1:27) and those who seek to be “fruitful and multiply” (Gen 1:28 NRSV). This work helps us see how we may best serve the poor and fulfill the mandate of Genesis 1.

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
² Krugman’s resistance to a more open market in the area of health care is often seen in his regular *New York Times* column. See Paul Krugman, “The Plot Against Health Care,” *New York Times* (May 31, 2018; accessed December 6, 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/opinion/republicans-health-care.html> and Paul Krugman, “Get Sick, Go Bankrupt, and Die,” *New York Times* (September 3, 2018, accessed December 6, 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/midterms-healthcare-bankrupt.html>.

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Mark Spitznagel. *The Dao of Capital: Austrian Investing in a Distorted World.* Hoboken: Wiley, 2013. Pp. xxix + 332. ISBN 978-1-118-34703-4. Hardcover. \$29.95.

Investing¹ is a favorite topic of Austro-Libertarians,² and with good reason: those who adhere to the economic framework of the Austrian School and a political ethic of individual liberty often find themselves seeking practical applications of their knowledge. In short, they want to make more money while increasing their personal freedom.

But as many have found out the hard way, understanding praxeology does not necessarily translate into profits. Entrepreneurship and investing are risky endeavors, and the unwary or overconfident may find themselves bankrupt despite their economic knowledge. Keynes is attributed as saying, “The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.” Regardless of its source, the wisdom is sound: economic knowledge can be a significant *disadvantage* in investing, insofar as it may lead the investor to predict certain (eventual) events far before their time. However, this does not mean that it is prudent to simply ride the waves of market uncertainty with the masses. Austro-Libertarian hedge fund manager Mark Spitznagel asserts that a proper understanding of economics *can* help guide investors, provided their knowledge is placed in its proper framework.



¹ This essay discusses investments in the context of a book review. Nothing written here should be construed as professional investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Readers are encouraged to consult their own legal and financial advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

² *I.e.*, libertarians sympathetic to Austrian economics.

This thesis is the subject of *The Dao of Capital*. The book was published in 2013 and is not a Christian work in any sense—some of its philosophical precepts are arguably un-Christian—but the practical relevance of the subject matter for Austro-Libertarian Christians makes it suitable to consider.

The first thing which stands out is the formidable list of endorsements from respected scholars, executives, and investors, including Ron Paul (who wrote the foreword), Steve Forbes, David Stockman, Lawrence Reed, Victor Niederhoffer, and Paul Tudor Jones. Those familiar with Spitznagel's background will recognize his own credibility due to the fact that he is a successful practitioner; he has amassed a significant fortune as an investor and entrepreneur. It is typically wise to take with a grain of salt any investment or business advice from those who are unwilling to risk their own capital, but Spitznagel is no armchair commentator.

Unfortunately, he is also not a professional author, and the language he employs is often so fanciful that the book is unnecessarily complex; the reader will at times find him or herself re-reading sentences to unravel the underlying point Spitznagel is trying to make, obscured by strange phraseology and excessive detail. This is certainly not a major defect, but it is something of which to be aware.

The book is a whirlwind of autobiography, economic history, economic theory, and practical investment advice. Spitznagel opens by quoting wisdom from his mentor, Edward Klipp: if you want to be successful in investing, you must hate to make money and love to lose money. "Klipp's Paradox," as Spitznagel calls it, is the foundation of the Austrian-based investing theory he advocates. The principle is rather simple on the surface: instead of seeking immediate gain, the investor must endure immediate loss so as to achieve greater gains later. Because this runs so contrary to human nature and the tenor of Wall Street, there remains an opening for the small minority who follow this contrarian path to generate immense profits.

The early portions of the book consist of Spitznagel's lengthy exploration of Chinese philosophy—along with copious metaphors from forestry and martial arts—mixed with his own personal history and development into the successful hedge fund manager he is today. He explains how he came to connect his experience as a trader in Chicago with what he eventually learned from the Austrian School.

The middle portions of the book begin to cover proto-Austrian and Austrian economic history, including figures such as Frédéric Bastiat, Carl Menger, Eugen Böhm von Bawerk, and Ludwig von Mises. The sequence with which Spitznagel moves between history, anecdotes, economic theory, metaphors, and practical application can at times seem dizzying, and the reader must trek through about three quarters of the book before really getting to its main point. This hodgepodge approach to the material—specifically how concepts vital to the primary thesis (like the Faustmann Ratio) are sometimes buried within it—is the book's greatest drawback.

The Faustmann Ratio is a concept drawn from the nineteenth century forestry studies of Martin Faustmann, who sought to compare the expected value of a developed parcel of land with its current bare market value (or "replacement value"). If the ratio is greater than 1 (that is, if expected value of developing the land exceeds the bare market value), then the investment is probably sound. Likewise, if the ratio is lower than 1 (if the expected value is less than the bare market value), the investment is probably unsound. This is a rather rudimentary method, but it does get to the heart of quantifying the viability of a long-term investment or capital expenditure (as is required in forestry). Contemporary investment analysis uses the same essential principles with concepts and terms like Discount Rate, Net Present Value (NPV), Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), and Opportunity Cost. Spitznagel modifies the Faustmann Ratio with these modern insights by showing that,

$$\text{Land Expected Value} / \text{Land Replacement Value} = \text{Return on Invested Capital} / \text{Opportunity Cost}$$

In other words, if we invest in something, is the return we expect to gain greater than the gains we forego in the present? The investor must consider what economists call Time Preference, and Spitznagel devotes an entire chapter to this important concept. Humans gravitate towards immediate gratification (high Time Preference), but the greatest gains often come from deferring consumption now for greater consumption later (low Time Preference). A preference for later and greater consumption is linked to higher rates of current production; this results in lower interest because people appear to be saving and more eager to lend money. In contrast, a preference for immediate consumption is linked to less resources left over for production and higher interest because there appears to be less money to lend. Those who want to reap great gains must be willing to forego present consumption with the intended goal of greater consumption later.

But Time Preference isn't always consistent, especially when extrapolated over a long timeline. Delays have a greater psychological impact in the short term than they do over the long term. Over the course of a long delay, the waiting still decreases the psychological value of the expected payoff, but the rate of decrease does lessen the longer the wait goes on, and Faustmann's calculation of expected value can be modified to account for this.

The most important concept Spitznagel discusses is what he calls the Misesian Stationarity Index (or MS Index), derived from the principles of the great Austrian economists. The MS Index is essentially an Austrian-branded version of the Equity Q Ratio devised by James Tobin in 1969, which is itself another way of looking at the Faustmann Ratio. Tobin's Equity Q Ratio is calculated as,

$$\text{Total U.S. Corporate Equity} / \text{Total U.S. Corporate Net Worth}$$

That is, the ratio has the current valuation of the total U.S. public stock market as the numerator, and the net worth (total assets – total liabilities) of the total U.S. public stock market as the denominator. Spitznagel, illustrating his point through a lengthy metaphor, shows that when the ratio of the total economy is different than 1, there has been a departure from stationarity. The MS Index is therefore a barometer for gauging the stability and rationality of the total economy. A departure from an MS Index of 1 therefore shines light on both potential profits and losses. Economically-literate readers may already recognize that this is really a corollary to the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, grounded in the central bank's manipulation of interest rates across the economy by expanding or contracting the money supply. But the market economy will always self-correct; it will, as Spitznagel writes, eventually return to homeostasis.

The final chapters of the book are the real payoff for the reader interested in practical application. Ironically (or intentionally?), *The Dao of Capital* exemplifies its own argument by taking the reader through the long, roundabout path towards reaping the gains of practical application in making investment decisions. Spitznagel divides his methods into two basic categories, referred to as Austrian Investing I and Austrian Investing II. When the MS Index is significantly above 1 as a result of monetary distortion, the trend is unsustainable and the market will inevitably return to homeostasis. Savers and investors will be dissatisfied with the artificially-low rates of interest pushed down by the inflation of the money supply, and will instead gravitate towards riskier investments to reap more immediate gains. As the cycle accelerates, eventually less capital is left for production, the economy is unable to progress, and investors are forced to liquidate, causing stock prices to plummet.

Comparing total excess returns of the S&P Composite Index (arguably the best gauge of the total U.S. stock market) over the so-called one year "risk free" rate of U.S. Treasury securities across historical data from 1901–

2013, Spitznagel finds statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval that when the MS Index is low, average stock returns are high, and when the MS Index is high, average stock returns are low. Across the same timeline from 1901–2013, he demonstrates that the higher the MS Index, the bigger the subsequent drop in stock price. Just as important, in periods with a low MS Index, bear markets were not much of a concern. In other words, the business cycle caused by central bank monetary distortion is fundamentally predictable (even if it can't be exactly timed). So how does this apply to investing?

The simplest Austrian-informed strategy, according to Spitznagel, is to buy when the MS Index is low (when capital is under-priced) and to sell when the MS Index is high (when capital is over-priced). After selling, the investor can stockpile cash or short-term cash equivalents (Spitznagel specifically mentions one month T-bills, though many Austro-Libertarian investors find the use of Treasury securities both financially and ethically dubious), waiting for the inevitable crash when he or she can swoop in and buy under-priced capital at a steep discount. Eventually, capital prices will rise to over-priced levels again, at which point the investor sells and repeats the process. The fundamental concept is to take the momentum from the manipulation of the market by the central bank and turn that momentum, contra the main stream, towards profit. Spitznagel's strategy, he notes, beats the general stock market by more than 2% annualized. So why doesn't all of Wall Street do this? Because the system is built around immediate gratification; most investors (and for that matter, investment professionals) won't last long enough to ride out a full cycle to its potential when they are getting beat year over year waiting around for the big payoff. Spitznagel rightly reminds the reader that while this sounds simple, it is psychologically and socially demanding.

Spitznagel discusses the so-called Black Swan problem: a philosophical probability question dating back millennia, but popularized in modern financial parlance by Nassim Taleb. A black swan (or "tail event") is an extraordinarily rare event—perhaps previously thought to be

impossible—which is so obscure and in the margins (“tails”) of a probability distribution that it never enters into the calculation of a financial model. But as Spitznagel shows, the 2008 crisis was actually no black swan; it was expected from the vantage point of the Austrians.

Beyond the aforementioned simple Misesian investment strategy, Austrian Investing I (“Tail Hedging”)³ involves the use of options. An option is a derivative security⁴ giving the holder the “option” to buy (“call option”) or sell (“put option”) a specific security at a specific price (“strike price”). For example, when the MS Index is high, an investor might purchase put options against an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) which tracks the S&P Composite Index, giving them the right to sell the ETF at a price far below its current market price. If the market price crashes below the strike price before the option expires, the investor can exercise the option, sell their ETFs at the strike price, and pocket the difference. He or she then has additional cash to deploy, buying up under-priced assets at a steep discount during the bear market. Of course, purchasing options costs money up front, and as long as the underlying security remains artificially over-valued, the investor will appear to be losing and their options appear worthless; the strategy depends on following the long-term, roundabout path towards gain.

While Austrian Investing I is a macroeconomic strategy, Austrian Investing II is micro, focusing on specific companies with a high Return On Invested Capital. Spitznagel calculates⁵ ROIC as,

$$\text{Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) / Invested Capital}$$

The savvy Austrian investor/entrepreneur, expecting that there is more value to be extracted from future business growth, reinvests the business’

³ Because the business cycle is predictable, Spitznagel notes the name is somewhat of a misnomer since this strategy is not truly a “tail hedge.”

⁴ A derivative is a security where the value is “derived” from the underlying asset to which it is pegged.

⁵ A better-known formula is Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) / Invested Capital

profits into the business itself rather than taking a dividend in the present, thus following the roundabout path towards greater profits later. Furthermore, on a micro level, a well-managed Austrian strategy (or business) is largely immune to the worst aspects of central bank monetary distortion. By not taking on debt at unsustainable levels and growing the business more slowly—reinvesting profits rather than expanding through aggressive borrowing only made possible by central bank inflation—the investor or entrepreneur will at first appear to be losing out to faster-growing companies. However, such a company will be better-positioned to ride out market downturns while competitors find themselves unable to service their immense debt or sustain their over-scaled operations.

Not everyone has the foresight, time, or opportunity to be an entrepreneur, but Austrian Investing II is also accessible to those who buy (in whole or in part) existing companies with a high ROIC and low Faustmann Ratio (of Market Capitalization / Net Worth). The reason for preferring a low Faustmann Ratio alongside high ROIC in this scenario is because it indicates the company is very effective at deploying capital, but is not yet priced to reflect its potential (and thus is ripe for massive gains later). Of course, businesses can still fail for a variety of reasons, and so this approach is a general strategy and not a guarantee of success.

The Dao of Capital is far from an introductory investment book or simple how-to guide, and those with little or no prior financial experience will probably find themselves lost in its intricacies, calculations, and terminology. For those who have experience as business owners, executives, traders, investors, or serious students of the market, it provides a very valuable (if at times far too verbose) set of strategies for utilizing Austrian insights in the world of investing and business.


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Bradley J. Birzer. *Russell Kirk: American Conservative.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015. Illustrated. Pp. 574. ISBN 978-0-8131-7527-0. Paperback \$29.95.

The name of the iconic conservative man of letters Russell Kirk (1918-94) is often invoked as the conservative antithesis of libertarianism. This assessment of Kirk is generally made in direct response his two short essays critiquing libertarianism — “Libertarians: Chirping Sectarians” (1981, originally published in *Modern Age*) and “A Dispassionate Assessment of Libertarians” (a 1988 Heritage Foundation lecture). Kirk’s descriptions of libertarianism and libertarians in those essays is both problematic and instructive. “Libertarians” is far better known and more acerbic in tone. The essay asserts that, apart from their mutual opposition to “the totalist state” and “the heavy hand of bureaucracy,” conservatives and libertarians can have “nothing” in common. Calling “genuine libertarians” “metaphysically mad” and concluding with a gratuitous swipe at Murray Rothbard, Kirk’s 1981 essay paints libertarianism with broad brush strokes, failing to acknowledge the various stripes and nuances within the broader libertarian identity.

But in “A Dispassionate Assessment” —not published until 1993— Kirk is initially more cautious. He explicitly distinguishes “ideological libertarians” from “descendants of classical liberals” who call themselves libertarians but “are simply conservatives under another name.” Kirk “approves of” the latter. Regarding “ideological libertarians,” Kirk— whose increasing sympathy with Christianity culminated in his 1963 conversion to Roman Catholicism — repeats the basic criticisms of his 1981 essay, highlighting (among other things) that libertarians recognize “no transcendent moral order” and that (similar to Marxists) they “generally



believe that human nature is good, though damaged by certain social institutions” and pursue an “illusory way to Utopia.” Conservatives, on the other hand, recognize that human nature “is irremediably flawed.”

Paradoxically, readers of *CLR* might argue that Kirk’s essays misrepresent libertarianism even as they find at least some agreement with Kirk’s critiques of certain tenets of a brand of libertarianism that Christian libertarians would disavow. Indeed, at least some self-proclaimed Christian libertarians would comfortably fit among the aforementioned descendants of classical liberals of whom Kirk approved.

That being said, *CLR* readers will find much of interest in Bradley Birzer’s magisterial biography *Russell Kirk: American Conservative*. (Birzer himself is both an active Catholic and a self-identifying libertarian.) Indeed, Birzer’s presentation of Kirk suggests that Christian libertarians ought view Kirk not as an ideological nemesis but rather an ally. Drawing profusely from Kirk’s voluminous published writings and unpublished letters, Birzer’s award-winning biography has already received numerous positive reviews, and I need not repeat their well-founded praises here. Rather, I will discuss how in various chapters Birzer effectively engages Kirk’s religious understanding and Kirk’s lifelong commitment to liberty, the two subjects being inevitably intertwined throughout.

Chapter 1 describes Kirk’s most foundational youthful influences, influences that suggest the origins of Kirk’s enduring intellectual and spiritual concerns. Raised in Plymouth, Michigan in a household that practiced Christian ethics but not religious devotion, Kirk was mentored by his maternal grandfather, a descendent of Puritans whose virtues Kirk described as “more Stoic than Christian” (p. 27). Happily educated in a public school before the influence of Dewey and progressivism became ubiquitous, the boy Kirk read voraciously the fiction of Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, all of whom Kirk would later highlight in his most important book, *The Conservative Mind* (*TCM*, 1953). The writers who most influenced Kirk during his undergraduate studies at Michigan State University were the humanists

Irving Babbit and Paul Elmer More, discussed at length in *TCM*. Not religious but rather championing and embodying the thought and ethics of Socrates, Plato, and Buddha, Babbit emphasized gaining individual virtue and liberty through “rigorous self-denial and discipline” (p. 32). More’s spiritual journey—moving from a humanism in league with Babbit’s to an eventual embrace of orthodox Christianity—resembled Kirk’s, and Kirk later affirmed that More’s writings allowed him “to bring Christian hope to his Platonic and Stoic longings” (p. 42). Going on to earn an M.A. at Duke, Kirk’s master’s thesis—which later became Kirk’s first book—defended the principles of the lesser-known American founder John Randolph of Roanoke, whose agrarian, Stoic, Christian, conservative, and libertarian (all adjectives Kirk used to describe Randolph) perspective largely mirrored Kirk’s own. Upon his return to Michigan in 1941, he eventually found himself, after the U.S.’s declaration of war against the Axis powers, working in the payroll department of the Ford auto plant. The monotony of this position elicited Kirk’s disdain of “the monstrosity Ford had built,” even as Kirk reserved his greatest animosity for U.S. government that Kirk called the “Gestapo” (p. 55).

Chapter 2 chronicles Kirk’s conscripted Army service during World War II, during which Kirk’s views became increasingly libertarian. Stationed in the Utah desert, Kirk read voluminously ancient Stoic writers whose ideas Kirk found profoundly similar to the Christianity he would begin earnestly pursuing the next decade. During this time Kirk also found himself increasingly hostile toward the U.S. government and its domestic allies. Kirk “viewed the government, labor, and corporations as working together to homogenize the world and remake it in the image of the United States,” and his letters and diary entries articulated both his hatred for the New Deal and his belief that Roosevelt and his minions “were worse than Nazis because they practiced oppression under the guise of liberty and equality” (p. 67). In 1945 Kirk also expressed horror at the atomic bombings of Japan, an event he considered “the logical consequence of progressivism,” a doctrine that inevitably leads to

“dehumanization” (p. 86). Also during the 1940s Kirk corresponded with the libertarians and individualists Albert Jay Nock and Isabel Patterson, whose respective 1943 publications *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man* and *The God of the Machine* influenced Kirk deeply. Patterson was especially prominent in Kirk’s 1946 article against conscription. Birzer astutely observes that both Nock and Patterson (with whom Kirk had a falling out in 1951) are discussed favorably in Kirk’s first edition of *TCM* but less so in later editions. Indeed, in his 1954 second edition and subsequent editions, Patterson is omitted, and Kirk does not mention her in his posthumous 1995 autobiography *The Sword of the Imagination*. Nock is also increasingly “marginalized” in later editions of *TCM* (p. 71), although Kirk’s enduring affection for his onetime mentor continued to occasionally manifest itself, particularly in Kirk’s introduction to a 1982 edition of Nock’s biography of Thomas Jefferson.

Chapter 3 observes that Kirk’s intellectual movement away from libertarianism coincided with his doctoral studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, where he discovered and embraced of the writings of Edmund Burke, the author most influential to *TCM*—Kirk’s dissertation. Kirk’s embrace of Burke also coincided with Kirk’s increasingly Christian understanding of humanity and indeed reality:

A real understanding of the being known as “man,” he argued, presumably echoing Burke, must recognize “that original sin and aspiration toward the good” are equally parts of “God’s design.” To know one’s place in the order of existence is to embrace the classical and Christian notions of justice. But one can recognize the good in humans only by first recognizing that “sin is a terribly real and demonstrable fact, the consequence of our depravity.” (p. 108)

Kirk also believed that a rejection of the tested classical and Christian tradition in favor of a new understanding of justice and reality based on reason would inevitably lead to human isolation and tyranny: “To ignore this truth or, equally bad, to dismiss or mock it as many eighteenth-

century Enlightenment thinkers had, Kirk argued, 'leads to a wasteland of withered hopes and crying loneliness, empty of God and man.' Following Plato's argument from *The Republic* through the mind of Burke, he claimed that once reason so called has replaced tradition, the demagogue will almost certainly claim his place as society's ruler" (p. 109), exemplified by Robespierre and, more recently, in Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. Significantly, in a 1953 letter to his publisher, Kirk referred to his libertarian views as something he had "pass[ed] beyond" (p. 83).

Clearly Kirk's acceptance of the Christian tradition, mediated through Burke, made Kirk skeptical and indeed fearful of libertarian thinking, derived as it was from the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century liberalism apart from the transcendent Christian truths and its related virtues and traditions that, by contrast, formed the foundation of the American republic. Birzer's chapter 4 discusses Kirk's increasing identification with Christian humanism. Noting Kirk's 1954 dismissal of liberalism as "a dead thing" (p. 136), Birzer writes that "Kirk saw liberalism as little more than a transitional stage between Christianity and totalitarianism" (p. 137). Quite simply, liberalism derived its defense of liberty from Christianity even as it became lifeless to defend liberty and ultimately undercut liberty itself. Kirk's critique of reason-based liberalism also extended to matters of economic liberty. Writing a year after his 1957 debate with F. A. Hayek, Kirk suggests that Hayek's reasoning is based on "the assumption that if only a perfectly free market economy could be established, all social problems would solve themselves in short order" — an idea that ignores the reality of both human fallibility and humanity's tendency to be unreasonable, and indeed fails to recognize the inextricable connection between the economic, the political, and the moral (p. 159). But Kirk's opposition to Hayek's ideas did not make him an enemy of the free market. Rather, Kirk enthusiastically embraced the writings of the free market Christian humanist economist Wilhelm Röpke, whose vision for a humane economy emphasized a Christian understanding of human nature and humanity's relationship to

God. Kirk's support of Röpke again manifested Kirk's belief that liberty could best be defended from the foundation of Christian tradition.

Similarly, chapter 7 notes that even Kirk's efforts as an unofficial advisor to Senator and eventual 1964 Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater were grounded in Kirk's belief that Goldwater shunned "ideologues" and "ideology," rather "taking his 'first principles of morality' from the Judeo-Christian tradition and his 'first principles of politics' from the U.S. Constitution" (p. 274); moreover, Kirk sought "to infuse Christian humanism into Goldwater's ideas" (p. 277). But Kirk's association with Goldwater—not to mention with William F. Buckley's *National Review*—also suggested a Kirk whose views on foreign policy had grown "increasingly hawkish" during the 1960s. In a 1962 speech that Kirk wrote, Goldwater spoke words that reflected "many conservatives' anti-Communist hawkishness at the time" (p. 279). Warning against pacifism, Goldwater's speech supported the development of the atom bomb, implicitly defending the 1945 bombings of Japan that Kirk once cursed.

In any event, in 1963 Kirk was effectively pushed out of his advisory role and his influence on Goldwater decreased dramatically, and Kirk eventually commenced in writing his second most important book, *The Roots of American Order* (1974). The book was a hefty tome that, following the pattern of T. S. Eliot and Eric Voegelin, "rooted the American order in the symbolic cities of Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, and London" (p. 265). Herein, Kirk wrote that "the most valuable thing in our common inheritance is the Christian religion" (p. 266). By contrast, the greatness of ancient Greece, despite Plato and Aristotle, "failed because as a culture it never really understood the concept of a transcendent, a failure that led to the worship of individual city-states above all things. Their sin was the sin of statism and often the glorification of humans as the highest end of the universe" (p. 266). Here Kirk restates his ubiquitous concern regarding the loss of liberty that must result from rejection of transcendent truth.

Chapter 9 discusses Kirk's ideological and sometimes personal quarrels with both libertarians and neoconservatives. Birzer writes that

Kirk's arguments against libertarians could be "at once detailed and scholarly as well as vindictive and savage" (p. 325). Significantly, Kirk enjoyed friendships and worked closely with prominent libertarians Peter Stanlis and Lawrence Reed, to say nothing of his aforementioned study of the "aristocratic libertarian" Randolph of Roanoke (p. 326). But all these men, we should note, shared Kirk's Christian convictions. By contrast, Kirk believed that "little if anything separated the utilitarian libertarian from the wanton liberal" (p. 326). Kirk's differences with the libertarian fusionist Frank Meyer turned bitter, with Meyer savaging Kirk in a 1955 article in the *Freeman*, calling Kirk's writings "another guise for the collectivist spirit of the age" (p. 327), whereas Kirk himself antagonized Meyer in the pages of *National Review*, for which Meyer also wrote. One may sadly note the irony of the conflict between Kirk and a man whose advocacy of the fusion between traditionalism and libertarianism had perhaps more in common with Kirk's views than Kirk would admit. Adding to this sad irony is the formerly secular Meyer's conversion to Roman Catholicism shortly before his untimely 1972 death. Kirk also clashed with Murray Rothbard. Curiously, however, the two reached a rapprochement in the early 1990s with their mutual opposition to the Iraq Conflict and support of Patrick Buchanan's run for president.

Kirk's positions on these matters coincided with the "increasingly anti-militaristic and anti-interventionist" views of his later years (p. 354). In *The Sword of the Imagination*, Kirk denies that "a single American war—even the war for independence—had been absolutely necessary" (p. 354). He lambasted neoconservative foreign policy and argued that George H. W. Bush, whose 1988 candidacy Kirk supported, was continuing a destructive interventionist progressivism in the vein of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. Kirk lamented that Bush's "'new world order' would impose a 'religion of democracy'" that would waste resources and incite hatred against the U. S. Warning against imposing "democratic capitalism," Kirk reminded his audiences that

“[c]apitalism was an economic system, not an originator of virtue or vice that had a transcendent source” (p. 356).

Birzer’s wide-ranging book implicitly analyzes Kirk’s thought with relation to libertarianism, and it invites a libertarian, and certainly a Christian libertarian, reevaluation of Kirk’s writings and ideas. The work pays special attention to how Kirk grounded his views on individual liberty and the state on his convictions regarding the transcendent truths of Christianity, including his regular emphases on human imperfection and sinfulness. Indeed, if a legitimate criticism of Kirk’s critiques of libertarianism is that they are guilty of hasty generalizations that suggest an inadequate understanding and appreciation of broader strains of libertarian thought, perhaps an equally valid criticism of libertarians is that they haven’t read Kirk’s writings closely enough, if at all. (Indeed, Kirk reasonably speculated that Meyer had never actually read *TCM*.) For Christian libertarians especially, such a neglect would be indeed unfortunate, for Kirk’s writings offer a well-developed rationale, based on Christian tradition, for limited government, the illegitimacy of war and imperialistic adventures, a critique of socialism, and the ever-present threat of totalitarianism in the guise of democracy at home. Birzer offers a generous and expertly presented discussion of Kirk’s various writings within a context that provides the Christian libertarian a profitable perspective on these writings. Birzer inspires a deeper investigation of Kirk’s works, an investigation that will not elicit full agreement throughout but will, I dare suggest, call to mind Jesus’ admonition that “the one who is not against us is for us.”

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